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1. Introduction 
 
Objectives and rationale 
The objective of this case study is to investigate EU Cohesion policy performance and 
communication in Scotland and the impact on citizensǯ attitudes to the EU. The case study also 
contextualises comparative COHESIFY research findings and provides more in-depth insights into 
the performance and communication of Cohesion policy. 
The case study focuses on two ERDF and two ESF Operational Programmes in 2007-13 (covering 
two programme areas of the Highlands and Islands, and the Lowlands and Uplands of Scotland) and 
Scotland-wide ERDF and ESF Operational Programmes in 2014-20.  
The selection criteria for the case study included Cohesion policy eligibility and financial intensity, 
programme type, governance system and European identity.   
x Funding and eligibility. In 2007- ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ 
 	 ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  	 ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ The funds were implemented through four 
programmes in two distinct programme areas covering the Highlands and Islands, as a less-
 ȋǮǯȌ region; and the Lowlands and Uplands, a more developed 
ȋǮǯȌǤ	 ? ? ? ? -20 programming period, 
Scotland was allocated relatively higher EU funding of  ? ? ? ?ǡ
 	 ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ  	 ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ  The programme architecture was rationalised by 
reducing the programmes to two Scotland-wide programmes, within which the Highlands 
and Islands region is incorporated as a transition region. 
x Governance. Scotland is a part of the United Kingdom enjoying a relatively high degree of 
autonomy. In 1999, legislative powers were devolved to a reconstituted Scottish Parliament. 
The Scottish Government is the devolved government for Scotland and has a range of 
responsibilities including the economy, education, health, justice, rural affairs, housing, 
environment, equal opportunities, consumer advocacy and advice, transport and taxation. 
The government was established also in 1999 as the Scottish Executive under the Scotland 
Act 1998, which created a devolved administration for Scotland in line with the result of the 
1997 referendum on Scottish devolution. The Scottish Government has been the Managing 
Authority for the ERDF and ESF programmes in both analysed programming periods. In 
relationship with the EU, although the UK government performs a monitoring role to 
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ensure that devolved governments implement EU policy, the Scottish Government enjoys 
considerable discretion in policy implementation. 
x EU attitudes and identity. Scotland is a generally pro-EU region in UK-wide terms, at least 
in terms of EU membership attitudes given that a large majority of 62 percent voted to 
Remain in the EU during the 2016 referendum vote. At the same time, however, two thirds 
of people in Scotland are sceptical about the EU (Curtice 2017). Various studies have shown 
that Scots are capable of accommodating multiple identities, which are not mutually 
exclusive. Nevertheless, European identity is lower relative to UK and EU averages, and 
there is a very strong regional Scottish identity.  
x Implementation settings. COHESIFY analysis of the regional relevance of EU policies, 
examining the objective vulnerability, receptivity and desirability of EU policies, from the 
point of view of the structural development situation, needs and challenges of regions, 
along with the analysis of relations between the features of territories, their receptiveness 
to EU policies and the perceptions of the EU and EU Cohesion policy, resulted in the 
development of territorial typologies, which also served the basis for the case study 
selection. Analysis of regional policy implementation settings classified most of Scotland in 
an appropriate policy (i.e. match between real and perceived needs) and Eurosceptic 
context (i.e. the good quality of institutions is not matched with a widespread support to EU 
institutions), whereas North-Eastern Scotland Ȃ in an unrequested policy (i.e. mismatch 
between real and perceived needs) in a Eurosceptic context (Capello and Perucca 2017). The 
analysis of European identification in EU regions based on two dimensions Ȃ ǯ
of the EU and their attachment to the EU Ȃ using Eurobarometer data showed that a 
negative image prevails in all parts of Scotland although the majority of citizens feel 
attached ȋ¦owski et al. 2017)1.  
Methodology 
In addition to secondary and primary resources for the desk-based analysis, the case study is based 
on the following original data:  
Stakeholder survey 
ǯspring Ȃ summer of 2017. The survey was sent to 
152 stakeholders, involved in ESI Funds during the 2007-13 and 2014-20 programming periods, 
including (i) Monitoring Committee members: stakeholders involved in the management and 
monitoring of operational Programmes, including Managing Authorities, implementing bodies, 
associations of local authorities or businesses, economic and social partners, education institutions, 
civil society organisations and NGOs; (ii) local state authorities: stakeholders involved in the delivery 
of EU projects as project promoters at the local level, (iii) and other economic development 
stakeholders. The response rate was 21 percent (or 32 respondents, out of which 14 incomplete  and 
18 complete responses) and the completion rate was 12 percent (or 18 complete responses), as 
shown in Table 37 in Annex 1. 
Stakeholder interviews 
Interviews were conducted with 18 stakeholders representing the Managing Authority (including 
the Communication officer), economic and social partners, civil society organisations, local 
governments and local authority associations, and implementing partners at regional level. Most of 
the interviews were carried out between June and August 2017, while two interviews took place in 
December 2017 and January 2018. (see Annex 2 for more details).  
                                                                    
1 In this type, on average 40% of respondents declared to be attached to the EU, 34% not very attached (differentiating value), and 22% 
not at all attached. 
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Focus groups 
In the case study of Scotland, 15 participants (7 female and 8 male) took part in 3 focus groups in the 
city of Glasgow. The groups included between 4-6 participants, and were homogenous per age 
cohort (19-41, 26-42, and 57-65 respectively). The first two groups had a relatively even gender 
balance. While the third group had a stronger male representation (4 males, 1 female), this did not 
hinder the level of engagement by the female participant in the discussion. The majority of 
participants were residents in Glasgow and were British citizens. One Scottish participant was a 
resident from the Scottish city of Aberdeen, and two participants were from Sweden and Bulgaria 
although studying or working in Glasgow. 
The majority of participants were recruited through the COHESIFY citizen survey, which asked a 
random sample of respondents living in Scotland to provide a contact telephone number if they 
were willing to participate in a focus group discussion on the topic of EU funding and attitudes to 
the EU. This method allowed the recruitment of 9 participants. The remaining 6 participants were 
recruited through snowball sampling using professional and personal networks. A payment of £25 
was made to each participant as an incentive to participate. (see Table 38 and Table 39 in Annex 1 
for more details).  
Citizen survey 
The analysis also draws on the results of a citizen survey of citizens in Scotland, which asked a 
representative sample of 500 citizens about their awareness and perceptions of Cohesion policy as 
well as their attitudes to and identification with the EU (Borz et al. 2017). 
Structure of the case study  
The case study is structured as follows. The contextual scene is set in the next section by reviewing 
the socio-economic and political background including public opinion on the EU, territorial identity 
issues and political context. It then proceeds to the analysis of the implementation and 
ǡǡǯeys and interviews. The 
analysis of the communication aspects follows in terms of the effectiveness of communication 
strategies and wider media framing of Cohesion policy, based on desk research, surveys, interviews 
and media framing analysis. Public perceptions of Cohesion policy and the impact of Cohesion 
policy on identification with the EU are reviewed in the final sections, drawing on policymaker 
surveys and interviews, the citizen survey and focus group results. The key findings are summarised 
in the conclusion including the policy implications and recommendations stemming from the case 
study. 
2. Context and background 
 
2.1 EU attitudes and identity 
 
Early studies on European identity suggest that Scots hold multiple territorial identities with 
Scottish being the most prominent, followed by British and then European (Huici et al 1998; Grundy 
and Jamieson 2005; see also Moreno 2006). Comparative analysis of Scotland with other UK and 
European regions highlights the stronger regional identity and relative lower levels of European 
identity in Scotland (Huici et al 1998; Grundy and Jamieson 2005; Guibernau 2006). Despite the 
common notion of Scotland being a relatively  Ǯ-ǯregion compared to other UK 
regions, the share of people in Scotland feeling European is similar or lower than in Britain as a 
whole. In 2007, around one in ten people saw themselves as European Ȃ much the same as Britain as 
a whole (Mahendran and McIver, 2007). In 2014, just 9 percent of people in Scotland described 
  Ǯǯǡ    ? ?  in Britain (Ormston 2015). According to 
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ScotCen Social Research data2, less t ?Ǯǯ
political identity if forced to choose.  
By contrast, a recent survey asking respondent about their level of identification with each 
territorial level (i.e. not requiring a choice between levels) shows that Scottish people feel 
noticeably less British and more European than English or Welsh counterparts, according to data 
from the British Election Study in 2016 (Pattie and Johnson 2017). As for relative priority attached to 
different levels of ǡ  Ǯǯ territorial 
identities, as is common across the EU. When contrastinǯǡ
  Ǯǯ    ǡ  y higher than their average 
Ǯǯ  Ȃ 52 percent of Scots report feeling more British than European (Pattie and 
Johnston, 2017). The regional Scottish identity is in relative terms the strongest. As noted, the 
feeling of regional identity also is significantly higher in Scotland than England. In England, most 
  Ǯ   ǯǡ while       Ǯ 
ǯǮǯȋMoreno 2006, Pattie and Johnston 2017; Ormston 2015). 
Socio-demographic determinants of European identity include gender, profession, education and 
political leaning, with higher levels of European identity found among males, managerial and 
professional occupations, graduates, those aged under 65, and Liberal Democrat and Labour party 
supporters (Ormston 2015). The impact of European or regional identity upon support for the EU or 
EU membership is contested. One of the earliest studies found evidence of a positive relationship 
between European identity and perceived EU benefits but, contrary to expectations, no relationship 
was between European identity and regional/Scottish identity (Huici et al 1998), although the study 
was based on a student sample rather general population. A study of young Scottish adults whose 
study or work orients them to Europe found that the main factor shaping their European identity 
was transnational exchanges with fellow Europeans including friendships, shared experiences, 
emotions and communication (Grundy and Jamieson 2007). 
Turning more specifically to EU attitudes, Scotland is generally a more pro-EU region than English 
regions, as reflected in the EU referendum vote where a large majority of 62 percent voted to 
Remain in the EU. In 2014, Scottish attitudes to EU membership showed a positive balance of 
ǡ ?ǣ ?Ǯǯ 
Ȃ as compared to that of around 1:1 in England (Henderson et al. 2016, based on Future of England 
Survey 2014). The analysis of EU referendum voting intention over the period May 2015 Ȃ March 
2016 equally demonstrated a consistently and significantly more pro-European stance of Scottish 
respondents (average of 65.6 percent pro-Remain in Scotland against 50.4 percent in England) 
(Henderson et al. 2016). A 2014 survey on wider attitudes showed that respondents from Scotland 
were relatively less negative about the EU and European cooperation on all aspects covered, 
ranging from specific personal benefits stemming from free movement to the promotion of 
democratic values and cultural affinity (Henderson et al. 2016). 
Historical data shows that Scotland has not always been more pro-European than other UK regions 
(see Figure 1). During the mid-1970s more respondents in England expressed a positive view of the 
EEC than was the case in Scotland, the pro- Ǯǯ
being more sustained in England than Scotland. Evidence well into the 1980s is that a larger 
proportion of respondents in Scotland than England held a negative view of the EU (Henderson et al. 
2016). However, from the late 1980s the rank order of attitudes to European integration had 
reversed, and the balance of opinion became relatively more positive in Scotland than in England 
(Henderson et al. 2016) Ȃ a trend largely maintaining over time until the present day.3 
                                                                    
2 http://whatscotlandthinks.org/questions/forced-choice-national-identity-5  
3 In UK-wide terms, a spike of positive attitudes towards Europe associated with the EEC referendum was evident in the mid-1970s. From 
a negative balance of views in the early 1980s, until the early 1990s a steadily increasing proportion of the population saw Ǯǯ 
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Figure 1: EU: good thing or bad thing? England, Northern Ireland and Scotland 
 
Source: Henderson et al. (2016) 
More positive EU attitudes in Scotland than England are also reported in Eurobarometer and Social 
Attitudes data. In 2006, significantly more Scottish respondents agreed that working conditions in 
the UK are better due to EU membership (60 percent compared to the UK average of 51 percent). 
Marginally more Scottish respondents felt that the EU increased business opportunities and provided 
more opportunities to live, work and study in another country (80 percent, compared to 78-79 percent 
in the UK). A majority of UK respondents remained more Eurosceptic and were inclined to disagree 
   Ǯ         ǯ  Ǯ    
ǯǤ 
Looking at trends over time, Euroscepticism is consistently greater in England than Scotland 
according to BSA data (Henderson et al. 2016). While trends over the 1993-2013 period appear 
similar in England and Scotland Ȃ both showing a spike of Euroscepticism in the mid-1990s and a 
further hardening of sceptical opinion around the beginning of the current decade Ȃ Ǯǯ
opinion is consistently lower in Scotland. 
That said, people in Scotland report broadly similar Eurosceptic views as people in Britain as a whole, 
with the main differences being related to an appreciation of specific benefits of EU membership 
(Mahendran and McIver 2007). In addition, the level of Euroscepticism in Scotland appears to have 
increased  ? ?Ǥ ǯ
relationship with the EU in the years immediately running up to the EU referendum than they had 
been in the early years of devolution. While in 1999, only two in five (40 percent) said either that 
ǯǡ ? ? ? 崀 ȋ 崃?Ȍ  
that view, and in 2015 the figure had risen to three in five (60 percent, compared to 65 percent in 
the UK) (Curtice 2017). This long-term increase in scepticism about Europe reflects similar trends in 
the UK (Curtice 2016, as cited in Curtice 2017) suggesting that attitudes are similar (Mahendran and 
McIver 2007) and that differences in the attitudes of Scots and rest of Britain towards the EU should 
not be overstated (Montagu 2016).  
Euroscepticism in Scotland appears to have increased following the EU referendum (Curtice 2017). 
The proportion saying that Britain should leave the EU increased between 2015 and 2016 by eight 
points (to an all-time high of 25 percent), while the proportion saying it should seek to reduce the 
ǯ      two in five. As a result, two in three (67 percent) of people in 
Scotland could be said to be sceptical about the EU (Curtice 2017). This data however shows that 
the correlation between the level of Euroscepticism, or wider attitudes towards different aspects of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
positive terms. However, this trend reversed after the early 1990s, from which point a declining proportion of the UK population regarded 
ǮǯǤ 
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the EU, on the one hand, and the position on the EU membership, on the other, is not 
straightforward, and any linear links should be avoided. The binary divide between Leave and 
Remain voters hides a multitude of variation and heterogeneity of views (McCrone 2016).  
Despite the insignificant difference in the identified levels of Euroscepticism in 2015, a much lower 
proportion of Scots than English wanted the UK to leave the EU (16.5 percent compared with 25.4 
percent) (McCrone 2016). Conversely, despite 60 percent of people in Scotland being sceptical 
about the EU in 2015, a large majority of 62 percent voted to Remain in the EU (Curtice 2017). At the 
same time, no less than 56 percent of those who said they voted to Remain said that Britain should 
ǯǡ ?
powerful institution (Curtice 2017). Staying in the EU but reducing EU powers appears to have been 
the preferred option for the majority of Remain voters in both Scotland and England, questioning 
the strength of commitment to the EU of many of those who supported continued membership in 
the EU (McCrone 2016; Curtice 2017).  
Level of knowledge of the EU and political party cues have been highlighted among key 
determinants of attitudes to Europe in Scotland. The relative ignorance amongst people in Scotland 
(as in Britain overall) and the desire to know more (Mahendran and McIver 2007) may be considered 
one of the obstacles towards an increased appreciation of the benefits of the EU and its policies. 
Differences in referendum voting in Scotland and England can also be partly explained by the 
strength of party cues: while in England voters are faced with a Conservative government and party 
that is split on the issue, in Scotland the SNP have made membership of the EU a central feature of 
their vision for an independent Scotland (Montagu 2016). 
As concerns the relationship between identity and EU attitudes, it appears problematic to establish 
any straightforward correlation, which overall appears limited (Ormston 2015). While it is true that 
most people who feel European would prefer Britain to remain in the EU, those who lack a 
European identity appear to be divided in their views about the EU (Ormston 2015). Instrumental 
      ǯ     
with views towards EU membership than identity considerations.  
The clear weakness of European identity among the hierarchy of identities Scottish people relate to, 
while demonstrating lack of a strong emotional attachment to Europe, does not preclude the 
possibility that people in Scotland may express relatively more positive views towards the EU or be 
in favour of political and economic union with Europe (Curtice 2015). The evidence overall suggests 
a weak sense of cultural affinity of the UK citizens with the EU. Their cultural concerns might be 
outweighed by a sense of the specific, including economic, benefits of EU membership (Henderson 
et al. 2016).  
There is evidence that a strong regional identity may weaken European identity. Scottish and 
English citizens whose feelings of sub-state (English/Scottish) identity dominate, are more likely to 
express scepticism abǡǯs stronger sense of national identity might lead to 
weaker attachment to apparently distant supranational institutions (Ormston 2015). Others suggest 
that exclusive identities, whether national (British) or subnational (English/Scottish/Welsh) may 
push towards Euroscepticism. Scottish-only and British-only identifiers in Scotland were those most 
             Ǯ ǯǡ      -only 
identifiers in England (Henderson et al. 2016). However, the relationship between exclusive sub-
national identity and Euroscepticism is stronger in England than in Scotland (Henderson et al. 2016). 
In Scotland, national or sub-national identity (British or Scottish) does not appear to structure 
attitudes on EU membership consistently (Henderson et al. 2016)4.This may be related to the 
                                                                    
4 In the case of England, this correlation, inter alia, may be confirmed by the results of the EU referendum: those who thought of 
Ǯǯ ? ?ǡǮǯ ? ?Ȁ ? ?ȋ
2016). If in England Euroscepticism is associated mostly with English identifiers, in Scotland, it tends to be mostly British identifiers who 
hold this attitude (Henderson et al., 2016). 
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greater fit between perceived European and Scottish values. For instance, Ichijo (2003) suggests 
that European values may be closer to Scottish values than the UK, and the Scottish identity has a 
European outlook (Mahendran and McIver 2007; Medrano 2011). 
2.2 Political context  
 
European integration has long been an issue of contention between parties in Scotland Ȃ 
particularly with the Conservative party being in favour of economic integration but opposing to 
political and social integration, and the centre-left parties such as Labour, Liberal Democrats and 
the Scottish National Party being strongly in favour of the social dimension of the process (Hepburn 
2014). At the same time, more recent years have seen an increased consensus on supranational 
matters, with the growing criticism among all the parties towards the lack of political accountability 
in the EU and the European single currency (Ibid.). However, European integration still has largely 
been viewed as a generally positive development for Scotland, the major divide on the European 
issue being Ǯwhether Scotland should have its own seat on the European Council as a small 
independent member-state (SNP), or if Scottish interests are best represented through being part 
of a large, powerful member-stateǯ (other parties) (Ibid.). 
The SNP has been supportive of European integration since the late 1980s, having adopted its 
Ǯǯ ? ? ? ?ǡǮ Europe was portrayed as an external economic 
and political framework for Scottish independence that in a way could replaceǯ the UK structure 
(Hepburn 2014). While analysis of election manifestos demonstrates a relatively strong pro-
European integration position (Debus and Gross 2017)ǡǮǯ
central objective of the party for more than twenty years, there also has long been an anti-European 
integration element within the party and times in its past when it was officially hostile to 
membership of the EC (Lynch 1996; Mitchell 1998; as cited in Mitchell et al. 1992). The position on 
Europe has been more cautious at times and the party has been critical of the lack of democratic 
accountability in the EU, the weakness of MEPs, and of the Common Fisheries Policy and impact on 
the Scottish fishing industry (Hepburn 2014).  
 ǯ position has been similar to that of the SNP favouring a reformed and more 
democratic Europe, and supporting EU membership (Hepburn 2014). Its position has become more 
critical in early 2000s since its apogee in a pro-European stance in the mid-1990s (Ibid.).  
The Scottish Liberal Democratsǯ  has shown a similar trend, shifting from unconditional 
support towards European integration and the creation of a federal Europe to more cautious views 
(Ibid.). The Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party have Ǯalways been critical of the non-single 
market aspects of European integrationǯ Ȃ although more critical views not necessarily translating 
into the opposition to EU membership (Ibid.).  
Overall, despite parties moving towards a more cautious and critical position, they have still 
remained broadly positive about the benefits of the EU and supportive of full membership 
(Hepburn 2014). This appears to contrast with political debates in England, associated with a 
relatively strong anti-Europeanism sentiment Ȃ apparent in sections of the UK Conservative Party 
and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) Ȃ and where the traditionally more pro-EU 
parties, notably Labour and the Liberal Democrat, have also become more critical of many aspects 
of European  ȋǤȌǤ          ǯ -
Europeanism, in this context seeking to   ǯ the 
EU and Ǯposition itself as much more sympathetic towards integrationǯ (Hepburn 2014). This 
appears to be in line with its strategy on immigration and multiculturalism, Ǯseeking to present 
Scotland as a much more open, progressive, outward-looking and tolerant nation than 
Britain/Englandǯ (Ibid.). 
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In general terms, there does not appear to exist a direct correlation between the position of a 
specific political party with regards to European issues, as stems from the manifesto analysis, and 
the European self-identification of its supporters. Thus, in UK-wide terms, Liberal Democrat 
supporters are most likely to identify as European (26 percent, compared with 17 percent of Labour 
identifiers, 13 percent of Conservatives and just 5 percent of those who identify with UKIP). At the 
same time, data from Scottish Social Attitudes indicate that in 2014 just 8% of SNP identifiers felt 
European (Ormston 2015) Ȃ despite the relatively strong position of the party with regards to 
European integration and EU Cohesion policy, as ste      ǯ
election manifestos. 
Analysis of the main party manifestos in the UK as part of the COHESIFY study shows that while the 
Conservative Party, British National Party (BNP) and UK Independence Party (UKIP) are heavily 
opposed to European integration and EU Cohesion policy, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats 
and the Green Party are strongly in favour of it Ȃ which is also the case for Scottish National Party at 
regional level in Scotland (Gross and Debus 2017).  
Scottish parties only deviate marginally from their national party counterparts regarding European 
integration and Cohesion policy.  At the same time, the Scottish Conservative Party takes on more 
EU-friendly positions in its regional election manifestos than the national party. UKIP dedicates 
more than 50 percent of its regional election manifestos in Scotland to European issues, the tone 
being predominantly negative. All other parties do not devote more than six percent of their 
manifestos to European issues, Cohesion policy overall not appearing to be a major issue in Scottish 
election campaigns (Ibid.).  
When looking at the regional party positions in Scotland, the SNP, along with the Scottish Green 
Party, Scottish Labour Party and Scottish Liberal Democrats feature in terms of favourable 
positions on European integration and EU Cohesion policy, sustained over several election cycles, 
whereas UKIP Scotland and Scottish Libertarian Party feature at the opposite end of the political 
spectrum.  
2.3 Regional and local governance  
The Scottish Government is the devolved government for Scotland and has a range of 
responsibilities including the economy, education, health, justice, rural affairs, housing, 
environment, equal opportunities, consumer advocacy and advice, transport and taxation. The 
government was established in 1999 as the Scottish Executive under the Scotland Act 1998, which 
created a devolved administration for Scotland in line with the result of the 1997 referendum on 
Scottish devolution. The Scottish Parliament is made up of all elected members of the Scottish 
Parliament and is the law making body for devolved matters. 
Local government in Scotland consists of 32 unitary local council, responsible for the provision of a 
range of public services. Local authority areas reflect the geographical diversity within Scotland 
with wide variations in size and population. The current structure was the result of a reorganisation 
in 1996, the legislative basis for which was the Local Government etc (Scotland) Act 1994. Councils 
in Scotland operate independently of central government and are accountable to their electorates 
for the provision of services.  ǯǡ
Local Authorities (COSLA), is engaged regularly in policy formulation and consultation with the 
Scottish Government (Mc Garvey and Cairney 2008).  
In terms of relationships with the EU, the Scottish Government complements its limited formal 
rights in the EU with informal channels of contact (Mc Garvey and Cairney 2008)Ǥǯ
central government controls its response to European policy, the Scottish Government enjoys 
significant access to its decision-making machinery and, although the central government performs 
a monitoring function ensuring that devolved governments implement EU policy, the Scottish 
Government enjoys considerable discretion in its implementation (Ibid.). 
  
 
11 
 
3. Cohesion policy implementation and performance 
 
3.1 EU Cohesion policy strategic and implementation framework  
 
3.1.1. Operational Programmes for Scotland 2007-2013  
 
In 2007-2013, EU Structural Funds in Scotland were allocated to two distinct programme areas 
covering the Highlands and Islands (H&I), designated as a less-developed (so-called ǮConvergenceǯ) 
region; and t    ȋȌ ǡ      ȋǮ
  ǯȌ Ǥ 	   	 ȋ	 d ESF) there were 
separate programmes in H&I and in LUPS, i.e. four programmes in all covering Scotland. 
x Ƭ	ǣ ? ? ? ?ǡ	  ? ? ? ?Ǥ ? ? ?  
x Ƭ	ǣ ? ? ? ?Ǥ ?ǡ	  ? ? ?Ǥ ? ?  
x 	ǣ ? ? ? ?ǡ	  ? ? ? ?  
x 	ǣ ? ? ? ?ǡ 	 ? ? ? ?  
The Scottish LUPS ERDF OP allocated a quarter of funding to Priority 1 to support research and 
innovation by improving the competitiveness of the enterprise base through increased innovation 
and a fuller use of its RTD base. The strongest priority in financial terms was Priority 2 Ȃ acccounting 
for more than a third of the budget Ȃ to improve enterprise formation and growth rates by 
enhancing the business support environment, particularly in the areas of access to finance, 
entrepreneurship, e-commerce and resource efficiency. Substantial funding was allocated to 
Priority 3 to support urban regeneration in the most disadvantaged urban communities. Finally, 
around a fifth of the ERDF budget aimed to maximise the contribution of rural areas to achieving EU 
Lisbon agenda goals and sustainable growth under Priority 4.  
The lionǯs share of funding under the ESF programme for the LUPs area was alloocated to Priority 1 
(almost half of the ESF budget), to support progression into employment by assisting the co-
ordinated progress of unemployed and inactive people of all ages towards sustainable employment. 
Accounting for over a third of funding, Priority 2 aimed to improve the skills of the workforce to 
enhance employability, productivity, adaptability, inclusion and entrepreneurial expertise. Priority 3 
aimed to improve access to lifelong learning by widening access to post-school lifelong learning, 
particularly for key client groups. In response to the global economic slowdown, in 2010 the LUPS 
	          崀 Ǯ  ǯ  
linking needs and opportunities through local-level Community Planning Partnership Bids. 
The Highlands & Islands region of Scotland has specific geographic and socio-economic challenges 
including geographic isolation, insularity and low population density. The programmes in Highlands 
and Islands were similar to the LUPS programmes in their underpinning ethos, but had a slight 
difference in emphasis and sought to address distinct geographical and historical access issues. 
 ?Ǯǡǯ ? ?
percent of the ERDF and aimed to increase sustainable growth through expanding the number, 
diversity and value of output of its enterprises with a focus on key sectors. Priority 2 aimed to 
enhance the sustainable value of the key drivers of the regional economy, specifically the University 
of Highlands and Islands Millenium Institute (UHI), the wider research capacity of the region and the 
use of the regions natural historical and cultural assets. Finally, around 15 percent of funding was 
allocated to Priority 3 to support growth in fragile and peripheral communities of the region in order 
to contribute to Lisbon goals. The Scottish ESF programme for the H&I area split its funding across 
three relatively equally balanced priorities. Priority 1 aimed to broaden and increase sustainable 
participation in the H&I workforce, particularly for groups which face severe and multiple 
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disadvantages. The second priority aimed to increase skills and earnings levels within the H&I 
workforce in all sectors of the regional economy, with particular reference to priorities identified in 
the ERDF programme, fostering the growth of enterprises and entrepreneurship. Finally, Priority 3 
aimed to widen access to lifelong learning, increasing the range of quality education and training 
provision available and participation rates, particularly through the UHI and its network. 
Table 1: Priority axes and allocations of Scottish OPs in 2007-13  
Highlands and Islands Scotland ERDF OP 2007-2013 
Priority axes EFDF 
allocation 
(%) 
ERDF allocation 
(EUR) 
1. Enhancing Business Competitiveness, Commercialisation and Innovation 44.7 54.5m 
2. Enhancing Key Drivers of Sustainable Growth 36.4 44.4m 
3. Enhancing Sustainable Growth of Peripheral and Fragile Communities 15.8 19.2m 
4. Technical Assistance 3 3.6m 
Total 100.0 121.862m 
Highlands and Islands Scotland ESF OP 2007-2013 
Priority axes ESF 
allocation 
(%) 
ESF allocation 
(EUR) 
1. Increasing the Workforce 29 15,123,557 
2. Investing in the Workforce 39 20,338,576 
3. Improving Access to Lifelong Learning 29 15,123,557 
4. Technical Assistance 3 1,564,505 
Total 100.0 52,150,195 
Lowlands and Uplands Scotland ERDF OP 2007-2013 
Priority axes ERDF 
allocation 
(%) 
ERDF allocation 
(EUR) 
1. Research and Innovation 24.3 91,648,953 
2. Enterprise Growth 32.3 121,575,144 
3. Urban Regeneration 26.8 101,000,888 
4. Rural Development 18.5 69,874,522 
5. Technical Assistance 2.3 8,977,857 
Total 100.0 375,957,844 
Lowlands and Uplands Scotland ESF OP 2007-2013 
Priority axes ESF 
allocation 
(%) 
ESF allocation 
(EUR) 
1. Progressing into Employment 47.2 127,283,072 
2. Progressing through Employment 22.1 59,712,715 
3. Improving Access to Lifelong Learning 5 13,440,003 
4. Technical Assistance 2.4 6,456,791 
5. Strategic Skills Pipeline 23 62,140,373 
Total 100.0 269,920,942 
3.1.2. Operational Programmes for Scotland 2014-2020 
 
For the 2014-2020 programming period, Scotland was allocated  ? ? ? ?  relatively equally 
across the ERDF ( ? ? ? ? ) and ESF ( ? ? ? ? ). A key difference in 2014-20 is that Scotland is being 
treated as a single programming area with the previously separate OPs for Lowlands and Uplands 
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Scotland and for the Highlands and Islands being rationalised into one Scotland-wide OP per Fund, 
with account being taken of the particular needs of the Highlands and Islands (which has Transition 
Region status). As a result, there is one national ERDF OP and one national ESF OP in Scotland, 
representing a halving of the number of ERDF and ESF OPs in 2007-13, with the Highlands and 
Islands Transition region incorporated within the two Scotland-wide programmes. 
In terms of substantive content, the Scottish OPs saw significant changes over the previous 
programme driven by evolving EU and domestic priorities. A tightly-drawn set of objectives for the 
new programmes and emphasis on vertical policy alignment from EU2020 through to regional 
priorities gave a top-down steer to the programming process. At the same time, the Scottish 

ǯ             ? ? ? ?     ? ?
thematic objectives, including a tighter focus on building the low carbon economy, on R&D and 
innovation, and on investing in human capital through employability and skills initiatives. Financial 
allocations are made to schemes, programmes and projects through three Scottish Themed Funds: 
(i) Competitiveness, innovation and jobs; (ii) Low carbon, resource efficiency and the environment; 
and (iii) Local development and social inclusion. By using the Scottish Themed Funds, it is expected 
to concentrate on interventions with the greatest impact and ensure the greatest push towards 
Europe 2020 targets.  
Despite certain positive trends in Scottish macroeconomic performance at the 2014-20 
programming stage Ȃ such as improvements in labour market and GDP indicators and a less severe 
recession than many parts of Europe, demonstrating resilience of workforce - a wide range of 
challenges remained, including high levels of unemployment, a fall in living standards and economic 
growth at modest levels. In the framework of the SWOT analysis exercise underpinning OPs 
strategic design, the following key challenges that the 2014-20 ESIF programmes should address 
have been identified: 
x Overcoming the low expenditure on business R&D. Despite the high quality of the R&D 
undertaken by the higher education sector, exploitation of this potential through business 
commercialisation is limited. Given the importance of R&D in driving Scotland towards its 
low carbon economy ambitions and delivering faster sustainable economic growth, 
overcoming this challenge is seen as having the potential to deliver significant gains for the 
economy. 
x Tackling the barriers to new firm formation. Despite recent increases in business births, it 
continues to lag behind other countries. Tackling the barriers to entrepreneurship and 
starting a business Ȃ such as access to finance, skills, innovation Ȃ are seen crucial. 
x Increasing the ambitions of SMEsǤǯ
businesses, many of which do not innovate, lack growth ambitions or have not taken steps 
towards becoming international. Innovative, high growth, exporting firms are seen as the 
key to economic success. 
x Boosting digital infrastructure. Encouraging all citizens and businesses to adopt and 
exploit digital technologies has the capacity to deliver a number of economic and social 
benefits for Scotland. 
x Exploitation of alternative sources of financing for SMEs. Credit conditions for SMEs 
remain constrained, and the new ERDF programme offers the opportunity to explore non-
traditional forms of finance. 
x     ǯ  . Scotland has significant 
growth opportunities in offshore wind, wave and tidal technologies. Promoting further the 
renewables sector is seen crucial. 
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x Striving to improve energy efficiency. The low carbon economy, covering the renewables 
sector but also energy efficiency installations and technology, supply chains and 
encouraging innovative consumption patterns in SMEs to reduce environmental impact, is 
seen as a key driver for job creation and sustainable growth.  
As in 2007-13, the Highlands and Islands (as a Transition region in 2014-20),  faces a range of 
additional challenges, particularly those related to permanent geographical handicaps, including 
distance and sparse populations, peripherality and remoteness from markets and services, which in 
turn leads to market failures around infrastructure (digital, business, and enabling infrastructure for 
R&D and low carbon), availability of services, fuel costs, transport time, and additional business 
costs (ERDF Scotland OP 2014-20). Concrete consequences include reluctance of the private sector 
to invest in infrastructure to support new sectors with growth potential and additional build costs 
(e.g. through transportation and less market competition) outweighing returns on investment 
(Ibid.). In addition, the innovation performance of Highlands and Islands businesses continues to lag 
behind that of businesses elsewhere in Scotland.  
The 2014-20 programmes therefore put focus in particular on:  
x RTD&I Ȃ particularly focusing on commercialisation and collaboration between business 
and academia 
x SME competitiveness through innovation, digital take-up and business models, export and 
globalisation, investment, and leadership development  
x Digital roll out and take up in hard-to-reach areas and remote communities  
x Encouraging and supporting low carbon investment and innovation, including low carbon 
transport solutions  
x Resource efficiency in business and industry, and promoting and up-scaling circular 
economies 
x Increasing employability for individuals facing multiple barriers to participation  and 
enhancing labour market mobility 
x Social innovation, social inclusion and combating poverty Ȃ targeted support at areas of 
multiple and complex need aimed at financial inclusion, household/family wellbeing and 
resilience and basic life skills 
x Education, skills and lifelong learning Ȃ aimed at increasing skills levels (vocational, 
academic and business-ready) linked to Smart Specialisation or regionally significant 
sectors Ȃ matching skills supply and demand Ȃ and extending and improving vocational 
education pathways  
Seeking to address the specific challenges faced by the Transition region, ERDF allows limited and 
sector specific infrastructure and capital support, e.g. for specialist builds and shared equipment. In 
ǡ    Ǯ  ǯ  apital investment where that is part of 
enhancing their business competitiveness, securing new markets and creating additional 
employment in remote and sparsely populated areas can be supported. While ERDF funding 
supports smart growth and sustainable growth objectives, ESF supports inclusive growth activity. 
Both programmes focus investments into niche areas to maximise the positive impact of the funds 
in achieving EU2020 objectives and Scottish Government policy priorities. (see Annex 3 for details) 
Table 2: Priority axes and allocations of Scottish OPs in 2014-20  
Scottish OPs 2014-2020 
Thematic objectives ERDF  ESF YEI Total 
1. Increasing R&TD&I 111.5 0.0 0.0 111.5 
2. ICT technology and usage 25.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 
3. SME competitiveness 143.7 0.0 0.0 143.7 
4. Low carbon economy 131.0 0.0 0.0 131.0 
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Scottish OPs 2014-2020 
Thematic objectives ERDF  ESF YEI Total 
5. Climate change adaptation 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
6. Environment and resource efficiency 56.0 0.0 0.0 56.0 
7. Sustainable transport 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
8. Employment and labour mobility 0.0 198.0 46.3 244.4 
9. Social inclusion and combating poverty 0.0 89.4 0.0 89.4 
10. Education, skills and lifelong learning 0.0 122.0 0.0 122.0 
11. Capacity building 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
12. Technical Assistance 9.5 8.4 0.0 17.9 
Total 476.7 417.8 46.3 940.9 
 
Interviews with stakeholders highlighted the path-dependent nature of economic development and 
the significance of specific territorial challenges. Several interviewees observed that the core needs 
and problems of the Scottish economy have not changed significantly in scale or over time during 
the last two decades. The needs and challenges of the regional economy and the labour market 
have mirrored trends in the wider UK and EU, but some of the fundamental challenges identified at 
the end of the 1990s remain significant challenges today. These include underperformance in R&D 
efforts, labour market exclusion problem, or shortage of a vibrant and growing business base.  
The specific territorial challenges of the H&I region were frequently highlighted, particularly by local 
stakeholders, which relate to the geographical remoteness from the mainland UK and Europe, 
peripherality and insularity and leading to challenges with transportation of goods, economies of 
scale and overall competitiveness of the regional economy. As discussed further below, there are 
concerns from some H&I stakeholders that these challenges are not sufficiently addressed in the 
new Scotland-wide programme for 2014-20. 
3.1.3. Implementation framework and partnership structures 
 
Implementation framework 
In 2007-13, programme management was largely centralised within the Managing Authority, 
although a number of strategic delivery mechanisms played a strong role. Further consolidation and 
centralisation of programme management was carried out in 2011 with abolition of the 
Intermediate Administrative Bodies5 (programme secretariats). 
Drawing upon experience of delivery arrangements in other Member States, a range of Strategic 
Delivery Mechanisms were developed to deliver elements of the 2007-13 Highlands and Islands and 
Lowlands and Uplands ERDF and ESF Operational Programmes, including:  
x Strategic Delivery Bodies: With the goal of achieving greater strategic alignment (i.e. 
between Scottish government objectives and EU Lisbon objectives) the programmes 
identified Strategic Delivery Bodies and the scope of their involvement in the Programmes 
as follows: 
o Scottish Enterprise: LUPS ERDF Priority 1 (Research and innovation). 
o Highlands and Islands Enterprise: H&I ERDF Priority 1 (Enhancing business 
competitiveness, commercialisation and innovation). 
                                                                    
5 Until then, two Intermediate Administrative Bodies (IABs) assisted with administrating the funds for the 2007-13 Programmes. The IAB 
for the Highlands & Islands Programmes was the Highlands & Islands Programme Partnership Ltd, for the Lowlands & Uplands Scotland 
Programmes Ȃ ESEP Ltd. The IABs were responsible for: publicising the Programmes and forthcoming application rounds; advising 
applicants on potential projects; assisting in project appraisal; processing claims; monitoring projects. 
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o University of the Highlands & Islands: H&I ERDF Priority 2 (Enhancing key drivers of 
sustainable growth) and ESF Priority 3 (Access to Lifelong Learning) 
 
x Community Planning Partnerships comprising urban area CPPs within LUPS targeted on 
the basis of disadvantage and all CPPs in H&I. Investing a degree of responsibility for 
Structural Funds management in the CPPs pursued the goal of achieving greater tactical 
alignment between locally derived objectives and the scope within the Priorities of the 
OPs.6  
x Global Grants Body: in the LUPS programme, the MA designated an intermediate body to 
manage and implement a global grant (as defined in Articles 42-43 of the General 
Regulation) in the South of Scotland under Priority 4 for rural development. 
x National Delivery Bodies: were identified to commission strategic activity in LUPS during 
the operational phase of the programmes, and specifically in relation to the creation of ESF 
Priority 5 in the LUPS area in 2010, a number of organisations were designated.7 
The established Strategic Delivery Mechanisms were anticipated to provide for: (i) greater strategic 
alignment; (ii) greater tactical fit; and (iii) best value for money and enhanced impact with the 
reduced funds available in 2007-13 as compared to 2000-06. 
In addition, the Monitoring and Evaluation Group was established, with the following features: 
x brought together officials from the Scottish Government (both policy and analytical 
services) with representatives of partner organisations (the two economic development 
bodies in Scotland, several from local government, and the two IABs) 
x remit covered both ESF and ERDF and, geographically, both the LUPS and H&I 
x provided advice on evaluation of the ESIF in Scotland  
x tasked with identifying the additionality associated with European funding with an 
emphasis on understanding the effectiveness of delivery mechanisms introduced in the 
2007-2013 programme and looking for lessons for the next programme. 
In 2007-13, there were two separate programme monitoring committees, one for each region: 
LUPS and H&I Programme Monitoring Committees. The monitoring committees were responsible 
for ensuring effective implementation of the ESIF in line with EU requirements. Their tasks included 
reviewing progress, especially the degree to which the quantified targets associated with each of 
the priorities have been achieved, approving selection criteria and approving annual and final 
reports on implementation.  
 
In the current, 2014-20 period, the Scottish Government continued to be Managing Authority for 
the ERDF and ESF programmes with responsibilities for overseeing governance, calling for and 
assessing applications for Strategic Interventions, ensuring monitoring, audit and regulatory 
activity complies with EC requirements, reporting on targets and for the overall performance of the 
ESF and ERDF programmes. However, the Structural Funds Division has brought the functions 
previously delegated to Intermediate Bodies in-house to ensure the expertise to manage the Funds 
is retained in the long term. 
                                                                    
6 Community planning, based on the Local Government in Scotland Act 2003, is the process by which councils and a wide range of other 
public sector bodies (e.g. NHS, enterprise agencies, colleges, third sector organisations) work together with local communities and the 
business sector to plan and achieve better delivery of services that include economic and skills development, community regeneration 
and renewal. 
7 National Delivery Bodies comprised Skills Development Scotland, Scottish Further & Higher Education Funding Council, Scottish Trades 
Union Congress, Scottish Council of Voluntary Organisations (fronting the Third Sector Consortium). 
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Implementation of the ESIF programmes has been to some extent decentralised from the 
Managing Authority while at the same time increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small 
number ȋȀȀǮLead PartnersǯȌ
greater responsibility for leading on project delivery and verification.  
      ǡ       ǮStrategic 
Interventionsǯǡ              
2007- ? ?    ? ? Ǯ ǯ   ? ? ? ? -20. Strategic Interventions present large-
   ȋ   ? ? ? Ȍǡ      
Ǯ        ǯ       
focus on domestic policy.  
Strategic interventions are managed and co-financed by Lead Partners. Lead Partners are policy 
directorates, agencies and local authorities with the capacity to manage the funds and provide 
match funding of their own to increase the overall levels of investment. Lead Partners receive 
funding allocations from the Managing Authority, similar to the previous Strategic Delivery Body 
model, which operated for Scottish Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise and the University 
of the Highlands and Islands. The SI and match funding are divided into smaller amounts 
(operations), with individual projects and organisations then applying to lead partners to access the 
funds. Lead Partners provide the initial match funding, but may deliver operations directly, contract 
delivery or enter into partnerships. Monitoring of these operations is done by Strategic Delivery 
Partnerships (SDPs) which ensure that they are complementary and that various interventions are 
performing and making a measurable contribution to the Europe 2020 targets. 
Overall, the new programme structure seeks to ensure a more integrated and streamlined approach 
to delivering ESIF as well as addressing the issues identified in the National Reform Programme. A 
number of interrelated reasons are stated to lie at the core of a shift to the existing programme and 
management structure: 
First, the need to identify match funding in a spending climate of budget consolidation, hence 
focusing on concentrating  relatively few and significant interventions of scale that OPs of this size 
can affect and change positively (ERDF OP Scotland 2014-20). 
Second, the need to maximise the impact of investments: large number of smaller and 
fragmented interventions were found to lead to fragmented outputs, be less efficient in achieving 
the desired results and impacts, and judged unlikely to make a measurable contribution to Europe 
2020 (Office of the Chief Economic Adviser 2013), justifying need for greater (thematic or 
geographical) targeting, fewer but larger and more strategic projects and lead partners taking 
responsibility for significant programmes of work to deliver bigger outcomes. Among other things, 
larger-scale interventions are hoped to help make a bigger contribution to the objectives of the 
Programmes; retain the focus on the long-term outcomes; and increase additionality and reduce 
duplication between local projects. 
In addition, drawing on the negative experience in 2007-13 related to a number of audit and 
compliance issues in Scotland, the new delivery structure is hoped to help increase compliance 
with national rules and audit requirements, at the same time simplifying management and delivery 
as well as reducing administrative burden for beneficiaries. Since smaller organisations are seen less 
capable of coping with the audit and record-keeping burden required to draw down EU funds, up-
scaling project delivery is seen important. Options to simplify and improve the ESIF management in 
Scotland, pursued by the Managing Authority, include the use of Lead Partners, increased use of 
procurement, increased use of simplified and unit costs, and improved IT systems. 
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As noted in the ex-ante evaluation of the 2014-20 Scottish OPs, the pursued approach, seeking to 
minimise the risk to the MA and at the same time simplify the audit and compliance burden on 
delivery bodies, is expected to drive improved delivery.8 
Partnership structures 
  Ǯ  ǯ     ǡ      
well as on-going dialogue and consultation with a wide range of partners. The process involved, 
among other things, a set of parallel surveys outlining collective priorities for future Structural 
Funds programmes, the Monitoring and Evaluation Group working groups, a public consultation on 
content of the future programmes, and stakeholder workshops.  
Scotland has established a Joint Programme Monitoring Committee covering all ESIF, replacing 
past separate programme monitoring committees. The JPMC oversees: 
x Performance Ȃ monitoring progress towards outcomes, targets and milestones, and 
continually assessing the contribution to EU 2020; 
x Complementarity Ȃ of the programmes and schemes in operation, with the ability to 
recommend changes to the SDPs, and to the Operational Programmes if required; and 
x Implementation and mainstreaming of horizontal themes, ensuring that European Funded 
activity contributes to equality and sustainability. 
The JPMC meets at least twice a year, generally in spring and autumn. 
 
Source: Hall Aitken (2014) 
                                                                    
8 At the same time, the EAE notes that the potential benefits were not well understood by partners and key stakeholders, the widespread 
view being that the new approach aimed to exclude community organisations rather than reduce the compliance burden Ȃ as discussed 
further 
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The Monitoring and Evaluation Group (MEG) was re-shaped in April 2015 to assist in the 
development, agreement and implementation of the Evaluation Plan 2014-2020. The group aims to 
meet on a quarterly basis to coincide with key evaluation milestones throughout the life of the 
programmes. Chaired by the MA, the overarching purpose is to be involved in the: (i) planning and 
development of evaluations, (ii) steering of evaluations (iii) quality control of evaluations (iv) and 
making long-term (post 2020) recommendations. The membership of this group is drawn from key 
stakeholders concerned with all aspects of the OPs. Many members are involved in other aspects of 
governance, e.g. the territorial committees for Highlands and Islands or the Youth Employment 
Initiative; or in the Joint Programme Monitoring Committee, securing a strong link between 
governance of the ESF and ERDF programmes. Individual additional members have been invited to 
join the MEG based on past experience and expertise and to reflect the prioritisation of work 
identified by MEG. Short-life Working Groups may be formed from MEG members to assist in 
gathering views and insights from stakeholders. This work will inform the development of the 
evaluation plan. 
The Territorial Committees for Highlands and Islands or the Youth Employment Initiative monitor 
the impact of interventions in question and recommend relevant improvements. The rationale for 
the territorial committee for H&I was to respond to the elimination of the previous OP for the  
region and therefore to provide a local oversight mechanism for the implementation of region-wide 
initiatives in Scotland. Its responsibilities include periodically reviewing progress made within the 
Territorial Area towards achieving the specific targets of the OP and making recommendations to 
the JPMC and Operational Programme Committees on the financial allocations across the Strategic 
Interventions. Membership of the Committee comprises Local Authorities, Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise, the University of the Highlands and Islands, SCVO (for Third Sector), Scottish Natural 
Heritage, Scottish Funding Council, Skills Development Scotland, VisitScotland, officials of Scottish 
Government, as well as Lead Bodies for ESI purposes as appropriate. 
At the local level, there are no specific partnerships purely focused on ESIF, although local action 
groups (with regards to rural and fisheries matters) and community planning partnerships have 
been highlighted as playing a direct role in the delivery of ESI Funds, and local employability 
partnerships present a space where partners receive updates on the implementation progress of 
employability programmes. In addition, the Scottish Local Authorities Economic Development 
Group (SLAED), as a network of senior officials from economic development teams across all 
Scottish  ǡ    Ǯ       
ǯǡǡǤ
a forum to discuss challenges and seek clarifications from the SG with regards to the 
implementation of the programmes. 
3.2 Assessment of performance 
3.2.1  Programme performance 
1. 2007-2013 
In Scotland, no impact evaluation was done in 2007-13. The only available assessment of 
achievement is available in the AIRs based on monitoring data. The reports shows that some targets 
were achieved or over-achieved several years before the end of the period. For instance, by the end 
of 2011, for the ERDF Programmes, the number of enterprises supported was 42,295 against 
targets of 17,000. The number of job brokerage initiatives was 124, against a target of 30. A total of 
230 renewable energy projects had been supported, against Programme targets of 160.  
In terms of financial progress, recent data for 2014 (AIRs 2014) suggests that N+2 targets for the 
OPs were met in both regions, confirming expectations that final targets would also be met.  
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In the Highlands and Islands region, AIRs report that European Funds played a critical role in the 
Economic Recovery Plan, supporting capital expenditure, improving business support and up-skilling 
individuals. By 2013, the Structural Funds programmes secured training and improved skills for 
135,000 individuals; and delivered 30,000 new jobs. Tacking action to address youth unemployment 
is considered to have been an important part of this. By 2014, a number of targets had been met in 
full, or in some cases, exceeded significantly. Over several consecutive years, the programme was 
reported to have made significant progress in supporting business: strong achievement against 
several of the business support indicators was reported, which was believed to be possibly related to 
businesses seeking support as a result of the recession. Already by 2012, the number of individuals 
and enterprises receiving advice and consultancy support was 140% above the original target set for 
the end of the programming period (reaching 162% in 2014), while in 2014 the number of 
enterprises receiving support through the SDB was 167% and that of new products and services 
developed by supported enterprises was 1570% above the programme target.  
At the same time, slower progress against indicators related to, for instance, R&D was being 
recorded over time, due to the lead-times involved before possible realisation, although many of 
the targets were close to being met by the end of the programme. The number of actual gross jobs 
created in 2014 was still at more than half way to the overall ERDF programme target, and the 
number of business start-ups resulting from support was only at 21% of the target value. More 
details are provided in Table 3. 
Table 3: HIE ERDF OP: progress towards indicators, 2014 
Type Indicator Target Forecast9 % Target 
met by 
Forecast 
Actual 
achieved 
to date 
% Target 
met by 
actual 
Priority 1 
Output  No of individuals and new enterprises receiving advice/consultancy  800  1459  182%  1,298  162%  
Output  Number of enterprises receiving financial support  250  379  152%  233  93%  
Output  Number of enterprises receiving support for e-commerce  150  516  344%  146  97%  
Output  No of enterprises receiving support for energy-saving & resource-efficiency 350  327  93%  238  68%  
Output  Number of social enterprises receiving support  200  309  155%  269  135%  
Result  Number of new business starts resulting from support  400  122  31%  84  21%  
Result  Number of ecommerce strategies developed  100  203  203%  199  199%  
Result  Number of enterprises implementing environmental audits and energy-
saving/resource efficiency systems  
250  144  58%  107  43%  
Output  Number of enterprises receiving support through the SDB  400  664  166%  667  167%  
Output Area of business space created or modified (m2) 20,000 260697 260697 170,055 850% 
Output  Number of commercialisation activities  189  155  82%  189  100%  
Result Increase in turnover in enterprises supported by SDB (£m) 40 312086 780215 18 45% 
Result  Number of new products and services developed 10  148  1480%  157  1570%  
Result  Number of gross jobs created  2,200 3734 170% 905 41% 
Priority 2 
Output  Number of research facilities supported  30  19  63%  11  37%  
Output  Number of e-learning/training facilities supported  60  19  32%  51  85%  
Output  Number of RTD projects supported  30  52  173%  28  93%  
Output  Number of renewable energy research projects  10  21  210%  15  150%  
Result  Number of patents filed  20  1  5%  18  90%  
Result  Number of vocational training infrastructure projects supported  10  13  130%  36  360%  
Result  No of new products & services based on natural & cultural assets developed  50  132  264%  101  202%  
Result Number of gross jobs created 1,300   957 74% 
Priority 3 
Output  No of e-learning/childcare and other community facilities supported  15  14  93%  12  80%  
Output Area of business space created or modified 2,750   2,934 107% 
Output  Number of transport projects supported  15  25  167%  18  120%  
Output  Number of ICT infrastructure projects supported  1  1  100%  0  0%  
Output  Number of renewable energy projects supported  10  6  60%  5  50%  
Result  Number of gross jobs created  600  60  10%  60  10%  
Output  Number of energy efficiency initiatives supported in Social Housing  4  3  75%  3  75%  
Output  Number of social housing units improved  400  315  79%  315  79%  
                                                                    
9 forecast targets from committed projects 
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Source: AIR 2014 
In the Lowlands and Uplands region, gross jobs created were estimated to be close to the 
programme target already in June 2012, being at 118% over the target value in 2014. Support to 
business was a prominent feature of the programme and 12,973 new business starts were recorded 
in 2014 under Priority 2, which was around 236% of the target. The business assistance targets were 
over three times more than the expected target already in 2012, in 2014 reaching over five times 
above the original target set for the end of the period potentially implying that targets were poorly 
estimated or set low. Poorer performance can be noted in indicators related to support for energy-
saving and resource-efficiency, social enterprises or educational access projects. 
Table 4: LUPS ERDF OP: progress towards indicators, 2014 
Indicator Name  Type  Target  Forecas
t  
% Target 
Met by 
Forecast  
Actua
l  
% Target 
Met by 
Actual  
Number of enterprises supported.  Output  3,900  46248  1185.9% 15867  406.8 
Number of new products and services developed by 
supported enterprises and research centres.  
Result  1,800  2209  
122.7% 
1968  
109.3 
Increase in turnover in supported enterprises (£m).  Result  290  1745  601.7% 2532  873.1 
Number of research networks and collaborations supported.  Output  600  2553  425.5% 3285  547.5 
Number of new products and services developed by 
supported research networks.  
Result  900  990  
110.0% 
674  
74.9 
Number of renewable energy projects supported.  Output  240  950  395.8% 685  285.4 
Number of gross jobs created.  Result  25,600  53282  208.1% 30229  118.1 
Number of enterprises receiving financial support.  Output  250  8002  3200.8% 8198  3279.2 
Number of individuals and new enterprises receiving 
advice/consultancy.  
Output  11,600  56738  
489.1% 
48711  
419.9 
Number of new business starts resulting from support.  Result  5,500  16006  291.0% 12973  235.9 
Number of enterprises receiving support for e-commerce.  Output  5,700  7644  134.1% 4848  85.1 
Number of enterprises receiving support for energy-saving 
and resource-efficiency.  
Output  5,700  3168  
55.6% 
2289  
40.2 
Number of e-commerce strategies developed.  Result  4,100  3835  93.5% 1779  43.4 
Number of enterprises implementing environmental audits 
and energy-saving/resource-efficiency systems.  
Result  4,100  2222  
54.2% 
1085  
26.5 
Number of job brokerage initiatives supported.  Output  30  134  446.7% 162  540.0 
Number of ICT and e-learning facilities supported.  Output  40  97  242.5% 78  195.0 
Number of childcare and other community facilities 
supported.  
Output  30  52  
173.3% 
46  
153.3 
Number of transport hub projects supported.  Output  25  21  84.0% 9  36.0 
Increase in the number of individuals gaining employment 
through supported job brokerage schemes.  
Result  650  30721  
4726.3% 
25581  
3935.5 
Increase in the number of individuals gaining employment 
through supported ICT/e-learning facilities.  
Result  650  2067  
318.0% 
1527  
234.9 
Increase in the number of individuals gaining employment 
through supported childcare/community facilities. 
Result  500  884  
176.8% 
38  
7.6 
Area of business space created or modified (m2).  Output  9,900  253719  2562.8% 67455  681.4 
Number of enterprises supported.  Result  1,100  6533  593.9% 6060  550.9 
Number of social enterprises supported.  Result  350  247  70.6% 117  33.4 
Number of new marketing initiatives.  Result  910  358  39.3% 386  42.4 
Number of enterprises introducing new supply and production 
processes.  
Result  910  426  
46.8% 
183  
20.1 
Number of e-learning/childcare and other community 
facilities supported.  
Output  40  70  
175.0% 
8  
20.0 
Number of educational access projects supported.  Output  20  19  95.0% 4  20.0 
Number of local transport projects supported.  Output  20  18  90.0% 2  10.0 
Number of enterprises benefiting from supported facilities.  Result  900  30623  3402.6% 453  50.3 
Occupancy rates of business space by the end of the 
Programme (%).  
Result  90  52.80  
58.7% 
1.94  
2.2 
Source: AIR 2014 
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Table 5: Scottish OPs 2007-13: progress across key common indicators (summary based on 2014 data) 
Indicator H&I ERDF OP LUPS ERDF OP 
 Target Achieved Target Achieved 
Jobs created (all PAx) 4,100 1922 25,600 30,229 
Number of enterprises receiving financial support 250 233 250 8,198 
Number of enterprises receiving support for e-commerce 150 146 5,700 4,848 
Number of enterprises receiving support for energy-saving and resource-efficiency 350 238 5,700 2,289 
Number of individuals/ enterprises receiving advice/consultancy  800 1,298 11,600 48,711 
No of new products & services developed by supported enterprises 10 157 1,800 1,968 
No of social enterprises supported 200 269 350 117 
Number of new business starts resulting from support  400 84 5,500 12,973 
Source: own elaboration based on AIR 2014 data 
 
Although the forecast targets from committed projects in certain areas look more promising, the 
final assessment of Programme performance should be made on the basis of the final physical data. 
In addition, it is difficult to interpret for instance how many of the gross jobs created for the 
programmes as a whole are additional in the sense that they would not otherwise have been there 
(Tyler 2012a); and more robust commentary on the overall impact of the programmes on 
beneficiaries and the programmes as a whole in terms of both jobs and enterprise creation must 
await the results of a proper impact evaluation. With regards to ESF Programmes, by the end of 
2011, the number of participants supported through the Scottish ESF OPs was 269,265, a 
considerable overshoot of 156% of the target.  
Two evaluations of ESF-related activities in Scotland 2007-13 were undertaken. The first is an 
evaluation of the delivery of employability support through the Community Planning 
Partnerships (CPPs) (Blake Stevenson 2011). The CPPs were an innovation in 2007-13 to achieve a 
more strategic use of the funds and to encourage more partnership at a local level, covering ESF 
and ERDF projects in both Scottish Programmes. The study found that the new delivery mechanism 
had stimulated more strategic behaviour at a local level and that had contributed to more effective 
use of the ESF. The interim findings influenced the development of the new Priority 5 for the 
Lowlands and Uplands Scotland ESF Programme, introduced in 2010. 
The second study was a survey of ESF participants (Hall Aitken 2012b). It found that ESF Priority 1 
projects were largely Ǯsuccessful in targeting those experiencing disadvantage in the labour marketǯ. 
In particular, they successfully engaged young people in the NEET group, those with health 
problems and some disadvantaged ethnic minority groups. The survey found that those who 
participated in work placements were Ǯmore likely to complete their training course and to move 
onto a positive destinationǯ. The survey showed that training courses incorporating work experience 
appear to have provided Ǯa popular and effective route towards employabilityǯ  . 
Some 89% of participants thought that their time spent on the ESF supported training was Ǯtime 
well spentǯ. ǡ Ǯarticipants rated work placements highly and were most positive about 
practical experience gained and getting exposure to the world of workǯȋǤȌ.   
Overall, the evidence from evaluations of the 2007-13 Programmes highlight several key findings: 
First, the relatively low share of ESIF funding as compared to the size of the economy implies that 
impacts are modest. Although providing a valuable contribution to economic and social 
development, the Funds represent a relatively modest amount of funding to bring in a radical 
change in significant policy areas, such as business competitiveness or commercialisation rates of 
R&D&I (Office of the Chief Economic Adviser 2013), meaning that the overall impact can only be 
relatively small (UK 2012). 
Second, ESIF played an important role in supporting reform and recovery in the Scottish 
economy over the 2007-13 funding period. Structural Funds have been an important tool to help 
combat the effects of the ongoing recession (Tyler 2012a), and delivery of the Scottish Government 
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Economic Recovery Plan (Office of the Chief Economic Adviser 2013). The ERDF has made a 
particularly important contribution in both H&I and LUP at a time when infrastructure spend and 
access to credit for SMEs were under pressure. The UK Strategic report 2012 (UK 2012) highlighted 
the impact of the investment under the ERDF in helping the Scottish economy emerge from 
recession particularly through supporting or creating large numbers of businesses, stimulating 
innovation, and facilitating job creation. ESF programmes are noted to have made a significant 
contribution to addressing the labour market challenges which came to the fore as a result of the 
recession, particularly through creating opportunities for participants to receive training, to gain 
qualifications and to get people into work. 
Third, business competitiveness was increased. The Mid-Term Reviews pointed to a significant 
number of companies increasing the amount of innovation they were undertaking. Many 
companies had also been able to gain access to ERDF supported finance, particularly from venture 
supported capital funds, that would otherwise have been in short supply. Benefits from assistance 
to tourism and improved transport links were also beginning to emerge. 
Fourth, the changing macro-economic conditions was a key challenge influencing programme 
performance in 2007-13. As elsewhere in Europe, the socio-economic landscape during the 
programme implementation was very different to that envisaged when the programmes were 
originally drawn up. By the end of 2011 and into 2012, the UK economy was still struggling to 
emerge from the downturn. The UK economy experienced a large fall in GDP, contracting 
significantly in 2008 and 2009 with further falls seen in late 2011 and the first half of 2012. The 
effects of the financial crisis have hit all parts of the UK, with Scotland having been particularly 
affected by downward pressure on public finances, economy performance being marked by a 
significant downturn (UK 2012). This can explain underachievement in several indicator targets for 
the end of the period for both the Convergence and the Competiveness and Employment regions. 
As a result, the quantified outputs and results for the Programmes projected the underlying growth 
trends at that time, which have since been demonstrated as unsustainable (e.g. with regard to the 
projected numbers of jobs created and increases in business turnover). Financial and physical 
performance of activity under the management of Strategic Delivery Mechanisms was delayed 
because of the unforeseen economic circumstances leading to Ǯextensive re-profiling and extended 
timeframesǯ (Fraser Associates 2013). 
These contextual challenges affected the two regions in various ways, sometimes leading to 
programmes modifications. In LUP programme, changes in the economic climate meant that there 
was a higher than expected level of interest in funding to help people progress into employment 
(LUP AIR 2010). As a way of responding to this, in 2010, it was agreed to use the remaining ESF 
funds in the LUP Programme to kick-start a Scottish Strategy pursuing a strategic, continuum 
approach to workforce skills development. The remaining ESF funds were moved into a single new 
ǲ  ǳ ȋ  崂)         ǡ
and created a sustainable basis for planning the use of further funding beyond 2013 in line with 
emerging workforce strategies (Ibid.). Strategic applications for Priority 5 projects were sought 
from Community Planning Partnerships and national organisations delivering employability 
strategies.  
In the HIE programme, the overall impact of the recession was felt the most acutely in the weakest 
regions. In the Highlands and Islands, significant problems in securing match-funding can be noted, 
which led to a reduction in project size and halt of some projects (Tyler 2013a). Slowing flow of 
credit and concern over the length of the recession, as expressed in business and consumer 
confidence, as well as continued employment decline and contraction in demand were some of the 
major challenges affecting the region.  
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The Programme sought to respond through a shift towards a more strategic approach to delivery Ȃ 
a shift in priorities towards more strategic measures and adjustment in the scope and focus of the 
OP to better reflect emerging priorities at national and local levels (H&I ERDF AIR 2013). 
Amendments to the H&I ERDF Operational Programme were agreed in 2013. The programme 
remained consistent with the overall aim and original purpose but transferred funds between 
priorities to reflect changed economic circumstances and allowing for a degree of private sector 
match funding, although of relatively modest scale (Ibid.). Allocation of funds shifted to target 
activity supported through ERDF Priorities 1 and 2, which recognised the local and community 
benefit that could be achieved through delivery of more strategic and targeted interventions 
supporting coordinated local development and providing catalytic investments rather than a range 
of individual projects, as more traditionally seen within Priority 3 (H&I ERDF AIR 2014). This was 
seen particularly effective in maintaining activity in these domains as the situation with regards to 
public and third sector funding continued to prove challenging (Ibid.). 
 
2. 2014-2020 
There is little evidence available on the outcomes and results in 2014-20 as no projects were 
approved in 2014 or 2015. A significant amount of activity has however been completed since the 
beginning of 2016 although the implementation reports mainly report on delivery and spending 
progress. At the same time, the AIR 2015   Ǯ       	
programme will go on to deliver aǯǤEarly indications are that outputs and results may 
have been conservative in some areas. Approved operations, if delivered as intended, are expected 
to exceed targets on a number of objectives including the number of enterprises supported, and the 
number of businesses being supported to develop new products.  In addition, early work on low 
carbon and green infrastructure Ǯǯǡ
considered an encouraging sign in terms of programme delivery against the set targets.  
Deviations in targets are positive projecting an over-achievement against output and result 
indicators (AIR 2015). This is considered to result from changes in approach, e.g. Ǯchanging from 
one-to-one approaches to one to manyǯ such as business leadership support or provision of 
additional accessible materials online (Ibid.).  
According to the latest AIR 2016, a series of strategic interventions were selected across each 
Priority Axis within the Scottish Programmes by the end of 2016, which cover the first phase of 
delivery ending in 2018. By the end of 2016, a total of 85 operations have been approved under 
ERDFǡ ? ? ? ?ǡ 崃?Ǥ ? ?  percent of the programme total. The pace of 
commitment and delivery was Ǯnot evenly matchedǯ within the ERDF OP. In the areas of innovation 
and SME competitiveness, commitment was slow, although significant activity Ǯwas being delivered 
at risk in advance of formal approvalǯ ȋ	   ? ? ? ?Ȍ . On the contrary, commitments were 
relatively steady across employability, whereas Ǯdelivery was slow to start in some areasǯ. The areas 
with slower pace of commitment mostly relate to intervention fields not previously receiving 
support (e.g. poverty), or where the type of support materially changed (e.g. innovation centres). 
Significant progress throughout the year and good commitment levels are reported particularly in 
the area of business support. At the same time, a mismatch emerged between committed funding 
and anticipated results, demonstrated by the number of businesses supported, which, less than 
halfway through the programme, is over five times the projection for the whole period (Ibid.). The 
ERDF (especially in the area of Smart Growth) had less funding committed than anticipated by the 
end of 2016, although with a major approval for ICT improvement.  
As concerns the ESF Programme, by November 2016 42 percent of the programme value was 
commit ȋ ? ? ? ?ǡ ?ȌǤ   overall positive commitment rate, variation in performance 
between priorities is apparent (ESF AIR 2016). For instance, while the employability pipelines have 
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delivered one year of activity, progress has been slower on promoting social inclusion and 
combating poverty. The early indications from the Youth Employment Initiative performance 
Ǯcaused concernǯ due to difficulties in reaching the client groups with most intensive needs in the 
context of changes in labour market conditions and the welfare system.  
The main issues affecting 2014-20 programme performance are programme launch delays and 
external factors. First, there was significant work and resource dedicated to closure of the 2007-13 
OPs and to re-performing checks and addressing the audit issues underlying the suspensions for 
2007-13. This diversion of resources led to delays in setting up the Management and Control System. 
The delayed launch of Programmes are seen as potentially impacting negatively on absorption in 
the approved Strategic Interventions. To address this, corrective action included extension of the 
timescales, increases in levels of activity or amendments to projects as required to manage the 
situation as part of the Early Review of Programmes in late 2016 and early 2017 (ERDF AIR 2016).  
The ERDF and ESF AIR 2016 similarly note that the selection of interventions and projects was 
delayed in order to allow the Managing and Audit Authorities to develop the Management and 
Control System in response to the interruptions and suspension of the 2007-13 Programmes and to 
work to resolve the issues which led to these problems. This meant there had been no claims and 
therefore no physical progress to report in the previous AIR. 
In addition, the new requirements for the 2014-20 period, mainly the much tighter compliance 
regime is making project spons Ǯǯ ys in the submission of claims 
(Michie and Dozhdeva 2017). In many cases, the new requirements had not been entirely 
understood and internalised by lead partners. This meant that sometimes the new processes had 
not been put in place, the necessary checks were not being done and the required evidence was not 
being gathered as the programming period progressed, making the catch-up a pertinent issue 
(Ibid.). Lead partners also expressed concerns regarding the volume of data they would be required 
to submit in support of their claims (ERDF and ESF AIR 2016). 
A number of external factors also played a role. AIR 2015 highlights the ongoing uncertainty in the 
global financial picture, which has had local impacts, with recent shocks to the UK and Scottish steel 
    ǯ   ǡ putting ǯ   
significant pressure.   ? ? ? ?ǡ Ǯ here is already some anecdotal evidence suggesting 
that match funding for ERDF will become increasingly scarceǯ and that Ǯjoint prioritisation of areas 
such as innovation will be required across public agencies to ensure the targets remain deliverableǯ. 
The fall in global commodity prices has also had an impact on steel and paper production in 
Scotland whereas the fall in oil prices has had an impact on the energy sector and beyond due to 
reduction in investment and operating expenditure (AIR 2015). This, in its turn, has an impact on the 
amounts available for investment in future technologies like energy-efficient production or low 
carbon as well as ǯ. In addition, this has an impact on 
the ESF OP through increased unemployment (Ibid.). 
Match funding problems are also highlighted in the ERDF and ESF AIR 2016, issues around co-
funding deteriorating through 2016, with lead partners and stakeholders increasingly perceiving 
and reporting it as an issue. Public sources of central match or co-financing of EU funds (relevant to 
much of the ERDF and ESF) continued to be under pressure through public sector budget control.  
Economic uncertainty increased following the EU referendum. The referendum result has had an 
immediate impact on economic and business sentiment in Scotland and the UK. The high degree of 
     ǯ       ? ? ? ? 
beyond (AIR 2016).  
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Turning to the assessment of key stakeholders, Structural Fund programme strategies are 
considered by most interviewees to address the key challenges faced by the Scottish economy 
over last two programme periods. They are seen to have been purposefully aligned with the 
ǯeconomic strategy, which is valued for its approach to supporting business 
competitiveness and inequality reduction and its emphasis on inclusive growth in particular. The 
prevailing view is that the ongoing problems of the economy and the failure to address them cannot 
be attributed to the failure of the Structural Funds. 
Stakeholders consider that ESIF support has generally left a lasting legacy in improving citizens' 
day-to-day lives, while recognising that it is hard to know what the reality would have been in the 
absence of the policy. Infrastructure support Ǯtransformationalǯ in earlier 
periods, particularly in the H&I area, and has allowed communities to continue to exist, especially in 
the Western Isles, while Ǯǯ types of investment have become more prominent in terms of 
supporting employability and business competitiveness. The impact of ESF funding is emphasised 
to have been particularly transformational in terms of addressing high levels of deprivation and 
reducing poverty in specific areas, as well as improving skills by providing training and helping 
people get into work through employability support actions. Support to low-carbon and broadband 
initiatives has also been mentioned as bringing pronounced benefits.  
Yet, it is recognised that the relatively low volume of money spent through ESIF as a share of total 
public spending in Scotland on economic and labour market measures means that the 
   	   Ǥ     ǯ    
ǯǡǤ In broader terms, availability of CP funding for all types 
of regions as well as a wide range of thematic objectives, leading to a lack of thematic 
  Ǯǯ      ǡ   
among the factors limiting the potential effects of Cohesion policy funding. At the same time, the 
targeted ESIF support in specific areas along with increased result-orientation, including through 
specific criteria for project selection, is noted by some stakeholders to be potentially significant in 
terms of inducing change and maximising the positive impact. 
The slow start and delays in the current period, as well as a time lag between delivery on the 
ground and results or impacts, mean that it is not possible to make judgements on the impacts of 
the current programmes in 2014-20. However, the slow launch and start-up of programmes is 
perceived to be a major obstacle to timely implementation. The lack of guidance, the unavailability 
of IT systems as well as the new funding application process (with the two-stage application process, 
applications to strategic interventions preceding applications for operational bids) have contributed 
to delays. The pace of implementation in the current period is considered to be slower than that of 
the previous programme, and stakeholders have been critical of the availability and timeliness of 
guidance and clarifications from the MA. The overlap of the two programming periods, with the 
associated increase in work effort needed to launch the new programme while ensuring the closure 
of the previous one, has contributed to the delays while being a factor largely beyond the MA 
control.  
It is acknowledged that the fallout from the recession and financial crisis has continued to 
impact on delivery requiring adaptation of programmes, restricting the availability of local match 
funding and raising concerns about underspend and absorption. From a development perspective, 
the crisis has impacted on growth, underlying problems in relation to the nature and insecurity of 
employment, and persistent problems related to certain areas of unemployment especially among 
particular groups of the population (including young people). 
The complexity of EU rules and the strictness of compliance requirements for beneficiaries are 
seen as obstacles to delivery and performance. The Scottish delivery system adds to this multi-
tiered complexity, wherein the interpretation of EU and national rules and policies by the MA can be  
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misinterpreted by other actors in the delivery chain. EU reporting requirements, national rules and 
guidance are criticised as bureaucratic, complex and in constant flux. This creates capacity 
difficulties, particularly for smaller organisations involved in delivery, discourages participation and 
leads to questioning  the cost benefit of using the European funds. 
A mismatch between wider strategic orientations and implementation realities has been 
highlighted as a challenge. According to some interviewees, tǮ-ǯ
insufficiently flexible to respond to regional changes. As one of the interviewees noted, too much of 
the policy is done 'in the laboratory', without sufficiently taking into account the reality of the 
situation on the ground. The discrepancy between the priorities set conceptually and strategically 
ȋǤǤ   Ƭ      Ǯ ǯ Ȍ     
match funding, as well as the match funding to be ensured by third sector organisations, to actually 
develop and deliver projects in specific areas is one of the challenges affecting policy efficiency and 
additionality.  
Changes in management and implementation structures from the previous 2007-13 period have 
had a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of programme delivery, according to a majority of the 
interviewed stakeholders outwith the Managing Authority. The perceived reduction in effectiveness 
is primarily due to the greater centralisation of implementation in the hands of a small number of 
Lead Partners leading on project delivery, as well as delayed set-up of systems. While centralisation 
may be justified to facilitate compliance and reduce administrative burden and costs, the 
concentration of management tasks with a small number of entities as well as changes in the 
format of the programmes are generally seen as detrimental for ensuring local reach , Ǯ
 ǯ instead, and leading to the exclusion of a lot of community groups that could access 
funds in the past. More specifically, the changes in the programme structure and delivery 
mechanisms are seen to have had negative effects with regards to the following dimensions: 
- less participative delivery system. Changes in the management are seen to have been to the 
detriment of the wider engagement of social partners in the programmes. Engagement of civil 
society organisations, involving the third sector but also to some extent the small business sector is 
seen as being problematic since the changes. In 2007-13 there were more opportunities for strategic 
engagement or engagement at the level of ongoing Programme monitoring and management, as 
well as delivery. The current opportunities for a range of societal organisations, which could be 
recipients of funding and participants in the delivery of the OPs in 2007-13, to participate in the 
Programme in areas not strictly aligned with the objectives of strategic delivery partners are much 
more limited. In addition, a reduction in the role and influence of local authorities has been noted, 
which  act as lead partners only in a fairly limited strand of the programmes (notably, in  poverty 
and social inclusion, employability and business gateway), and their ability to access funds is 
reduced under strategic interventions controlled by Scottish Government bodies. The new structure 
of funding delivery (through strategic interventions) is seen, in particular by the H&I stakeholders, 
as being insufficiently responsive to the specific needs and challenges faced by different types of 
territories within Scotland. 
- limited communication between various layers in the delivery system, including between Lead 
Partners and other stakeholders, as well as the MA and local authorities / third sector organisations. 
The centralisation of programme governance has not been accompanied by improved 
communication between various actors involved in the delivery. Lead partners sometimes seem to 
Ǯǯǡ
limited. For local authorities or third sector organisations, opportunities for strategic engagement 
with the MA are limited. This engagement is perceived as being less regular than in 2007-13, and 
less information is noted to be available on Programmes performance than previously. It has been 
noted that the MA prefers to communicate with local authorities collectively rather than 
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individually, engagement with the Government at the operational level often taking place through a 
collective representation body (SLAED), which is however not formalised.     
- duplication of effort: There appears to be significant potential for duplication and overlap, 
particularly across the employability and social inclusion focus programmes according to local 
stakeholders, due to the insufficient clarity in terms of focus or delivery agents as well as lack of 
consultation on these issues. A perceived lack of information and knowledge on how the European 
money adds value and aligns with the current local authoritiesǯ funding priorities and streams may 
potentially lead to funding overlaps, according to some local stakeholders and third sector 
organisations.  
- loss of expertise and experience: The fact that IBs are no longer used as a buffer between the 
government and project sponsors has led to a significant loss in the expertise, experience and 
leadership, which is important for ensuring timely and informed implementation. A large share of 
competences previously entrusted to IBs has been brought by the MA in-house, but organisational 
learning takes time and therefore the outsourced approach to managing the funds is viewed by 
some stakeholders as having been more effective. The fact that certain types of organisations (e.g. 
third sector) are not able to be Lead Partners any more is viewed negatively by [some of] them, 
especially given that there existed expectations and readiness to take up the delivery 
responsibilities in the current programme. Such organisations reportedly possessed the necessary 
experience and expertise in managing ESIF and had a proven record of successfully complying with 
the audit requirements and managing public money, and therefore could be a valuable element in 
the ESIF delivery system in Scotland.  
- loss of flexibility in terms of delivery of the Programme: The previously existing implementation 
structure is viewed by some interviewees as having been more effective due to a higher degree of 
flexibility for strategic delivery bodies to deliver the programmed outcomes using the mix of policy 
interventions deemed most suitable for the purpose. Some of that flexibility is considered lost in the 
current programme, with the LPs being more restricted in their choice of delivery mechanisms. 
- excessive audit burden: Many interviewees consider that the anticipated audit burden reduction 
has not actually been achieved. Instead, the changes have passed the burden down to Lead 
Partners, who do not always have sufficient resources to deal with the requirements, particularly at 
a time of public funding restraint. The process of delivering certain strategic interventions is 
referred to as being Ǯincredibly onerousǯ, making compliance more onerous too, which is particularly 
challenging for smaller organisations with limited administrative capacity. Some have however 
expressed hope that the introduction of new simplified cost options/models will eventually result in 
less detailed audit. Improvements in this regard have been noted, e.g. the introduction of a 
simplified cost model for ESF is reported to make transactions easier and more straightforward. At 
the same time, innovations in other domains (e.g. the introduction of the new IT system through E-
Cohesion), despite the positive intentions, are noted to make procedures more onerous and slow 
processes down (for instance from the LEADER perspective). 
There are mixed views about the impact of the new programme architecture Ȃ involving a single 
Scottish-wide Programme Ȃ on programme performance.  
- Weakened territorial dimension. On the one hand, the shift is perceived negatively, particularly 
by H&I stakeholders, by weakening the territorial (sub-regional) focus of the Cohesion policy in 
Scotland. Driven by the reduced funding available, the associated need for rationalisation as well as 
the ǯ, it is considered by interviewees to have diminished the 
relevance of programmes in terms of the specific needs of areas within Scotland making them 
insufficiently responsive to local and regional challenges and opportunities, diminishing the quality 
of monitoring and evaluation and, ultimately, reducing local accountability and ownership. It is felt 
that the specific territorial challenges faced by the H&I region (rurality, insularity, remoteness etc.) 
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are not addressed within the current OP and the necessary focus on H&I-specific issues has been 
lost, which might affect the ability to efficiently deliver the outcomes. On the other hand, an 
alternative viewpoint is that H&I-specific issues in the programme administration and management 
are relatively low key.  
- Increased strategic approach. By contrast, some interviewees consider that the current 
programmes have seen an improvement in the rationale, intervention logic and effectiveness. 
Strategic programming has been far more open and inclusive than previously, even though certain 
sectors have lost out at the implementation stage. The higher standard of partnership working in 
drafting the programmes, however, does not necessarily translate into improved partnership at the 
delivery stage. Although local authorities, for instance, have a more active role in a number of areas 
(e.g. ESF-related issues), and a range of agencies and partners of the Scottish political and policy 
landscape are more empowered than previously, this empowerment is conditional on pre-existing 
resources and networks, which have a strong influence on decision-making outcomes. The delivery 
record is therefore in some ways inevitably but in others consciously less open and transparent than 
in the policy formation stage.     
The MA consider that the effectiveness of implementation arrangements has increased owing to a 
more streamlined approach (due to the reduction of a number of Lead Partners) as well as the 
insurance of more effective error prevention mechanisms thanks to the identification of those LPs 
who had robust procurement systems and monitoring/control structures in place. This is expected 
to reduce the error rates and prevent the previously identified issues around compliance and 
suspension risks. At the same time, there are difficulties linked to the reduction in the number of 
staff working in structural funding within the LPs as well as the increased intensity of compliance 
requirements in 2014-20. 
Related to that, regional stakeholders interviewed consider that there is now a strong focus on and 
prioritisation of compliance, above other considerations such as performance or publicising 
achievements. The need to meet the auditing requirements and minimise the risk of non-
compliance (that arose in the earlier programme) are seen as some of the main drivers behind the 
recent changes in the implementation framework. Despite the legitimacy of the rationale, the 
Ǯǯ      -averse approach adopted in the current period is 
seen as excessive and as leading, among other things, to capacity issues (especially for smaller local 
authorities), discouragement of organisations from engaging in the policy, slowing down processes, 
and overlooking of other priorities. The compliance-driven approach is seen to be largely driven also 
by the prevalent mentality at the EU level, wherein the prioritisation of financial and procedural 
compliance still dominates, despite the recent shift of focus Ȃ at least in policy rhetoric Ȃ towards 
the performance-orientation. Given the experience in the 2007-13 programme, the MA has 
implemented a number of structural changes and allocated more considerable priority to the 
quality of checking processes to ensure higher levels of compliance, although notes that the 
learning process for some organisations is taking time.  
Performance and communication are seen to be secondary considerations with the main focus 
being on compliance and absorption to ensure funding is spent and not decommitted. 
Communication is often seen as Ǯǯ
right. At the same time, it has been noted that the relative priority placed on the different tasks 
largely varies depending on the programming stage. If compliance and spending concerns 
dominate the first stages (sometimes, as noted, to the exclusion of everything else), performance 
becomes more relevant as the programmes implementation progresses because committed and 
compliant projects are preconditions for demonstrable results and performance. In turn, 
achievements are crucial to publicise the success of the programmes, although ongoing 
communication from the outset of the programmes is also considered important. 
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At the time of the interviews in mid-2017, acceleration of spending was noted to be among the 
most pressing concerns, although compliance considerations were still deemed important. The 
relatively short time window and so the increasingly tight timescale for committing the remaining 
funds and the associated risk of decommittment were viewed as a critical factor driving this 
approach. The MA emphasised that mechanisms were in place to ensure meeting the overall 
programme spending targets, notably the delivery system designed to commit funding in two 
phases to allow for the necessary corrections and modifications throughout the process. In addition, 
a change from the previous period was highlighted in the sense of a greater focus on the actual 
delivery of the outcomes through closer monitoring and more proactive information sharing with 
LPs on the outputs and outcomes Ȃ a process, however, hindered by the slow start of the 
programme.  
The majority of stakeholder survey respondents provided a positive assessment of the 
effectiveness of the use of Cohesion policy funds in Scotland (see Table 6). Over 55 percent of 
respondents consider that the funds have been used well or very well in their municipality or region, 
while 28 percent agree that they have been used in an acceptable manner. Negative assessments of 
the ESIF are less common, with only 11 percent ǯǮǯǤ
no variation in the assessment depending on the territorial scale at which the funds were used 
(regional or local).  
Table 6: Stakeholder survey Q1. How well Ȃ in your opinion Ȃ have Cohesion policy funds been used in your 
municipality and region? 
 Very well Well Acceptable Poorly Very poorly ǯ 
Your municipality 11.1% 44.4% 27.8% 11.1% 0.0% 5.6% 
Your region 11.1% 44.4% 27.8% 11.1% 0.0% 5.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
Cohesion policy objectives are generally seen as being aligned Ȃ strongly or in some way Ȃ with the 
development objectives at both local and regional levels (see Table 7). This finding can be viewed as 
supplementing those responses gathered through the interview research that highlight the 
alignment between Structural Fund programme strategies with the national level economic 
development strategy. 
Table 7: Stakeholder survey Q2. To what extent have the Cohesion policy objectives reinforced the 
development objectives of your municipality and region?  
 Completely Largely In some way Not much Not at all ǯ 
Your municipality 0.0% 33.3% 55.6% 5.6% 0.0% 5.6% 
Your region 0.0% 33.3% 55.6% 5.6% 0.0% 5.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
ǯ
strategic alignment with the local and regional development priorities, most respondents see a 
limited impact Ȃ or no impact whatsoever Ȃ of Cohesion policy fundsǯ on the reduction of inter-
regional and intra-regional disparities, as well as the EU-wide development gap at country level (see 
Table 8). While the effects of ESIF on reducing disparities between poorer and richer regions in the 
country are assessed marginally more positively, views on the impact of Cohesion policy funding on 
reducing the gap between rural and urban areas within the region are more divided. Half of 
respondents see no impact at all on the reduction of disparities between poorer and richer areas 
within the region, as well as between the UK and other EU Member states. 
Table 8: Stakeholder survey Q3. To what extent have Cohesion policy funds helped to increase or decrease:  
 Decreased Somewhat 
decreased 
Had no 
impact 
Somewhat 
increased 
Increased ǯ
know 
Differences in the development level between 0.0% 50.0% 27.8% 16.7% 5.6% 0.0% 
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poorer and richer regions in your country 
Differences in the development level between 
rural and urban areas in your region 5.6% 22.2% 38.9% 22.2% 5.6% 5.6% 
Differences in the development level between 
poorer and richer areas in your region 0.0% 27.8% 50.0% 16.7% 5.6% 0.0% 
Differences in the development level between 
your country and other EU Member states  0.0% 22.2% 50.0% 5.6% 5.6% 16.7% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
The main reported policy implementation problems are excessive audit and control, as well as 
the complexity of rules and procedures determining access to Cohesion policy financing, along 
with excessive reporting requirements (see Table 9). These responses are largely in line with the 
interview findings, highlighting the complexity of Cohesion policy- related rules and the strictness 
of compliance requirements for beneficiaries as factors hindering delivery and performance. Lack of 
co-financing has also been mentioned as a strong constraining factor, which was also picked up 
through the desk and interview research. 
Some respondents have highlighted that the above mentioned issues have characterised 
programme implementation across a number of programming periods (being less pronounced in 
Objective 1 in 1994-99 and HISTP in 2000-06), although assess the current period more critically, 
particularly with regards to the centralisation and delayed pace of management, governance and 
delivery. 
Despite the relatively low share of ESIF funding as compared to the size of the economy, the 
relatively small level Cohesion policy funding is not viewed as a major obstacle to effective 
implementation. Administrative capacity issues are also not viewed as a major constraint.  
Open ended responses to the survey highlighted additional factors affecting implementation 
included unclear targeting, duplication of focus, lack of clarity in regulations, as well as excessive 
sanctions for non-compliance with procurement rules , which may lead to unjustified penalisation of 
good projects.  
Table 9: Stakeholder survey Q5.  How significant was the impact of the following problems and challenges 
during the implementation of Cohesion policy projects?  
 Very 
significant  
Significant  Average  Insignificant  Not  
at all 
ǯ
know 
Scarcity of Cohesion policy funds 5.6% 16.7% 33.3% 16.7% 16.7% 11.1% 
Problems with obtaining Cohesion policy 
financing such as complicated rules for 
submitting applications 44.4% 44.4% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Excessive, cumbersome reporting 44.4% 44.4% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Unclear objectives for evaluating project 
results  11.1% 44.4% 27.8% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Poor cooperation between project partners 0.0% 16.7% 50.0% 22.2% 5.6% 5.6% 
Excessive audit and control during or after 
the project completion 61.1% 33.3% 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lack of funds for own contribution (co-
financing) 11.1% 55.6% 22.2% 5.6% 0.0% 5.6% 
Difficult access to credit and/or loans for 
own contribution 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 16.7% 11.1% 38.9% 
Lack of capacity such as qualified staff 0.0% 16.7% 33.3% 33.3% 11.1% 5.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
In line with the previously identified predominantly positive perception of the alignment between 
Cohesion policy and regional/local development objectives, most respondents consider that ESIF 
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respond well to the actual needs of their region or municipality, channelling funding to the right 
projectsǤǯappreciation of 
ESIF projects, although a relatively large proportion of respondents are not certain whether these 
projects are actually valued the most by the local population Ȃ potentially raising questions about 
the effectiveness of communication, along with the discrepancy between the real and perceived 
needs.  
Around three quarters (72 percent) of respondents agree that many positive changes took place in 
their municipality or region, which would not have been achieved without the funds Ȃ thus 
emphasising the added-value and transformational impact of Cohesion policy funding in Scotland. 
The views on the general adequacy of control over ESIF spending are largely positive, despite the 
previously identified discontent with the overly risk-averse approach adopted in the current period, 
sometimes seen as excessive. Less agreement can be noted with regard to the administrative 
efficiency of Cohesion policy delivery, which may be related to the previously mentioned criticisms 
over the recent shifts in programme architecture and implementation arrangements.  
Despite the perceivably adequate control over ESIF spending, non-compliance with EU rules has 
led to a large number of irregularities according to nearly 40 percent of respondents. As also 
identified through desk and interview research, non-compliance issues were among the main 
drivers behind the changes in the delivery mechanisms for 2014-20, and are also linked to the 
complexity of EU rules. However, fraud in ESIF spending in Scotland is not seen to be common by a 
vast majority (over 72 percent) of respondents (see Table 10). 
Table 10: Stakeholder survey Q6. How strongly do you agree/disagree with the following statements:  
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree  
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
ǯ
know 
Cohesion policy funds finance those investment projects 
which your municipality/region needs the most  5.6% 61.1% 16.7% 11.1% 0.0% 5.6% 
In your municipality/region Cohesion policy  funding 
goes to investment projects which are most valued by 
the local residents  0.0% 38.9% 33.3% 11.1% 5.6% 11.1% 
There are many irregularities in spending Cohesion 
policy funds due to non-compliance with EU rules 0.0% 38.9% 22.2% 27.8% 0.0% 11.1% 
Fraud, such as corruption or nepotism, is common in 
spending Cohesion policy funds 5.6% 5.6% 0.0% 33.3% 38.9% 16.7% 
There have been many positive changes in your 
municipality/region thanks to Cohesion policy funds, 
which would not have been achieved without the funds  16.7% 55.6% 16.7% 5.6% 0.0% 5.6% 
The spending of Cohesion policy funds is adequately 
controlled  16.7% 61.1% 5.6% 11.1% 0.0% 5.6% 
The money from Cohesion policy funds is in most cases 
wasted on the wrong projects 0.0% 5.6% 22.2% 50.0% 16.7% 5.6% 
The administration of Cohesion policy has been 
delivered in an efficient (cost-effective) manner 0.0% 16.7% 16.7% 44.4% 11.1% 11.1% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
Stakeholder views on the adequacy and effectiveness of the existing monitoring and evaluation 
arrangements are divided (see Table 11). Programme monitoring and evaluation reports are 
considered to lack clarity (39 percent), and their accessibility and influence on policy-making is 
doubtful, according to more than half of the respondents.   
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Table 11: Stakeholder survey Q8. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
ǯ
know 
The monitoring and evaluation reports provide 
adequate information on the implementation and 
performance of the programme/s 0.0% 44.4% 22.2% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 
The monitoring and evaluation reports of the 
programme/s are easily accessible  0.0% 27.8% 5.6% 55.6% 0.0% 11.1% 
The monitoring and evaluation reports of the 
programme/s are easy to understand 0.0% 27.8% 33.3% 38.9% 0.0% 0.0% 
The monitoring and evaluation report results are used 
to improve policy-making and implementation 0.0% 27.8% 11.1% 50.0% 5.6% 5.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
Participation in training and knowledge-exchange varies across topics with the greatest focus 
being on management issues (where two thirds of respondents reported participation in workshops 
or training), as well as monitoring and control (half of the respondents). Participation in 
communication-related sessions is lowest, which is in line with the identified lack of prioritisation of 
communication among the hierarchy of programme priorities. Overall, more than three quarters (77 
percent) of respondents reported participation in at least one type of workshop or training sessions 
in the last two years (see Table 12). 
 
Table 12: Stakeholder survey Q9. In what Cohesion policy workshop or training sessions did the 
representatives of your organisation/municipality/region participate in the last two years (select all that 
apply)? 
  Management Control Monitoring Evaluation Communication Nobody participated 
in such events 
No  33.3% 50.0% 50.0% 61.1% 72.2% 77.8% 
Yes 66.7% 50.0% 50.0% 38.9% 27.8% 22.2% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
3.2.2 Partnership  
 
Analysis of ESIF Programmes implementation in 2007-13 (PMC) has identified a number of issues 
that had a negative impact on the workings of the management committee including: 
- long time taken to determine the purpose of the group 
- Ǯǯ 
projects rather than taking a more strategic overview 
- PMC members (in particular substitutes) often being programme experts rather than more 
Ǯstrategicǯ people 
- (sometimes) lack of consistency, or duplication of effort, between the two PMCs 
- (sometimes) lack of clarity of papers prepared by the MA. 
The interview research highlighted a number of drawbacks. With respect to the ǯ
membership,  the Ǯǯ with most of the participants 
having limited experience or hands-on involvement in strategic interventions or European 
programmes, which does not always allow for detailed discussion of delivery on the ground. Local 
stakeholders and economic and social partners are critical of the composition describing meeting as 
not being well attended with limited private sector representation as well as more limited 
representation of local partners and actors as compared to Scottish government and European civil 
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servants. Opportunities for the engagement of third sector organisations have also decreased, and 
certain disengagement of the third sector from the JPMC is reported. Overall, there is perceived to 
be unrealised potential in using the expertise and insight of a wider range of stakeholders, which 
can potentially impact performance.  
Turning to the organisation of meetings, some partners were critical of their frequency . The JPMC 
meets only twice a year for two hours, which is regarded insufficient for meaningful discussion of 
implementation progress. Wide-ranging and technical agenda may discourage wider participation 
at the same time as not allowing for detailed discussion. The standards of papers going to the 
committee have been reported     Ǯ ǯ   ǡ  
information and not being available well in advance of the meetings. 
Finally, the impacts on policymaking and accountability were questioned. The committee has 
been noted to be limited in its ability to influence decision-making, with its role being largely 
confined to raising membersǯ awareness of programme performance and a lot of decisions being 
taken before matters actually reach the meetings. Scrutiny of the JPMC and direct accountability to 
the public appears limited, with lack of publicity (including relevant media releases) on the decisions 
ǤǮǯǡnavigate 
and find it. In addition, there is limited awareness or interest by the public, nor would they be able 
Ǯǯthat is made available, as it is mostly statistical/technical or strategic. 
While JPMC meetings are viewed as useful by some stakeholders, regular direct contacts with the 
MA are described as being more useful as they allow for more detailed discussion of the actual 
delivery of the Programme. A need for more regular informal meetings bringing together 
stakeholders working on common themes was voiced, at a level below the JPMC. 
The MA recognised the existence of certain drawbacks in the way the JPMC is currently functioning, 
at least in terms of unrealised potential. While the importance and necessity of maintaining the 
JPMC was emphasised, the possibility of introducing another level enabling fruitful and meaningful 
discussion about the programme priorities and progress was noted. It is hoped that this could 
enhance the quality of partnership working.  
As regards the Highlands and Islands Territorial Committee, the lack of a strong formal status has 
raised questions about its value. There is a feeling that the committee is not fully delivering on its 
core task of overseeing progress of spend on various strategic interventions in the H&I due to a 
perceived lack of formal responsibility or input into programme implementation in the region, from 
the setting up of the strategic interventions to their delivery. This is perceived as a deterioration 
compared to the previous period, where involvement of regional stakeholders in programme 
delivery was better ensured through a dedicated OP and management structure. 
The H&I representatives have noted that the shift from a separate H&I programme to a single 
Scottish OP has changed the dynamics of ESIF-related partnership in Scotland, leading to a lower 
level of Ǯǯǡ
collective responsibility in delivering the Programmes. There is a feeling that the existing 
partnership structure does not allow to address sufficiently the specific regional needs of H&I. Since 
the administration and running of the group is ensured by the MA, most of the information and 
analysis presented at the meetings is Scotland-wide rather than H&I-specific. Although this is 
starting to change, the H&I territorial committee has not so far managed to demonstrate its real 
value. 
By contrast, one stakeholder noted that engagement under the LEADER programme was 
     Ǯ ǯǤ   Community 
Planning Partnerships (CPP) ǯ
participation. Openness to the broader public is however not implicit, as most meetings have a 
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closed character due to sensitive project information being often discussed. However, committee 
minutes are published online providing accountability. 
The MA engagement with local authorities mostly takes place through a collective representation 
body (SLAED), which is however not formalised. The group is mainly made up of European project 
officers and is not particularly open to the public per se but does nevertheless represent local 
government interests. It presents a forum to discuss challenges and seek clarifications from the SG 
with regards to the implementation of the programmes. 
In addition, concerns were expressed by some civil society organisations regarding the lack of 
engagement in the current period (due to the decreased influence opportunities for civil society 
organisations through the JPMC), which have led to the set-up of a separate channel for dialogue 
and engagement Ȃ a civil society forum. However, it has been noted to be largely non-functional at 
present.  
Overall, local stakeholders consider that changes in the implementation arrangements in the 
current period (including delivery through strategic partners and a shift to a Scotland-wide OP) have 
worked to the detriment of wider engagement into programme implementation. The decreased 
engagement of local and third sector stakeholders, among other things, has reduced flows of 
information and decreased a sense of local ownership. On the other hand, the MA reports that the 
new structure is more effective and efficient since the programme is dealing with a smaller number 
of lead partners.  
In terms of the UK-wide partnership, the MA reported high degree of autonomy in delivering the 
Scottish OPs as agreed in the framework of the Partnership Agreement and lack of interference in 
the delivery of the programme by central government, which is viewed positively but is not new. 
The opinions from stakeholder survey respondents on the effectiveness as well as inclusiveness and 
openness of the programme partnership are divided (see Table 13). While a marginally larger share 
of respondents believe that the programme partnership operates in an inclusive, open and fair 
     ǯ     ȋ ? ? Ȍǡ 
view on partners as being only interested in promoting their own organisational and financial 
interests is equally relatively widespread (39 percent). 
 
Table 13: Stakeholder survey Q7. The partnership principle requires the participation of a wide range of 
partners throughout the different stages of programming and implementation through consultations, 
monitoring committee work and other mechanisms. How strongly do you agree or disagree with the 
following statements about the operation of the partnership principle in practice? 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
ǯ
know 
The way the programme partnership operates is 
inclusive, open and fair 0.0% 38.9% 22.2% 33.3% 0.0% 5.6% 
ǯ
facilitates a shared understanding and shared 
commitment by paǯ
objectives 0.0% 38.9% 33.3% 27.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Partners are only interested in promoting their own 
organisational and financial interests  0.0% 38.9% 33.3% 27.8% 0.0% 0.0% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
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3.3 Assessment of added value 
 
According to Tyler (2012a), evidence from impact evaluations was scarce and thus there was very 
little evidence on additionality. However, the added value of EU Cohesion policy is still reported in 
two main areas. From a financial and economic perspective, business support co-funding is reported 
to have created additional gross value added and employment than would have been the case in the 
absence of support. Additionality in this sense was relatively high and Ǯsupport to business was 
meeting an important needǯȋǤȌ. 
Governance and related democratic additionality is a second area of added value. The delivery of 
Structural Funds in Scotland has had a significant impact on partnership working mechanisms 
historically. In the period under investigation, an evaluation (Blake Stevenson 2011) looking at how 
the CPPs have responded to their new role in delivering ESIF has found that CPPs have adopted a 
more strategic approach, developing local employment strategies, as a consequence of having 
responsibility for co-ordinating the use of European funds, while delivery through CPPs has led to 
more effective use of Structural Funds. A major achievement of the initiative of routing Structural 
Funds through CPPs has been the impact it has had on partnership working as well as on 
policy/strategic innovation. While in some areas the funding allowed for the development or 
refinement of employability programmes that were already taking shape, in others the impact was 
more dramatic in that the partnership approach to employability provision required by ESIF has 
fundamentally changed the way the area works. The latter resulted in partners implementing 
strategic approaches to employability for the first time, allowing for the services and approaches 
become Ǯfar more joined up than was the case historicallyǯȋǤȌ.  
The interviews with stakeholders highlighted EU Cohesion policy added value in strategic, 
administrative, democratic and financial terms. 
Strategic added value. Structural Funds are viewed as a major driver behind the development in 
the UK and therefore Scotland of the concept of regional policy, in the sense of a strategic long-
term policy addressing economic development challenges specific to particular areas, which was 
largely absent before the access to EU funding and might be affected in light of the recent events Ȃ 
the future of regional policy in the UK after Brexit being under question. CP is seen as enabling 
spatially targeted interventions that would otherwise not have happened.  
Structural Funds are seen as providing a more certain, stable, reliable and long-term framework for 
regional policy planning and delivery than many domestic programmes, which are viewed as being 
more vague in content and/or unreliable over long and medium term. They are also seen to be a 
useful tool for a devolved government and less subject to the vagaries of politics, among other 

ǯǤ Value 
is also seen in the alignment and negotiation of national and local spending priorities. The 
continuity and certainty of Cohesion policy funding are seen as crucial for ensuring commitment of 
providers and securing match funding in sectors like skills development and training. The absence 
of a multi-annual funding framework would raise additional risks or reduce the scale and ambition 
of interventions. Funding additionality is viewed as providing added value and opportunities for 
development. The challenge is to avoid further erosion of the additionality effect of Structural 
	   Ǯǯ Ǯǯ, which 
risks hindering innovative approaches to providing support. While SFs do not drive policy to a great 
extent (due to the relatively low share of funding), the Funds can act as change drivers. For instance, 
in the area of higher skills, SFs have been used to try to get higher skills linked to specific industries, 
which might become mainstreamed. This also applies to low carbon economy interventions, where 
SFs are used to build a pipeline of interventions, and  Ǯemployability pipelineǯ
used by the local authorities up and running.  
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Administrative and democratic add value. Stimulation of partnership work has been highlighted as 
one of the main achievements of CP, as well as the mainstreaming of new and more efficient ways 
of working such as e.g. employability pipelines where through the programmes different 
stakeholders and service providers are encouraged to work together in a coherent way Ȃ something 
which has also become mainstreamed into wider employability policy. Accountability and local 
empowerment that CP provides have been noted among the key elements of added value 
benefitting Scotland over decades. 
SFs have supported several key projects which have involved mobilisation of stakeholders in a 
meaningful way, including through the Cities Alliance and the employability pipelines of the local 
authorities. The best-functioning employability pipelines have generated genuine partnership, and 
this coordination would not have happened without SFs. Research has found that the employability 
pipeline approach has enabled local partnerships to develop a more strategic approach, in particular 
towards partnership working, improving outcomes and leading to a more client centred approach 
(TERU 2015). By working together, the Cities Alliance partners share knowledge and create projects 
of scale which offer greater investment prospects.  
x The Employability Pipeline Strategic Intervention was one of the first to be approved 
under the 2014-20 programmes in Scotland and to spring 2017, £43.7 million in ESF has 
been approved up to the end of 2018 for the lead partners Skills Development Scotland and 
ǯ ? ?ities. ESF support has been crucial in rolling out the employability 
pipeline model, which has become mainstream across employment and training 
organisations in Scotland. The employability pipeline model has been developed as a 
framework to support the effective delivery of employability services. The pipeline is made 
up of five key stages, whereby the needs of the individual are considered in relation to 
existing soft skills, employability skills and skills requiring development. The pipeline 
concept was introduced in order to Ǯprovide a structured approach to the organisation and 
delivery of services to  unemployed  people  in  Scotlandǯ,  especially  the long  term  
unemployed. A wide range of partners (including local authorities, national skills agencies 
and government departments, local colleges and third sector representatives) are involved 
in the design and management of most employability pipelines. Most also draw on a wide 
range of organisations to deliver their pipeline (TERU 2015). 
x The Scottish Cities Alliance ǯȋǡ
Dundee, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Inverness, Perth and Stirling) and the Scottish Government, 
working together to promote the economic potential of the country. The Alliance was 
established in 2011 to jointly promote economic development and develop a long-term 
  ǡ         ǯ Ǥ
             
ǯ
refreshed Agenda for Cities and International Trade and Investment Strategy. It secured £10 
	 Ǯǯ  ? Ȃ 
ǯǡ ? ? ? ramme to take 
forward co-designed technology and data opportunities that will help achieve the cities' 
ambitions to be global hi-tech hubs. 
In addition, the opportunity to collaborate, exchange experience and learn from other organisations 
involved in the delivery of Structural Funds programmers, including through transnational 
cooperation initiatives, is highly valued by stakeholders. 
The financial added-value capacity of Cohesion policy was considered to be more limited owing to 
the relatively low share of EU funding in domestic expenditure (£828 million for SFs versus £30 
ȌǮǯ
ǤǡǮǯ
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terms of the development of small interventions and what is achieved, CP is seen as lacking 
capacity to generate really significant changes. At the same time, it was noted that in specific cases, 
the ESIF contribution can be very consideraǡǯ
(e.g. third sector) turnover, and although the overall share of Cohesion funding in Scotland is 
limited, targeted support in specific areas can be very perceptible and change-inducing (e.g. in the 
areas of skill development or youth unemployment). 
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4. Cohesion policy communication 
 
4.1 Approach to communication 
 
A single communication strategy was established for all programmes in both periods. As noted, 
    ? ? ? ?Ǥ ? ? ?      ? ? ? ? -13 through four operational 
programmes for the Highlands & Islands and for Lowlands & Uplands Scotland. For the 2014-2020 
ǡ ? ? ? ? ed number of OPs (two instead 
of four) covering the whole of Scotland. A key change in the new programme structure (with large-
scale funding allocations known as Strategic Interventions allocated to and administered by Lead 
Partners) is that Lead Partners now take on the task of communicating with potential applicants.  
This section reviews the approach to Structural Funds communication in the 2007-13 and 2014-20 
periods, drawing on Communications Plans for the OPs, the Annual Implementation Reports, 
evaluations and interviews with stakeholders. 
4.1.1 Overall approach to communication 
A) 2007-13 period  
The 2007-13 Communication plan in Scotland applies to all four ERDF and ESF OPs in the Highlands 
& Islands and Lowlands & Uplands. The plan distinguishes aims and objectives, the overarching 
aims being: 
x Promote the role of the EU and the contribution Structural Funds makes to Scotland in 
helping to add value to the Scottish Government national strategies 
x Raise awareness and understanding of the funding opportunities offered by the EU by 
providing clear information and guidance by publicising best practice 
x Identify who needs to know what, by when and how, in relation to the four Structural Funds 
Programmes operating in Scotland for 2007-13 
x Ensure that the communication and publicity is clear, transparent, accessible and 
appropriate, and ensure this works with key partners to complement their communications 
activity 
x Ensure that stakeholders are aware and understand the impact of changes to the European 
Structural Funds Programmes in Scotland, in terms of funding, in terms of policy and in the 
delivery of the funds, and 
x Ensure full compliance with EU regulatory requirements on information and publicity. 
Key objectives to fulfil the aims are: 
x Promote the use of European Structural Funds in helping Scotland contribute to the Lisbon 
and Gothenburg agendas for sustainable economic growth 
x Explain how European Structural Fund Programmes will complement and add value to 
Scottish national regional and local policies 
x Provide clear guidance and access to information about applying for, and progressing 
through the 2007Ȃ2013 programmes 
x Include all stakeholders with a common and consistent approach, ensuring that information 
is processed in a consistent way 
x Engage in ongoing discussion with relevant stakeholder groups, ensuring beneficiaries 
make their participants aware of the ERDF and ESF Programmes through their projects 
x Publicise the activities and achievements of the ERDF and ESF programmes in appropriate 
media at national, regional and local levels 
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x Comply with EU regulatory requirements on information and publicity at all stages and all 
levels of the programmes, and 
x Monitor, review and improve publicity and information measures during the life of the 
programmes. 
The plan states that information and communication needs of audiences will vary and identifies the 
following groups of stakeholders to target communication activity effectively (with subgroups 
named in an Annex):  
x Scottish Ministers 
x Scottish Government Communications Teams 
x Scottish Government Directorates/Divisions/agencies 
x European Structural Funds Division 
x Government Organisations 
x Political parties, MPs, MSPs, and MEPs 
x Intermediate Administration Bodies/Strategic Delivery Bodies/Global Grant 
Bodies/Community Planning Partnerships 
x Structural Funds Partners/Practitioners/Potential and actual beneficiaries 
x General public. 
The plan identifies three key messages to communicate: 
x Scotland still receives significant funding in this Programme period, which provides a great 
opportunit     ǯ    Ǥ    
reduction compared to funds received for 2000-06 Programmes. 
x With the possibility that 2007-13 will be the last programming period with significant 
Structural Funds support allocated to Scotland, there is a greater emphasis on assisting 
strategic, legacy projects and on encouraging partners to put in place exit strategies. 
x The Programmes reflect the importance the Commission has attached to the types of 
activities that directly support the Lisbon and Gothenburg goals. A proportion of each 
ǯǤ 
The main activities foreseen in the plan are: 
x Events Ȃ publicity events, Programme launches and technical events; 
x Websites Ȃ Scottish Government and Intermediate Administration Bodies (IABs); 
x Direct engagement with stakeholders and target groups Ȃ networks, meetings, press 
releases and newsletters; 
x Branding; and 
x Flying of the flag of the European Union. 
B) 2014-2020 period 
As in 2007-13, the Communications Strategy for 2014-20 covers both Structural Funds (ESF and 
ERDF) under all OPs which have been reduced from four to two programmes covering the whole of 
Scotland. The overall approach to communications for the ESIF programmes in Scotland in 2014-20 
is somewhat low-key and low-budget, mainly because the emphasis on communications has 
changed to reflect the new programme structure in 2014-20 (Mendez et al. 2016). The emphasis for 
the MA is now on communicating with the wider public on what the Funds are achieving, rather 
than on communicating with potential applicants on how to access the Funds, as in 2007-13 (Ibid.). 
The new programme structure (with large-scale funding allocations Ȃ    ? ? 崀   Ȃ 
named ǮStrategic Interventionsǯǡ allocated to and administered by Lead Partners) means that the 
Lead Partners are now responsible for communicating with potential applicants.  
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The 2014-20 strategy sets out the following aims: 
x Promote the role of the EU and the contribution European Structural and Investment Funds 
make to Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth in Scotland and the EU 2020 Strategy;  
x Ensure lead partners and other interested parties understand the new ERDF and ESF 
funding structures; 
x Ensure lead partners fully comply with the communications obligations, and that they work 
with the Managing Authority to maximise ERDF and ESF publicity; 
x Ensure effective supportive measures are in place to maintain the communications 
partnership between the Managing Authority and lead partners; 
x Ensure the communications activities of the Managing Authority and lead partners 
        ǯ 
priorities of Smart Growth, Sustainable Growth and Inclusive Growth; 
x Ensure consistency of messaging about ESIF in the communications activities of the 
Managing Authority and support consistency in the activities of lead partners; 
x Ensure effective monitoring and evaluation measures are in place to improve 
communications activity in the long term and to support continuous improvement. 
The key changes compared to 2007-13 are the emphasis on the new EU-level priorities (Europe 2020 
Ȍ        ǡ ǣ     Ǯ
ǯ   lementation in the current period and the associated need to ensure 
that lead partners fully comply with the communications obligations and work with the MA to 
maximise ERDF and ESF publicity, and that effective supportive measures are in place to maintain 
the communications partnership between the MA and lead partners. 
The main actions tȋǮǯ ? ? ? ? -13) include: 
x Developing key messages for European Structural and Investment Funds to support clarity 
and consistency of messaging across Managing Authority and lead partner communication 
channels, and to strengthen partnership communications activity; 
x Maintaining the Managing Authority website to provide a reliable online information source 
for use by the Managing Authority, lead partners and other interested parties; 
x Proactively maintaining Managing Authority social media channels to promote the 
programmes, and working with lead partners to coordinate and share relevant information 
through social media; 
x Supporting lead partners in fulfilling their obligations set out in the publicity requirements; 
x Setting up a communications network for the Managing Authority and lead partners to 
share information and learning, and to support and promote communications best practice; 
x Proactively identifying events and opportunities to widely promote the ESIF 2014-20 
programmes; 
x Participating in EU-level communications networks to support continuous improvement in 
communications activity about the programmes in Scotland; 
x Effectively monitoring and evaluating Managing Authority communications activity to 
support continuous improvement.  
In line with the new aims of the communications strategy in 2014-20, reflecting changes in the 
programme structure, new actions relate, among others, to the development of key messages for 
ESIF to support clarity and consistency of messaging across the MA and lead partner 
communication channels, and the overall strengthening of partnership communications activity. 
Reference to a communications network to be set up in order to allow the MA and lead partners to 
share information and best practices, as well as to participation in EU-level communications 
networks is a novelty in the current communications strategy. In addition, the 2014-20 document 
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specifically highlights the importance of using social media channels for communication purposes, 
which was not the case in 2007-13. 
The target groups listed in the 2014-20 strategy are largely coherent with the groups of audiences 
highlighted in 2007-13, although with certain ȋǡǮǯ
explicitly marked out among main target groups10). The 2014-20 strategy refers to the following 
groups: 
x Scottish Ministers; 
x Scottish Government Communications Teams;  
x Scottish Government Directorates and Divisions;  
x Lead Partners Ȃ Scottish Enterprise, Highlands and Islands Enterprise, Transport Scotland, 
Scottish Natural Heritage, Zero Waste Scotland, Skills Development Scotland, Scottish 
Funding Council, Local Authorities;  
x Lead Partner Delivery Agents;  
x Third Sector organisations; 
x Political Representatives Ȃ MPs, MSPs and MEPs;  
x European Commission Ȃ communications staff;  
x Member States Ȃ European Structural and Investment Fund and communications officials.  
Messages for ESIF activity are expected to be tailored depending on the audience and the channel 
being used. The strategic core messages below are designed for general use by the Managing 
Authority and lead partners when promoting ESIF, although it is recognised that they will be 
tailored to suit particular channels and audiences: 
x The ESIF 2014-20 programme will help facilitate major investments to support 
transformational change and economic and social structural reforms across Scotland; 
x The 2014-20 ESIF programmes will be invested in tandem with significantly larger public 
funds, working together to enable large-scale economic and social structural reforms; 
x The ESIF programmes aim to support the delivery of the EU 2020 Strategy priorities of 
Smart Growth, Sustainable Growth and Inclusive Growth; 
x T 	    ? ?Ǥ ? ? ?  ǡ  	       ? ? ? ?  million, including 
matched funding from lead partners; 
x The European priorities of Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth will deliver benefits to 
people and communities across Scotland including helping to build an innovative, low-
 ǡ     ǯ ǡ  ǡ
increasing workforce skills and providing practical routes into work for people facing 
multiple employment barriers; 
x Programme partners are working ambitiously to ensure ESIF successfully delivers long-term 
growth for Scotland and for Europe. 
There is continuity in the communication activities and measures for 2014-20 (e.g. press releases, 
events), albeit with some changes.  
First, there is a new emphasis on social media and online activity. The Managing Authority recently 
set up a Twitter account @scotgovESIF. The account is used to distribute accurate, up to date 
information about the new programmes, as well as other relevant information of interest to 
stakeholders. In particular, the account aims to drive viewers to the website where relevant 
information is posted. During calls for applications, the ESIF website Ǯkept up to date with 
application rounds, approvals and Lead Partner guidanceǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ . The redesign of the Scottish 

ǯ     ? ? ? ?           
                                                                    
10 although the relevance of the general public in the overall context of ESIF communication activities is not disregarded (as evident e.g. 
from other sections of the communications strategy) 
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development of a new blog for ESIF. Overall, currently communications are broadcast via online 
blogging, Twitter and the Scottish Government website. It is expected that the mix of relevant tools 
(including the Events and Content Planner, Hootsuite and Web Analytics) will improve the MA 
social media presence (Ibid.). Lead Partners and stakeholders are encouraged to follow the MA new 
blog to keep up to date with ESIF 2014-20 activities such as announcements and case studies. Lead 
Partners and projects are also expected to increasingly use digital technology to communicate, and 
social media channels such as Facebook and Twitter can be used as a platform to promote events 
(e.g. Europe Day) and the results. Apart from online media, print and broadcast media continue to 
be used by the MA as a channel to promote ESIF activity to a wide audience. The MA issues press 
releases focusing on strategic activity, the responsibility for which sits with the ESIF 
Communications Officer with support from the Governance Team. Press releases are seen as an 
important way of engaging with the media and communicating messages to the general public. 
News releases are published on the SG news pages for any ESIF funding announced by a Minister. 
Second, close work with the Scottish Government web team has been maintained by the 
Communications Officer to ensure web analysis on a monthly basis, identifying the dynamics of 
traffic to particular webpages during specific time spans (e.g. following announcements, events or 
news releases). Also, news coverage which follows an announcement or launch event Ǯis monitored 
and recorded on the media monitoring tableǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ . 
Third, to reflect the new 2014-20 structure, lead partners need to work in partnership with the 
Managing Authority to maximise media coverage about the awarding of funding for individual 
projects. Responsibility for coordinating this activity lies with the lead partner programme contact, 
lead partner communications staff and the European Structural Funds Communications Officer. 
Also, the MA is expected to establish a new network for lead partner communications staff to share 
learning and experience, and identify opportunities to work together to promote the funds. The 
group will operate online, with face-to-face meetings where appropriate. However, it appears that 
no formal network has been set up as yet. 
Furthermore, in 2014, a new approach was taken towards the annual communications activity, 
which used digital technology (in the form of an online booklet) in order to promote and raise 
awareness not only of the achievements of Structural Funds over the previous year, but also ESIF 
achievements in Scotland over the previous seven years (AIR 2016). 
Table 14: Communication strategies in 2007-13 and 2014-20 Ȃ summary table  
Communication strategies/plans 
2007-2013  2014-2020 
Main objectives Measures 
Target 
groups 
Main objectives Measures Target groups 
Promote the 
role of the EU 
and the 
contribution of 
ESIF to Lisbon 
and 
Gothenburg 
agendas 
- Promote the use of 
ESIF in helping Scotland 
contribute to the Lisbon 
and Gothenburg 
agendas  
- Explain how ESIF 
Programmes will add 
value to Scottish 
policies 
 
Ȉ
Ministers 
Ȉ

Communicat
ions Teams 
Ȉ

Directorates
/Divisions/ag
encies 
Ȉ
Structural 
Funds 
Division 
Ȉ
-t 
Organisatio
Promote the role of the 
EU and the contribution 
of ESIF to EU 2020 
Strategy 
Ȉ Develop key 
messages for ESIF to 
support clarity and 
consistency of messaging 
across MA and lead 
partner communication 
channels, and to 
strengthen partnership 
communications activity 
Ȉ Maintain the MA 
website to provide a 
reliable online 
information source for use 
by the MA, lead partners 
and other parties 
Ȉ Scottish 
Ministers; 
Ȉ SG 
Communicatio
ns Teams;  
Ȉ SG 
Directorates 
and Divisions;  
Ȉ Lead 
Partners Ȃ 
Scottish 
Enterprise, 
H&I 
Enterprise, 
Transport 
Raise 
awareness and 
understanding 
of the funding 
opportunities  
Provide guidance and 
access to information 
about applying for and 
progressing through 
programmes 
Ensure lead partners and 
other interested parties 
understand the new ERDF 
and ESF funding 
structures 
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Identify 
information 
needs with 
regards to ESIF 
 
Include all stakeholders 
with a common and 
consistent approach, 
ensuring that 
information is 
processed in a 
consistent way 
- Monitor, review and 
improve publicity and 
information measures 
during the life of the 
programmes 
ns 
Ȉ
parties, MPs, 
MSPs, and 
MEPs 
Ȉ
e 
Administrati
on 
Bodies/Strat
egic Delivery 
Bodies/Glob
al Grant 
Bodies/CPPs 
Ȉ	
Partners/Pra
ctitioners/Po
tential and 
actual 
beneficiaries 
Ȉ

public 
Ensure effective 
supportive measures are 
in place to maintain the 
communications 
partnership between the 
MA and lead partners 
Ȉ Maintain MA social 
media channels to 
promote the 
programmes, and work 
with lead partners to 
coordinate and share 
information through 
social media; 
Ȉ Set up a 
communications network 
for the MA and lead 
partners to share 
information and learning, 
and to support 
communications best 
practice; 
Ȉ Identify events and 
opportunities to promote 
the ESIF 2014-20 
programmes; 
Ȉ Participate in EU-
level communications 
networks to support 
continuous improvement 
in communications 
activity about the 
programmes in Scotland 
Scotland, 
Scottish 
Natural 
Heritage, Zero 
Waste 
Scotland, 
Skills 
Development 
Scotland, 
Scottish 
Funding 
Council, Local 
Authorities;  
Ȉ Lead 
Partner 
Delivery 
Agents;  
Ȉ Third 
Sector 
organisations  
Ȉ Political 
Representativ
es Ȃ MPs, 
MSPs and 
MEPs;  
ȈEuropean 
Commission Ȃ 
communicatio
ns staff;  
Ȉ MS Ȃ 
ESIF and 
communicatio
ns officials 
Ensure 
transparency 
and 
accessibility of 
ESIF 
communication 
and publicity 
Publicise the activities 
and achievements of 
the OPs at national, 
regional and local levels 
- Ensure the 
communications activities 
of the MA and lead 
partners raise awareness 
and understanding of the 
strategic priorities of 
Smart, Sustainable and 
Inclusive Growth 
- Ensure consistency of 
messaging about ESIF in 
the communications 
activities of the MA and to 
support consistency in the 
activities of lead partners 
Ensure 
ǯ 
awareness and 
understanding 
of the ESIF 
Engage in ongoing 
discussion with relevant 
stakeholder groups, 
ensuring beneficiaries 
make them aware of the 
OPs through their 
projects 
Ensure effective 
monitoring and 
evaluation measures are 
in place to improve 
communications activity 
in the long term and to 
support continuous 
improvement 
Effectively monitor and 
evaluate MA 
communications activity 
to support continuous 
improvement 
Ensure 
compliance 
with EU 
regulatory 
requirements 
Comply with EU 
regulatory requirements 
on information and 
publicity at all stages 
and all levels of the 
programmes 
Ensure lead partners fully 
comply with the 
communications 
obligations, and that they 
work with the MA to 
maximise ERDF and ESF 
publicity 
Support lead partners in 
fulfilling their obligations 
set out in the publicity 
requirements 
 
4.1.2. Indicators. 
In 2007-13, the communication plan does not identify indicators with accompanying targets, 
although output targets are reported in the Annual Implementation Reports e.g. the number of 
website visitors, number of press releases and events. Nor does the plan provide result/impact 
indicators.  
Table 15: Indicators and targets in the 2007-13 Communications plan 
Indicators and Targets in the 2007Ȃ13 Communications Plan 
Output indicators: Scottish Government Annual Target 
Number of website visitors per year 20,000 
Quantity of information downloaded Not available 
ǤǤǡǯ 4,000 
Number of promotion events held (Major Information Event) 1 
Number of press releases issued 3 
Output indicators: ESEP Ltd (Intermediary Administrative Body) Annual Target 
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Indicators and Targets in the 2007Ȃ13 Communications Plan 
Output indicators: Scottish Government Annual Target 
Number of website visitors per year 30,000 
Quantity of information downloaded Not available 
Number of IAB e-bulletins issued 4 
Number of IAB hard copy newsletters distributed 2 
Numbers of promotional material produced i.e. fact sheets, leaflets etc See SG table above 
Number of promotion events held 6 
Number of press releases issued See SG table above  
Source: AIR (2011) Annual Implementation Report 2011. Lowlands and Uplands Scotland. European Regional 
Development Fund Programme 2007 Ȃ 2013 
In 2014-20, as in the previous period, the communication plan does not identify indicators with 
accompanying targets. 
4.1.3. Budget. 
In 2007-13, the budget allocated is £30,000-£40,000 annually for the four ERDF and ESF 
programmes covering activities such as the production of publicity and information material and 
events such as seminars and workshops. The budget does not cover the staff costs within the 
Scottish Government and IABs dedicated to managing publicity on a day-to-day basis within each 
of the organisations; upkeep of the websites within each organisation; or support received in areas 
such as the Marketing Unit, Communications and New Media and Website Directorates within the 
Scottish Government. In addition, the Scottish Government has spent in excess of £500,000 on a 
web-based IT project management system for project applications and monitoring and reporting. It 
is anticipated that the indicative budget will be funded via technical assistance, and matched by 
Scottish Government funds. 
According to an independent evaluation, a total of £315,458 was spent by the Managing Authority 
and IABs on information and publicity measures between 2007 and 2011. This implies that the 
budget was around 60k pa over the five year period Ȃ significantly above the planned budget Ȃ 
although it is not clear whether this includes any of the areas types of expenditure excluded from 
the planned budget estimate. 
In 2014-20, an allocated publicity budget is of between £25-35k per annum for the MA in 2014-20 to 
fund communication activities and implement the Communications Strategy, excluding the day-to-
day publicity activity of the lead partners; support received from other areas of Scottish 
Government, for example from the Marketing Unit or the Digital /Website teams. It is anticipated 
that the indicative budget will be funded via technical assistance, and matched by Scottish 
Government funds. 
Table 16: Budget for communication activities 
Period Scotland Unit 
Allocation 2007-2013 30,000-40,000 annually GBP 
Allocation 2014-2020 25,000-35,000 annually GBP 
 
4.1.4. Governance 
In 2007-13, according to the communication plan, the MA (European Structural Funds Division) is 
responsible for the key communication activities including drafting and updating the 
Communication Plan on an ongoing basis and routinely by 30 June every year. There is a designated 
Policy Officer for Communications within ESFD, who is responsible for networking and exchange of 
experience, and participating in the Commission networks of communications officers. The 2012 
evaluation of the communication strategy reported that the MA initially employed a dedicated 
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Communications Officer and an internal communications group, but as the programmes matured, 
spending on communications in the MA dropped - from £20,723 in 2008-09 to £13,058 in 2009-10 
and £4,774 in 2010-11 Ȃ and the division later lost its dedicated communications officer and the 
internal communications group was disbanded. However, the 2012 AIR states that the IAB work was 
transferred into the Scottish Government with responsibility for communications and publicity for 
the Programmes transferred to staff in the Future Funds Team, and the Communication Plan was 
updated to reflect a more proactive approach to publicising and promoting the Programmes in 
Scotland. 
In 2014-20, the communications activity for the European Structural Funds is the responsibility of 
the recently established communications team, comprising a Communication and Engagement 
Manager and a Communications Officer. The team is solely responsible for all communications and 
publicity activity relating to the ESF and ERDF programmes. The team is stated to be taking a 
proactive approach to communicating and promoting the funds in Scotland. It is responsible for 
managing the programme website and its social media (which is being used more proactively in 
2014-20), publishing project lists on its website, organising annual events and reporting on strategic 
communications and publicity activities through a Communications and Engagement Manager at 
the Managing Authority with support from the Communications Officer.   
The main governance change for 2014-20 reflects the new role of the Lead Partners, which now 
take a major role in programme implementation. Large-scale funding allocations (Strategic 
Interventions) are administered by Lead Partners who are responsible for distributing smaller-scale 
amounts of money to eligible projects. Lead Partners have communications responsibilities, and 
among the main aims of the Communications Strategy are:   
x to ensure Lead Partners and other interested parties understand the new ERDF and ESF 
funding structures;  
x to ensure Lead Partners fully comply with the communications obligations and work with 
the MA to maximise ERDF and ESF publicity; and  
x to ensure effective supportive measures are in place to maintain the communications 
partnership between the MA and lead partners.   
To reflect the new 2014-20 structure, Lead Partners must work in partnership with the MA to 
maximise media coverage about the awarding of funding for individual projects. Responsibility for 
coordinating this activity lies with the Lead Partner programme contact, Lead Partner 
communications staff and the MA. According to the strategy, the MA would establish a new 
network for lead partner communications staff to share learning and experience, and identify 
opportunities to work together to promote the funds. The group will operate online, with face-to-
face meetings where appropriate. However, it appears that no formal network has been set up yet. 
Table 17: Governance framework in the Communication 
Governance framework in the Communication  
2007-2013 2014-2020 
Communication networks  Communication networks 
 Establishment of a new network for lead partner 
communications staff foreseen  
Bodies responsible for implementation of the  
measures 
Bodies responsible for implementation of the  measures 
MA (Scottish Government) MA (Scottish Government) 
Intermediate Administration Bodies (until 
abolition) 
Lead Partners 
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According to most of the interviewed stakeholders (outside the Managing Authority), the approach 
to communication can be characterised as minimalist. The communication requirements are 
Ǯ ǯǡ     is on compliance. The communication strategy, although 
viewed as straightforward and sensible, is seen by some interviewees as existing largely due to the 
EU regulations and guidance rather as a self-driven way to structure and guide communication 
measures. There appears to be limited encouragement to go beyond mere compliance with the 
communication requirementsǡǮ-ǯ
other priorities. In terms of funding awards, stakeholders have noted lack of big announcements of 
new tranches of European funding (as opposed to similar announcements of domestic funding 
streams) or lack of continuously intensive communication activity over the length of the 
programming period (e.g. on new tranches or anticipated benefits of funding). 
The changing nature of support measures over time has also led to changes in the key 
communication measures and tools. For instance, the former relevance of big launch events and 
billboards highlighting high-profile infrastructure support projects has given way to that of social 
media platforms featuring human stories pinpointing benefits of EU funding for individuals. While a 
change in communication measures and ways of reaching the audience has been noted, the 
messages are reported to remain largely consistent over time.  
As noted by some interviewees, there has been increased understanding of the need to improve 
communication of the policy to the policy community, by making it more open and transparent. 
This understanding has also been driven by external factors Ȃ the intensity of communication 
activity as well as the awareness of the importance of proactive communication are noted to have 
grown to some extent since the launch of the debate on the referendum to leave the EU. 
Communication is generally not considered to be a leading priority in the hierarchy of programme 
priorities among the majority of stakeholders interviewed. With the focus on compliance to avoid 
irregularities being a dominant policy logic, communication and publicity largely remain a 
ǡǮǯ
its own right. At the same time, it has been noted that the relative priority placed on the different 
tasks largely varies depending on the programming stage, and focus on communication becomes 
more significant once achievements of the policy support begin to emerge, although ongoing 
communication from the outset of the programmes is also considered important. In addition, 
variation across funds has been noted, with for instance higher priority allocated to communication 
activities within the Leader programme. 
According to some interviewees, there has not been any major qualitative change over time, in 
terms of an increased priority given to the communication activity. The MA resource dedicated to 
Cohesion policy communication is rather limited (one full-time communication officer), although it 
draws on support within the Scottish Government and is in any case reliant on devolved 
communication by lead partners at project level. Some stakeholders consider that shifts in the 
Structural Funds delivery system have contributed to a reduced communication effort and visibility 
of support. On the other hand, some stakeholders are of the opinion that communication has been 
given a higher priority in the current programmes, also becoming more organised and focused than 
it was previously. It is viewed as having been more mainstreamed into the day-to-day work, 
including that of local authorities Ȃ partly through the requirement to prepare own communication 
plans and strategies Ȃ        Ǯ-ǯ Ǥ This 
mainstreaming is thought to be driven by the MA, translating into changes at local level as well. 
Some concrete positive changes have also been reported, for instance the availability of the 
citizen's summary of the OP or the MA effort to be more proactive by planning communication 
activities for a year ahead (both of which are EU requirements). 
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The intensity of communication activity effort varies across stakeholders given the devolved nature 
of project-level implementation and reflecting local priorities and capacities. The overall 
communication requirements are largely met, but each local authority is free to decide whether to 
put in additional effort. While some do, building good portfolios of activity at local level and 
sometimes seeking to apply innovative approaches to communicating ESIF support, others do not 
go beyond strict compliance with the rules. The need for pro-active encouragement by the MA and 
European Commission has been emphasised in this respect. Limitations in terms of the budget and 
staff resources partially account for the need to balance the various priorities and focus on the more 
obvious and urgent tasks, including ensuring actual project delivery and timely execution.   
The awareness and recognition of the importance of an efficient approach to communicating the 
purpose and achievements of the programme is generally present. Items on the communication 
strategy, for instance, are included in the Monitoring Committee meetings agenda, and according 
to some interviewees, the MC is aware not only of the obligations to promote the ESIF but also of 
the importance of doing so.  
The communication activity that has been undertaken is not insignificant, but there seems to be 
scope for improvement. The impact of this activity is however not so evident, which is due to 
various factors, including a lack of the broader enabling conditions for it to generate substantial 
effects (as discussed further) or a lack of the necessary capacity (budget and resources) to allow 
greater professionalisation of communication activities.        
According to stakeholder survey respondents, the communication tools used most often to 
disseminate information about the use of ESIF are the programme website, as well as more 
traditional tools such as brochures, leaflets, newsletters, and plaques/billboards featuring the EU 
flag. While the latter have been noted by some interviewees as starting to give way to more 
interactive instruments such as social media (albeit focused primarily or exclusively on Twitter), 
most survey respondents agree that social media is not currently used on a regular basis. 
Communication via television and radio, including through the use of advertising campaigns, as well 
as via film clips and videos is reported to be the least common. The potential of other tools, such as 
newspapers and press releases or workshops and seminars also appears to be relatively under-
exploited (see Table 18). 
Table 18: Stakeholder survey Q10. How regularly are the following communication tools used to disseminate 
information about the use of Cohesion policy funds? 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Often Very often 
Television 61.1% 22.2% 16.7% 0.0% 0.0% 
Radio 44.4% 27.8% 16.7% 11.1% 0.0% 
Local and regional newspapers 5.6% 27.8% 38.9% 27.8% 0.0% 
National newspapers 16.7% 16.7% 50.0% 16.7% 0.0% 
Workshops, seminars 0.0% 16.7% 50.0% 27.8% 5.6% 
Brochures, leaflets, newsletters 0.0% 16.7% 27.8% 38.9% 16.7% 
Press releases 0.0% 11.1% 50.0% 22.2% 16.7% 
Programme website 5.6% 0.0% 27.8% 27.8% 38.9% 
Film clips/videos 16.7% 38.9% 33.3% 5.6% 5.6% 
Plaques/billboard with EU flag 5.6% 5.6% 11.1% 50.0% 27.8% 
Social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, YouTube) 5.6% 11.1% 50.0% 22.2% 11.1% 
Advertising campaigns on 
television and/or radio 27.8% 50.0% 22.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 No Yes 
We have not launched any action 81.8% 18.2% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
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4.2. Assessment of effectiveness of communication strategies  
 
In 2007-13, monitoring and evaluation of the communication plan was undertaken by an internal 
communications group and involved annual reviews/plans, reports to monitoring committees and 
annual implementation reports, and external evaluations.  
In 2014-20, the plan was for monitoring and evaluation arrangements to include some new 
elements: 
x Commissioning an annual media monitoring survey to ascertain the frequency of European 
Structural and Investment Funds media coverage in Scotland, and to assess amount and 
tone of coverage [this was not monitored annually previously, however three is no evidence 
that this has been done in 2014-20]; 
x Quarterly analysis of social media channels, particularly Twitter, to assess development of 
online engagement activities [new] 
x Annual analytical survey of Managing Authority website to assess activity and ways to 
improve it; 
x An annual stakeholder survey conducted using methods including the Managing Authority 
website, Twitter and stakeholder events; [new] 
x An evaluation of Managing Authority communications activity included in the annual 
update to the Joint Monitoring Committee. 
A 2017 Communications Update to the Joint Programme Monitoring Committee (Scottish 
Government 2017), among other things, included information on media monitoring in the form of a 
media monitoring table showing media coverage following announcements for the 2014-20 
programmes. In addition, the update provided concise information on Social Media and Web 
Analytics work, outlining plans to carry out a web analysis on a monthly basis as well as specific 
measures aimed at improving the MA social media presence (including Events and Content Planner, 
Hootsuite and Web Analytics).   
4.2.1. 2007-13 period 
An independent evaluation of the communications strategy for the 2007-13 programme carried out 
in June 2012 looked at the effectiveness, compliance, and impact at Programme and project level 
by assessing communications activity and media coverage and a range of project-based case 
studies. The method combined desk research with case study fieldwork to address three broad sets 
of research questions (i) the effectiveness of the Communications Plan at Programme level, (ii) the 
compliance of communications at project level with requirements, and (iii) the impact of 
communications at Programme and project level. 
Method Summary 
Quantitative review Desk based review of data Ȃ including web stats and records of 
events Ȃ to establish compliance with the Communications Plan 
Qualitative review Structured web research to analyse how messages around 
Structural Funds support have been covered in the media 
Case study research Case study visits to ten projects to capture their stories, collect 
examples of communication materials and evidence of impact, 
using different media such as photos and video recordings 
Multi-media reporting In addition to this written evaluation report we produced a DVD 
to illustrate the case studies 
Source: Hall Aitken (2012) 
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Overall, the evaluation concluded that the Scottish Government and partners have been successful 
in communicating positive and consistent messages around the role of Structural Funds in Scotland.  
Quantitative targets set in the Communication Plan were met or exceeded, and the mix of methods 
and media that had been used turned out to be appropriate for reaching target groups. Evidence 
suggested that messages have been consistent and generally suitable for getting the right 
messages across, and thus overall impacted positively on the awareness of participants and other 
ǡǯȋ
available than previously). 
All of the key targets were achieved: 
x One major information event took place per year;  
x Number of press releases exceeded the annual target of 3 by far in all Programme years to 
date; 
x The annual target of two hard copy newsletters per IAB was met; 
x The actual numbers for e-bulletins issued by IABs well exceeded the target figure of 4 as 
from 2009 monthly bulletins were published; 
x Actual numbers of website visitors mostly exceeded respective targets 
 ǯ
attitudes. 
The effectiveness of activities is analysed. 
x Press releases.          ǲ
ǳ     messages across. The imbalance between coverage of ESF 
and ERDF projects suggests that media interest in ERDF supported activities may have 
been higher possibly due to the nature of the activities as some ERDF projects provide 
grants and loans or build tangible infrastructure (buildings or facilities). It also states that it 
is impossible to establish the true impact of the communication measures but that it is 
reasonable to say that the combination of events, press releases and newsletters and other 
publications, supported by appropriate guidance, has been effective in achieving the 
ǯǤ 
x Communication with projects.       ǯ 
was mostly positive. Guidance was clear and straightforward, but space for improvement in 
considering all potential channels and specifying promotion through broadcast channels, i.e. 
radio and TV, was noted.  
x Project level communication.  Case studies of 10 representative projects were undertaken 
involving visits and interviews. All case study projects could demonstrate that they were 
Ǯusing every opportunityǯ to use the official logo in line with guidance/requirements. 
Acknowledgement of EU support is embedded in communication activities, especially in 
ESF projects as part of inductions. News releases to local press played an important role in 
keeping communities informed. Most projects gave the impression of being enthusiastic 
about communication rather than merely complying with requirements. Media coverage of 
projects is variable with ERDF attracting more attention, but the EU funding contribution is 
often omitted from the story. Surveys of ESF participants show that there is high awareness 
of ESF and this has increased over time.  
Based on the case studies, a series of factors are highlighted for effective project communication: 
x Planning. It is important that project sponsors identify communication opportunities at the 
outset and use them all. 
x Knowledge. It is important that staff understand and are aware of the Fǯ
they deliver so they can explain it to participants. 
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x Regular press releases. Although it is difficult to get the funding message covered in other 
media, project sponsors have to keep trying and issuing press releases as this will pay off 
eventually.  
x Branding guidance. Large-scale communication campaigns require detailed branding 
guidelines to ensure consistency at different levels and across a range of media. 
x Word of mouth promotion. In remote geographical areas, word of mouth promotion has 
an important role. 
x Planning. Projects need to build in communications plans from the start, and a good 
project name is effective at gaining attention. 
x Social media. Social media is starting to be important to some projects. 
x Impact on effectiveness perceptions. Projects that communicate well are seen to be 
successful and are better at publicising their funding source; 
x Media friendly logos, messages and guidance. The logos and guidance from the 
Managing Authority are not media-friendly. Logos are difficult to reproduce and messages 
are not picked up by the media. 
A number of policy recommendations for 2014-20 ERDF and ESF activity are made: 
x To ensure that project sponsors (lead partners in the new programme structure) identify 
communication opportunities at application stage and that these are used throughout the 
project lifecycle; 
x To ensure staff understand the role of the Funds and what they are designed to deliver; 
x That project sponsors should use different media forms to promote key funding messages; 
x That large scale communication campaigns need detailed branding guidelines to ensure 
consistency at different levels and across different media11; 
x That projects need to build in communication plans from the beginning; 
x That projects should proactively use social media; 
x That logos and guidance from the Managing Authority should be media friendly and easy to 
reproduce. 
x That the Managing Authority facilitate an exchange of best practice between projects or 
support capacity building to encourage better communications activity. 
The recommendations are also listed in 2014-20 communication strategy to feed into future ERDF 
and ESF activity. 
The second evaluation assessed the two main publicity events held in 2008 and 2009 to feed into 
the Annual Implementation Report for 2010, which is required to include an assessment of 
evaluation activity. The evaluation was carried out by the same PR firm that carried out the events 
(the Big Partnership) rather than an independent evaluator (The BIG Partnership 2009). The main 
focus of the evaluation is on the media coverage of the campaigns broken down by: % of coverage 
containing mention of ERDF or ESF; % of coverage containing mention of the project ESF funding 
Ǣ ? ǯǢ ?
containing mention of the total ESF funding awarded to the project; % of coverage containing 
inclusion of a quote from the Minister for Enterprise; % of coverage containing a positive supporting 
quote from a project spokesperson; and overall tone of coverage generated [although it does not 
explain how tone is assessed] 
Turning to key finding, there were 88 articles printed in the press and online, of which 27% were in 
the national press, 34% in the regional press, 24% in local press and 15% in specialist papers and 
                                                                    
11 In terms of guidelines, communication-relevant Programme guidance was assessed as clear and straightforward, although it was 
recommended that guidance should consider all potential channels and specify promotion via broadcast channels, i.e. radio and TV. 
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websites (such as Regeneration and Renewal and Hi-Tech Scotland). There were also a number of 
radio adverts. The main outcomes reported are: 
x total circulation of all print coverage generated was 2,816,600 
x total number of listeners generated by all broadcast coverage was 1,183,000 
x total opportunities to see the coverage generated was 3,999,600 
x total PR value of all coverage generated was £209,418.76 
The evaluations showed the overall tone of the coverage of the 88 articles was positive (as noted, 
Ȍǲ
succe	ǳ. 
Aside from evaluations, annual implementation reports provide another source of information on 
communication progress and achievements. The 2010 Annual Implementation report summarises 
the findings of the evaluation of the two events. As noted, this was a self-evaluation by a PR 
company and involving analysis of press cuttings, rather than a comprehensive independent 
evaluation. While an independent evaluation was undertaken in 2012, the findings are not reported 
in the AIRs for 2012-2014.  
The main focus of the implementation reports is on summarising activities undertaken and referring 
to their effects / success in general terms (mainly in terms of quantitative progress against 
indicators and targets set in the plan, or in terms of other quantitative achievements Ȃ e.g. 
attendance in the case of events/seminars, numbers of articles printed over major information 
ǡǤȌǤǮ-ǯan assessment, the common 
narrative being that the targets set out in the Communication Plan for a specific year were met12 
and the activities being assessed as effective overall. The reports also highlight the most significant 
communication activities undertaken by the Managing Authority and the Intermediary 
Administrative Bodies, 13  which are mainly communication/publicity events and campaigns. 
Information is also provided on other activities (e.g. publication of newsletters and bulletins, 
website-related activity, publication of publicity and communication guidance, etc.).   
4.2.2. 2014-20 period 
There are no evaluations or implementation reports available at this stage with evidence on the 
effectiveness of communication measures in 2014-20. However, interview evidence suggests that 
the current communication effort remains minimalist and does not going beyond compliance with 
the regulatory requirements. Publicity and communications efforts, particularly at the earlier stages 
of the programming cycle, are noted to have been limited by funding suspensions in the 2007-13 
programmes as well as the series of elections and referenda in Scotland which have posed 
restrictions on the announcements that could be made.  
Interviewees have noted the lack of information and evidence on which it would be possible to 
judge on the effectiveness of the strategy and different tools. This partly relates to the delayed 
implementation of the current programmes and therefore limited evidence on effects as well as 
absence of evaluations focused specifically on communication. 
Yet, differences were also noted in the effectiveness of tools targeting different groups. Whereas 
the effectiveness of communication to the general public is generally viewed more negatively, 
communication to policy community is assessed more positively. There is a feeling that the 
transparency and openness of communication with the policy community has increased in 
2014-20, partly due to the recognition of the pre-existing limitations and criticisms Ȃ including in 
                                                                    
12 	 ? ? ? ?ǮǯȂ rather than all Ȃ targets have been met 
13 With a change in the approach since 2012: the IAB work was transferred into Scottish Government, and therefore responsibility for 
communications and publicity for the Programmes shifted to staff in the Future Funds Team, with the Communication Plan having been 
updated to reflect a more proactive approach to publicising and promoting the Programmes in Scotland. 
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terms of the lack of open and shared information and regular updates on the policy. More regular 
updates using the website, mailing lists, bulletins and social media (Twitter) are now made to 
inform and engage the policy community. 
An often-noted challenge for increasing public appreciation of the policy and its achievements is 
that the EU funding dimension is not sufficiently emphasised but is rather ǲoften purely 
anecdotalǳ and ǲnot sufficient for enabling comprehensive recognition and appreciationǳ. In 
addition, the European dimension and contribution is often overlooked in the messages spread by 
information transmitters, including press officers and the media, as well as elected politicians. 
The main focus is often on highlighting the contribution of domestic actors, while the European 
dimension, although duly acknowledged, tends to feature as a secondary consideration. The 
national funding is given prominence over European funding, which can be seen in the 
announcements and publicity of the programmes, although this is not necessarily a conscious and 
deliberate tactic. For instance, announcements of European funding streams tend to receive much 
less coverage and prominence compared to announcements of comparable tranches of domestic 
funding. Furthermore, even where the EU dimension is recognised and highlighted, it often remains 
insufficiently understood by applicant or the wider population as EU funding is made available 
through other organisations. Moreover, the EU funding dimension does not always get picked up by 
the media, which contributes to the challenge of communicating the benefits of ESIF to the wider 
public. 
In a similar vein, elected politicians do often acknowledge the European dimension but mostly in 
terms of the co-funding provided rather than engaging in discussion about the added value of the 
EU. Overall, while there is due recognition, there is no active promotion of European support.  
The views of the stakeholder survey respondents on the effectiveness of communication strategies 
are divided, although a large share of respondents hold a neutral position on many aspects of such 
effectiveness (see Table 19 and Table 20). Among other things, this may indicate an overall low level 
of interest in the subject, and confirm the relatively low-key and low-priority approach to 
communications of the ESIF programmes in Scotland. The use of human interest stories has the 
highest level of satisfaction (30 percent of respondents), although views are very polarised as 33 
percent of respondents are unsatisfied or very unsatisfied. Views on aspects such as the support 
from the European Commission, the targeting of different groups, the administrative capacity or 
the overall way Cohesion policy is communicated to citizens are marginally more negative (see 
Table 19). 
 
Table 19: Stakeholder survey Q11. How satisfied are you with: 
 Very 
satisfied 
Satisfied Neither satisfied 
nor unsatisfied 
Unsatisfied Very 
unsatisfied 
Don´t 
know 
The way Cohesion policy is 
communicated to citizens 0.0% 22.2% 44.4% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 
The branding and messages used to 
communicate Cohesion policy 0.0% 27.8% 50.0% 5.6% 16.7% 0.0% 
The use of human interest/personal 
stories 0.0% 38.9% 27.8% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 
The support from the European 
Commission on communication 0.0% 16.7% 50.0% 11.1% 16.7% 5.6% 
The targeting of different groups 
with different communication tools  0.0% 27.8% 38.9% 16.7% 11.1% 5.6% 
The administrative capacity and 
resources dedicated to 
communication activities 0.0% 27.8% 38.9% 16.7% 11.1% 5.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
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There is an overall lower level of satisfaction with the effectiveness of communication efforts in 
conveying the achievements of Cohesion policy programmes and projects as well as the role of the 
EU, or in fostering good relations with the media and press for greater public outreach, while again, 
a large proportion of survey respondents hold neutral views on these aspects (see Table 20). As 
ǡǲȋȌ
ǳǤ 
 
At the same time, communication of projects appears to work relatively better than that of 
programmes, which emphasises the importance of communicating at a lower level for fostering the 
appreciation and identification of citizens with the policy. This may also relate to the reportedly 
more efficient communication of EU funded projects at local level due to a smoother delivery of 
messages thanks to the established links with the press Ȃ facilitated by the local dimension (as 
discussed further). 
 
In the qualitative responses to the survey, a respondent highlighted room for improvement in 
communication activities of Managing Authorities, noting that they often do not use the 
technical assistance earmarked to promote the added value of ESIF among the general public, 
overlook the European dimension of support when announcing new ESIF funded schemes or 
overlook the role of the sub-delegated and delivery authorities. 
 
Table 20: Stakeholder survey Q12. To what extent are the communication efforts effective in: 
 Very 
effective 
Effective Neither 
effective nor 
ineffective 
Ineffective Very 
ineffective 
ǯ
know 
Not 
used 
Conveying the achievements of 
Cohesion Policy programmes 
overall and the role of the EU 0.0% 16.7% 33.3% 27.8% 22.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Conveying the achievements of 
co-funded projects and the role of 
the EU 0.0% 27.8% 22.2% 27.8% 22.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
Using social media to promote the 
programme and projects (e.g. 
Twitter, YouTube, Facebook) 5.6% 16.7% 38.9% 11.1% 11.1% 11.1% 5.6% 
Fostering good working relations 
with the media and press to reach 
the general public  0.0% 22.2% 33.3% 11.1% 16.7% 11.1% 5.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
 
In terms of the evolving use of communication tools, a change over time has been noted by the 
interviewees, with increased use of social media, as well as an increased web presence. Social 
media and website have also been mentioned among main communication tools by the MA.  
With regards to the website activity, however, significant scope for improvement in terms of 
ensuring better web presence has been noted, as well as reliance of websites on more general 
media messages. From the Managing Authority perspective, and given the shift away from 
ǡǯ
website to communicate on programme activities is envisaged. The website is viewed as one of the 
most important tools, as is looking for opportunities to get mentions of ESIF into Government 
announcements, keeping them on the Ministerial and political radar. Creation of a dedicated 
website purely focused on ESIF-related activities, as opposed to communication through generic 
council websites, has been noted as a good practice by some local authorities representatives. 
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The use of social media and online communication to promote programme and project 
achievements has increased. For the MA, the focus is exclusively on Twitter, and the MA has made 
efforts to promote more active use of various types of social media by stakeholders by issuing 
guidance in the form of a toolkit. In order to maximise the impact and widen the outreach, the MA is 
working with colleagues across the SG seeking to ensure greater intensity of information sharing, 
including through access to the wider organisational Twitter account and personal retweets. 
Some interviewees view the use of social media as being effective primarily in communicating with 
the policy community and much less so with other groups or the public. It was also suggested that 
the use of social media, despite the recent increase, remains largely confined to people of the 
younger generation. Some interviewees highlighted difficulties with regards to the task of 
maintaining up-to-date the content on social media platforms (e.g. Facebook pages and blogs, 
Twitter accounts), which is time consuming and requires regular input. On the other hand, others 
have noted that websites and social media are easy to update and do not take up a lot of resources, 
which encourages their active usage to ensure public outreach. Some stakeholders have reported 
higher attendance at events thanks to more active promotion through social media channels. 
The importance of big high-profile events, particularly at local level has been noted. At the same 
time, given the Brexit, it is unclear whether these opportunities will be much exploited in the future. 
Roadshows are noted among the least effective tools, being no longer relevant for the MA as the 
programme structure has changed Ȃ this activity is now for the Lead Partners to engage in, which 
the MA monitors.  
Events, such as lead partner events and the annual event, have been emphasised by the MA as 
particularly important tools for engaging with LPs and programme stakeholders. Face-to-face 
communication, including through such events and one-to-one engagement, are considered 
important for ensuring a good level of understanding of programme dynamics, having an overview 
of the delivery progress and encouraging involvement of projects and mobilisation of applicants.  
The newsletter (issued on a quarterly basis) is also noted to be an important tool for 
communicating with the programme stakeholders. The newsletter feeds the MA blog, which, in its 
turn, feeds the Twitter communication. 
Billboards and plaques on completed projects have been noted among the key tools, particularly 
given their high visibility and durability. At the same time, their relevance might have decreased 
more recently due to the mentioned changes in the nature of support. 
Press releases and radio have also been mentioned as widely used and efficient tools by some 
interviewees; at the same time, others have noted the limited effect of press releases in temporal 
terms. One of the issues mentioned by stakeholders is the fact that press releases often do not get 
picked up by the media and therefore do not reach the public, which can make their preparation 
wasteful of time and resources. Media releases are noted to be more intensive when there are big 
announcement made by Ministers. 
Word of mouth has also been mentioned ǲǳ
as well as new funding opportunities, particularly in smaller communities. 
Promotion of marketing materials (e.g. pens, cups, mouse mats etc.) as well as distribution of hard 
copy materials (e.g. at events) have also been mentioned among communication tools in use. 
The production of film media presentations (film clips of a news type, e.g. promoted through social 
media) have been noted by the MA as so far not a very successful but promising and desirable 
communication tool Ȃ as they are seen as a tool which people can relate with. 
One of the challenges mentioned by the MA is that many communication tools (including the social 
media) target the same audience, the challenge remaining to reach out to the wider public. One of 
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the promising ways forward is seen in focusing more on simple news stories with a strong human 
dimension, communicated at a level closest to an average citizen. There is a recognition that 
communication is often done at a too high and too complex level, whereas things that people are 
more likely to relate to are simple and concern small initiatives and concrete, personal stories. 
 
4.3. Good practice examples  
 
The desk research has revealed two examples of good practice. 
ǯ ȋ ?Ȍ won an award for the best use of publicity in a European 
funded project. SQA were recognised for the innovative use of the European logo in GamesSpace Ȃ 
a virtual game-based assessment system. The award was organised by the Scottish Government, 
and the ICT Education Partnership Award at the 2011 BETT Awards, and presented by the Minister 
for Skills and Lifelong Learning and two European Commissioners of DG Employment and DG 
Regional Policy. The project was reported as a good practice in the 2012 evaluation of the 
communication strategy.  
Online booklet. The use of the main results of the previous OPs formed an important part of 
publicity for the 2014-20 programmes and highlighted a new approach to embracing digital 
technology. An online booklet was produced highlighting the achievements of the 2007-13 
programmes through a series of case studies from different parts of Scotland. The booklet also 
introduced the new ERDF and ESF OPs in 2014-20 along with the main priorities for Smart, 
Sustainable and Inclusive Growth. The book was launched in March 2015 at an event at the 
Edinburgh Centre for Carbon Innovation, which was organised to highlight a £76 million scheme 
ǯ co-financed with ESIF. The Cabinet Secretary for 
Infrastructure, Investment and Cities attended the event in order to promote the fund and launch 
the book, and several media and press representatives attended (Mendez, Dozhdeva and Bachtler 
2016). 
Many interviewees have found it difficult to identify examples of communication good practices, 
which would highlight and increase the positive perception of the EU dimension in Scotland. 
Local programme websites, e.g. for the Leader programme, are seen as generally well received and 
present a good way of promoting at local level the co-funded activities. In addition, setting-up a 
dedicated website covering specific activities part financed by ESIF at a council level, as opposed to 
including this information on generic council websites, has been highlighted as a good practice14. 
This allows users to navigate better in the content and, presenting information in a more detailed 
but also consolidated way, potentially raise the awareness and profile of the Structural Funds 
contribution to local development. Inclusion onto such websites of case studies highlighting how 
the activities co-funded by ESIF have helped individuals are also an example of good practice in 
communication. In general, case studies focusing on particular projects and showcasing how people, 
communities and businesses have benefitted from European support have been noted as an 
effective and attractive communication tool as they make success stories more concrete and help 
people relate to them.    
                                                                    
14 For instance, a dedicated website https://www.workeastren.co.uk showcases the work of the East ǯ
and skills team, many of the activities being part financed by the European Social Fund; among other things, the website includes a 
separate page (https://www.workeastren.co.uk/case-studies) highlighting specific case studies on how the activity helped individuals to 
progress in their employment or training. 
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The importance of evaluations has also been highlighted in this regard, as evaluations of ESIF co-
funded activities are able to provide good material for compiling case studies Ȃ apart from providing 
evidence that could be used in other different ways for communication purposes. 
The use of social media has also been mentioned as an example of good practice in communication. 
The main focus has been on Twitter announcements and signposting to announcements on the 
programme website.  
The importance of consistent branding has been highlighted (e.g. consistent use of logos), as well 
as potential value of distributing marketing materials (e.g. pens, cups, mouse mats etc.) for 
communication purposes (e.g. during open day events). 
Capacity building seminars for the policy community, particularly at earlier stages of programme 
life cycle, have been mentioned as a good example of positive internal communication activity.  
The generally more proactive engagement and publicity activities pursued by the rural networks 
under the EAFRD has also been noted. The implication is that it would be appropriate to encourage 
more learning and dissemination of good practices across different Funds within programmes. 
 
When questioned about the effectiveness of different communication measures in increasing 
ǯ     (Table 21), stakeholder survey respondents considered 
that the most effective sources were television, radio and the associated media campaigns with 
many rating them as potentially very effective. However, they are also among the least widely used 
tools, which may relate to the actual costs and the cost/benefit ratio.   
 
ǯ
high, although the actual use of this communication channel is assessed as being significantly lower, 
which may point to some room for improvement in terms of the relationship with the press. Some 
communication tools viewed effective are also reported to be used most often Ȃ including 
plaques/billboards with EU flag and publications such as brochures, leaflets and newsletters Ȃ 
indicating to a good exploitation of the perceived potential. Interestingly, programme website, 
identified through the interviews and the stakeholder survey as the most widely used tool, is viewed 
as ineffective by 22 percent of respondents Ȃ although those assessing it positively are still in 
majority.  
 
There appears to be need in exploring more the potential of social media as well as events, as 50 
and 78 percent of respondents respectively indicated them as effective or very effective 
communication tools.      
 
Table 21: Stakeholder survey Q14. How effective do you think each of these communication measures are in 
ǯion Policy?  
 Very 
effective 
Effective Neither effective 
nor ineffective  
Ineffective Very 
ineffective 
Don´t 
know 
Not used in 
my region 
Television 27.8% 5.6% 27.8% 11.1% 5.6% 0.0% 22.2% 
Radio 16.7% 22.2% 22.2% 11.1% 5.6% 0.0% 22.2% 
Local and regional 
newspapers 16.7% 38.9% 27.8% 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 11.1% 
National newspapers 16.7% 27.8% 22.2% 16.7% 0.0% 11.1% 5.6% 
Programme website 5.6% 38.9% 27.8% 11.1% 11.1% 5.6% 0.0% 
Video/film clips and 11.1% 22.2% 33.3% 16.7% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 
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presentations 
Plaques/billboards with 
EU flag 0.0% 66.7% 11.1% 5.6% 5.6% 11.1% 0.0% 
Social media (Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn, 
YouTube) 22.2% 27.8% 22.2% 11.1% 0.0% 16.7% 0.0% 
Media/advertising 
campaigns on television 
or radio  11.1% 27.8% 38.9% 5.6% 0.0% 11.1% 5.6% 
Press releases 5.6% 44.4% 16.7% 22.2% 0.0% 11.1% 0.0% 
Brochures, leaflets, 
newsletters, other 
publications 5.6% 55.6% 27.8% 5.6% 0.0% 5.6% 0.0% 
Events  16.7% 61.1% 11.1% 5.6% 0.0% 5.6% 0.0% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
4.4. Media framing of Cohesion policy 
 
The framing analysis of British newspaper stories on Cohesion policy shows that the majority of 
articles frame EU Cohesion policy in positive and economic terms (Triga and Vadratsikas 2018). This 
ǲǳ 崃? ? e sample (247 articles in total), and most 
of these articles focus on the positive implications of EU Cohesion policy for the economy. As 
ǡǲǳȋ ? ?Ǥ ? ?Ȍ
ǲJǳȋ ? ?Ǥ ? ?Ȍǲǳȋ ? ?Ǥ ? ?ȌǤ  
Moreover, the second most dominant frame, accounting for 20% of the total, ǲ ǳ
ǯ
lives, mainly by supporting disadvantaged social groups (7.7%) and by providing infrastructure 
ȋ ?Ǥ ? ?ȌǤȋǲǳǡǲ Ȁǳǡǲǳǡ
ǲ ǳǡ ǲǳ  ǲ	 ǳȌ      ȋ ?Ǥ ? ?ǡ  ? ?ǡ  ? .8%, 
2.8% and 2.4% respectively).  
In terms of media tone, the framing analysis revealed that 62% of the articles have a positive 
Ǥ ǡ         Ǯǯ 
emphasising the EU dimension (4%) implying that national and local interests and priorities 
dominate the news stories of Cohesion policy. 
Finally, the framing analysis of territorial differences found that national and regional media apply 
similar frames but that regional media tend to present positive news more often than national 
media, yet they never approach the news from a European perspective. 
These findings mirror the results of the Scottish evaluation of media coverage of PR campaigns and 
some of the findings in the interview research. As noted previously, the evaluation of the two 
publicity events held in 2008 and 2009 showed that the overall tone of media reporting on the 
events Ȃ based on a review of 88 news articles Ȃ was positive. The campaign activity was considered 
ǲ           	Ǥǳ That said, 
the method for assessing tone was not explained and the evaluation was carried out by the same PR 
firm that carried out the events (the Big Partnership) raising questions about the independence of 
the conclusions (The Big Partnership 2009).   
The stakeholder interview research found that most interviewees characterised the media as 
largely indifferentǤ ǡ      Ǯǯ   ǡ  ies in 
these areas are rarely picked up. Where they are picked up, coverage is often confined to specific 
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high-ǮǯǤ
has not been any comprehensive promotion of ESIF through the media in Scotland. 
ǲIt is not the nature of the tone but rather the lack of any tone with regards to Cohesion policy that 
is seen as worrisome as it indicates a general lack of interest; the message is neither positive nor 
negative Ȃ it is juǳǤ 
At the same time, where Cohesion policy-related issues are covered, the EU dimension of support 
is noted to be often omitted or downplayed, in line with the media analysis. While the 
requirement to acknowledge the EU contribution is normally respected, there is a tendency to 
highlight the actions, achievements and impact of domestic actors (e.g., the Scottish 
ȌȀ	ǣǲ
funding dimension is very much a footnǳǤ 
          Ǯǯ    
ǮǯǤSometimes, this is conditioned by limitations in terms of space available for a 
news article, which urges the need for prioritisation Ȃ mentioning of the EU support clearly not 
being a priority. 
According to some interviewees, such downplaying is not necessarily deliberate and can be 
explained by the general indifference of the media to the source of support and, instead, 
interest in its effects Ȃ it is the outcomes and achievements of policy and human interest aspects 
that are regarded meaningful, rather than funding-related technicalities.  
ǲf who is funding what and that would include the EU. 
ǤǡǤǳ 
In addition, the policy technicalities are not always well understood by journalists. Furthermore, the 
language associated with EU policy support is considered dense and often difficult to explain to 
ordinary citizens, which might encourage journalists to avoid referring to it. Cohesion policy 
 Ǯǯ Ǯǯ, the terms and abbreviations not 
being easily recognisable and in most cases not meaning anything to citizens.  
Lack of media interest in and coverage of Cohesion policy partly relates Ǯǯ
Ǯǯral, media focus on different priorities or lack of resources to 
cover CP-related issues. 
The omission of the EU dimension in news stories is something that project promoters and 
programme managers have limited or no control over, which in some cases encourages them to 
become more reliant on their own communication, including web based and social media type 
communication, which ensures control over how the message is delivered.  
At the same time, some interviewees have noted distinction between national and local media 
sources Ȃ whereas national newspapers tend to cover EU funding less, local press tends to put more 
focus on highlighting European funding. 
In more general terms, a dominant negative Ǯǯ, 
according to many interviewees, is due to the media generally having a preference for bad and 
sensationalist news over good news. Negative stories are picked up more willingly, as they generally 
ǮǯǤ ǲ
       ǳ   Ǥ 	 ǡ  ǡ   
media attention has been drawn to the delays in farm payments in rural development, which have 
been caused by the faults of the newly introduced IT system rather than broader inefficiency or 
failure of the policy. Media interest is noted to be often directed to aspects related to, real or 
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ǡǮǡǡǯǤ The 
view of some other stakeholders however differs in that they view the tone of the media as being 
largely positive Ȃ ǡǮǯǡǤǮ
     ǯǤ Where there has been negative criticism, it has not 
focused on the wrong priorities of policy but rather the technical pitfalls (e.g. rural payment system 
for farm payments) and delivery issues (e.g. high levels of bureaucracy).  
At the same time, in a similar vein, distinction is often made between national and local media, the 
view of Europe and Cohesion policy varying. Whereas local and regional press is generally Ǯmore 
informed, interestedǯ and objective and less inclined to focus on the negative aspects, there is a 
tendency nationally to focus on negative stories ȋȌǤǲ
ǡǳǤ-based media is noted to hold and 
ǡǲ	ǳǤ
ǡ ǡǲ-Eurosceptic 
and mainstream media is an illustration that there has been no major negative issues that could 
hav	ǳǤOne of the 
explanation behind local vs regional variation in media tone is that while nationally, European 
funding might be viewed as something too abstract, locally, it is easier to relate to the positive 
benefits of EU support. Regional variations in media tone have also been mentioned, with 
potentially more positive and prominent coverage of ESIF in the H&I due to more intense support 
historically.  
At the same time, according to some interviewees, even though the overall tone of the regional and 
ǡǮ
     ǯǤ Media stories generally do not provide a sense of wider 
context, which would make a strong case in terms of showcasing the benefits of Cohesion policy 
funding to the wider public.  
A change in tone over time, from positive to more negative or indifferent, has been noted by 
some interviewees. If previously Cohesion policy was receiving more positive reflection in press 
ȋ    ǲ         
ǳȌǡǡgative (e.g. 
focusing on audit delays etc.) or passive and indifferent (e.g. not going beyond simple repeating of 
ǯȌǤ 
Some interviewees noted the lack of knowledge on what specific measures are taken to improve 
media take-up of news stories. It has been highlighted that in the conditions of significant resource 
constraints across government, resources dedicated to these measures have to be balanced against 
resources devoted to other priorities, and although improving media relations could be desirable, it 
is not always feasible. 
      Ǯ   ǯ     
project level. Characteristics of the place can also play a role Ȃ in small communities, delivery of the 
message is facilitated for instance by the use of press releases, interviews on the local radio, and 
0verall the established relationship between the press department and the local media (e.g. radio 
stations, newspapers). Work with press officers, liaising with the local media as well as the MA, is 
often viewed as an efficient way of ensuring communication on EU funded project at local level. 
At the MA level, in the absence of a specialised press officer solely for the ESIF due to resource 
restrictions, close work with the Scottish Governments communications team is ensured, including 
with regards to press officers and media relations work, in order to enhance the coverage of the 
relevant to the Structural Funds division- relevant activities. In a similar vein, in the absence of 
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specialised ESIF press officers, coordination with broader media relations teams within the 
organisation is pursued across a range of bodies delivering Structural Funds. 
It has been noted that council press officers often tend to highlight primarily the achievements of 
the council rather than pinpoint the EU contribution. Due acknowledgment of European support is 
ǡǤǡǲ
press office is paid ǥǡǯǯǢ
ǳǤ 
Relations are also maintained through the Europe Direct Information Centres as local information 
contact points on Europe. 
Overall, difficulty in ensuring media pick-up of Cohesion policy-related stories has been noted, as 
well as the absence of control over how any of such stories may be picked up, presented to the 
public and therefore perceived by the population. With media interest generally remaining 
relatively low, the relationship with the media is more intense at specific points in time e.g. during 
big events organised by the SG. The presence of high-profile figures as keynote speakers, for 
instance the First Minister, at such events is noted to attract increased media interest and generate 
wider coverage and therefore impact.  
 
In line with the interview findings, a large share of stakeholder survey respondents identified the 
tendency of the media as well as politicians to overlook or downplay the European dimension of 
support among the obstacles to more efficient communication of Cohesion policy achievements.  
 
The tone of the media in reporting stories about Cohesion policy is another constraining factor, 
viewed to be predominantly negative by 33 percent of respondents. Survey responses suggest that 
there is significant room for improvement in terms of consistency of communication messages 
as well as the form for reaching their target audiences. Opinions on the sufficiency of resources and, 
interestingly, priority dedicated to communication by programme stakeholders are divided, 
although a large proportion holds neutral views on this aspect. 
 
Table 22: Stakeholder survey Q13. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
ǯ
know 
The media mainly report negative stories about EU 
Cohesion Policy 5.6% 27.8% 44.4% 22.2% 0.0% 0.0% 
During publicity events, politicians mainly highlight 
the local/regional dimensions of projects to claim 
credit for themselves, rather than the role and 
contribution of the European Union 11.1% 61.1% 16.7% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
The media do not highlight the European Union role 
and contribution in a sufficient way 16.7% 38.9% 33.3% 11.1% 0.0% 0.0% 
The key programme communication messages 
have adopted an appropriate form to reach their 
target audiences 0.0% 27.8% 44.4% 16.7% 5.6% 5.6% 
The communication messages have been consistent at 
country or regional levels 0.0% 16.7% 27.8% 27.8% 5.6% 22.2% 
There is insufficient resources and priority dedicated 
to communication by programme stakeholders 5.6% 11.1% 55.6% 22.2% 0.0% 5.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
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4.5. Implications for citizens CP perceptions and attitudes to the EU  
 
The overwhelming impression of the interviewees is that overall the public profile, visibility and 
awareness of the Structural Funds in Scotland is low and has not grown Ȃ if not reduced Ȃ over time. 
This is despite the perceived considerable achievements of the policy in the region, compliant 
recognition of the European support as well as specific efforts made in terms of communicating the 
policy and its achievements. The general opinion of most stakeholders is that the policy and its 
value are not well communicated, not well recognised or well understood among the general 
population. Citizens are often noted to have difficulties in articulating what Cohesion policy is or 
what its benefits for their everyday lives or lives of their communities are, not least due to the 
ǮǯǤ Whereas there may be a 
vague awareness of European funding support to concrete, mostly tangible projects, the general 
level of understanding of the value of ESIF support for the local economies and communities is 
perceived to be low.  
Where support is recognised and noted, it does not necessarily translate into a positive perception 
of and support towards the policy and the European Union more generally. It was noted that there 
were fewer Remain voters in some of the most economically challenged and therefore more heavily 
supported areas of the country, suggesting that the ESIF impact was not influential in the 
referendum outcome or in the overall appreciation of the EU. 
Territorial variations in awareness and appreciation of Cohesion policy have been highlighted 
with the population in the Highlands and Islands, particularly the Western Isles, seen as having a 
better-informed understanding of Cohesion policy and its benefits for local communities and the 
public profile of the policy being relatively higher. This can partly relate to the fact that convergence 
areas have historically benefitted from greater ESIF investment, particularly in terms of physical 
infrastructure support Ȃ   Ǯǯ and 
being by nature more visible to the population. At the same time, it was noted that the public 
profile of the policy remains high despite the more recent demise of infrastructure projects and shift 
 Ǯǯ   Ǥ Among other things, this appears to be facilitated by the 
smaller size of local communities, where cooperation with the local media is often relatively easier 
and press releases issued by the council and highlighting EU contribution have higher chances of 
reaching the population.  
The level of awareness and appreciation depends on the level of knowledge and direct experience. 
Whereas the general population tends to know and understand less, people who work in the field or 
have been beneficiaries of ESIF support are obviously more aware and arguably more appreciative 
of European funding. Similarly, visibility is higher for professional circles in policy and delivery 
ǢǡǮǯ
than the general public. 
A wide range of factors accounting for the generally low levels of awareness and visibility of 
Structural Funds in Scotland have been highlighted by the interviewed stakeholders. Apart from the 
lack of continuous and active promotion of benefits to the wider audience, the changing nature of 
ESIF-supported investment appears to partly account for the reduced visibility. Thus, the shift from 
investment in capital projects such as infrastructure support to investment in supporting softer 
interventions, although seen sensible from the policy perspective, inevitably reduces visibility and 
makes communicating the EU contribution and benefits to the wider public more challenging. The 
use of Funds to support revenue projects appears to be not only less visible but also less well 
understood, particularly beyond those who are directly involved and directly affected (e.g. clients of 
employability services or training programmes), as well as less widely reported in the media. 
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At the same time, the awareness of and interest in EU funding is noted to have increased since the 
Brexit referendum vote, the overall discourse having been highly politicised. On the other hand, 
some interviewees noted that among those well aware of EU funding prior to Brexit, the interest in 
Cohesion policy fell due to the awareness of the forthcoming discontinuation of support. 
Further factors contributing to the low levels of awareness, visibility and appreciation highlighted 
by the interviewees relate to the lack of real encouragement for ESIF delivery bodies to go beyond 
mere compliance with regulatory requirements on communication; changes in the ESIF delivery 
system, among other things leading to reduced visibility of ESIF due to the delivery centralisation 
(according to some H&I stakeholders); as well as delayed implementation of the current 
programmes, leading to the unavailability of evidence on policy achievements. 
In suggesting ways for improving the communication of EU policy objectives and results, the 
interviewees have covered the following aspects: 
x Need for a more proactive approach to communicating the ESIF and their benefits by the 
MA and the European Commission, and more active encouragement to delivery bodies to 
go beyond mere compliance with regulatory requirements on communication: Some 
interviewees have noted the need for the MA to serve an active driver behind a more 
proactive approach to communicating the policy, including by providing examples of best 
practice with regards to communication. Currently, the overwhelming part of 
communication work is left to the delivery bodies, and in the absence of a common 
approach or framework for efficient communication activity (apart from that offered by 
regulatory requirements) or real incentives for applying interesting and innovative 
approaches, stakeholder organisations often     Ǯ  ǯ 
terms of their communication activity. At the same time, interviewees have noted that the 
European Commission should be doing more itself in terms of promoting EU objectives as 
well as setting an example of efficient and proactive communication measures, rather than 
leaving it to national governments. That said, interviewed stakeholders are of the opinion 
that additional communication requirements are not a solution to this, and a softer 
approach to encouraging more active communication effort should be pursued. 
x Ensure communication is not just about acknowledging European funding but 
showcasing and promoting its benefits and achievements: While, as highlighted previously, 
there generally exists due acknowledgement of EU support in Scotland, in compliance with 
the relevant regulations, this has not resulted in a greater recognition of the value of 
European support among the general public. An effort should therefore be made to ensure 
the communication effort at all levels goes beyond the mere acknowledgement. 
x Ensure permanent and continuous communication activity over the whole programming 
period: As noted by many interviewees, often communication becomes more of a priority 
only towards the end of the programming period, which is largely explained by the earlier 
unavailability of results and impacts on the ground. At the same time, it is important to 
communicate during all period (distributing the activity more evenly over time) rather than 
concentrate all effort at the last stage, by showing the progress on an on-going basis, to 
keep the level of interest and awareness high. Even if no results are available as yet, it is 
important to reach a wider number of people when announcing the programme launch, 
communicate the expected results, announce new tranches of EU funding. Whereas the 
benefits are almost always publicised only at the end of the programme, the mid-term 
review or continuous monitoring and evaluation exercises, for instance, provide good 
opportunities to publicise the benefits by communicating the likely achievements in the 
coming years. 
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x The related recommendation thus relates to the need to conduct more, and more timely, 
quality evaluations of programmes and improve the uptake of their results, as well as use 
the case studies produced by evaluations for communication purposes. In a similar vein, 
constant monitoring, along with regular updates to evaluations, should aim to provide 
evidence on the progress of programme implementation on an on-going basis rather than 
leaving it until the end of the period. The relevance of media monitoring, as part of the 
broader monitoring and evaluation exercise, has also been noted, serving to provide 
evidence of the effectiveness and dynamics of the media activity and introduce the 
necessary corrections to the communication strategies. 
x Need to highlight the European dimension of support: as noted previously, the EU 
dimension of support is often omitted or downplayed, and there exists a tendency to 
highlight the actions, achievements and impact of domestic actors. In addition, 
domestically-funded programmes and initiatives are often branded and promoted much 
more actively and broadly than similar EU-supported projects. In this regard, there is a need 
to put more emphasis on the European dimension of funding, including through the 
announcements of new tranches of ESIF support; the acknowledgement of the fact that 
many of funding priorities have emanated at EU rather than national or regional level (in 
both conceptual and strategic terms);      Ǯǯ
programmes, aiming to pursue also EU rather than purely national strategic priorities. In 
addition, more emphasis should be put on promoting the EU added value of support, by 
emphasising the additionality of European funding (countering the tendency to perceive it 
ǮǯǮǯ
back to the region), or by promoting communication of other EU activities strongly 
transmitting the European idea (for instance the INTERREG projects as those with a strong 
ǮǯȌǤ	ǡ
the role of the EU across a wider range of dimensions, i.e. those stretching beyond 
Cohesion policy, or pulling together ESIF communication with that of other EU policies 
making a difference to regions and territories, is seen as being able to enhance the 
positive impact on awareness and appreciation and counter the negative associations 
people might have around European policy-making. 
x Ensure a coordinated approach to communication across all levels: It appears important to 
ensure effective cooperation of delivery bodies (the MA, lead partners) and beneficiaries to 
support clarity and consistency of messaging across communication channels, maximise 
media coverage about the awarding of funding and overall strengthen partnership 
communications activity. Such cooperation-based approach could also be helpful in terms 
of providing a reference and benchmarking for stakeholders engaged in communication 
activity.  
x Set common criteria for selecting good practices, as well as communicate and promote 
best practice examples: Identifying and disseminating cases of good practice in terms of the 
delivery, as well as communication, of Cohesion policy appears important, therefore the 
approach to identifying such good practice examples could be streamlined and more active 
use of case studies highlighting concrete achievements of Cohesion policy for 
communication purposes could be promoted.  
x Need to set a clear budget for communication activity from the outset, ring-fence funding 
for dedicated and professional staff who can understand marketing tools better than 
general day-to-day programme managers, and overall strengthen budget allocations for 
communication: Budget limitations have been noted by many interviewees as a significant 
factor hindering more active and effective communication activity, at all levels. 
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Strengthening of resources for communication to allow greater professionalisaiton is 
therefore seen important. 
x Need to build and strengthen cooperation with the media, particularly through closer work 
with press officers and liaison with the local media as an efficient way of ensuring 
communication on EU funded projects. 
x In terms of actual communication tools, the main proposals by most interviewees for 
improving the communication of EU policy objectives and results focused on increased use 
of social media, capable of providing coverage to a wide audience, preferably highlighting 
individual success stories, the human dimension and raising awareness of the EU in the 
lives of individuals. Tweets and Facebook messages posted by those who benefitted from 
 	   ǲ  ǥ       
councillors talking about how effective the funding ǳǡ
to. Focusing communication at  Ǯlower levelǯ Ȃ by highlighting small concrete success 
stories through case studies and personal accounts Ȃ is seen as being potentially more 
efficient for raising awareness and increasing appreciation of the policy than 
   ǡ Ǯ ǯ Ǥ Such case studies are believed to be 
better placed to picks ǯ interest and capture the imagination. 
x Using simple and accessible language Ȃ a language that people actually understand Ȃ and 
delivering simple messages is also seen as important. Due to the breadth of what Cohesion 
policy does, it is often very difficult to capture what is the Ǯstraplineǯ for the policy that 
would make sense to everybody and that would convey why the EU funds do really matter 
to people. In this sense, as highlighted by the MA, it appears important to focus on key, 
captivating messages delivering the value of the ESIF work in a way that would capture 
ǯǢcreate an attractive and strong story-line; collect together evidence 
from different cases and demonstrate the EU value in a comprehensive way; build a brand 
that is understandable and meaningful for people. Coming up with and communicating 
such a simple message that could serve as a Ǯǯ  policy related story-
telling appears challenging yet important. 
x Focus more on visual elements (infographics, maps, etc): Promoting a wider use of 
visuals such as infographics is seen as an efficient and attractive communication tool. 
x Involve high-profile figures to attend and speak at events:  Ǯǯǡ 
profile personalities, famous politicians to attend and make speeches at events promoting 
EU funds, e.g. launch events, launch of new big funding tranches etc. was noted by some 
interviewees as an efficient way of raising interest and awareness among  stakeholders, the 
media and consequently (potentially) the wider public.   
In addition, interviews at the MA level suggest that some new communications activity is 
considered desirable but is highly unlikely given the vote to leave the EU (e.g. radio campaigns). The 
main focus remains centred on the annual events and social media (Twitter). 
At the same time, it was highlighted by the interviewees that efforts to improve the communication 
ǡǯ
ǡǮǯ
being communicated.  
Greater, or more efficient, use of certain communication tools, increased budget for 
communication activities or a more proactive approach to communication can all contribute to the 
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quality of the communication activity but are far from being enough to influence in a positive way 
ǯǡǡǤ 
Promoting the value of the EU and the contribution of the ESIF is complicated by the need to 
counter what is often perceived to be the wider economic thinking and practice that emanates at 
EU level, including a wide-spread scepticism around the broader policies of the EU in relation to the 
economy, the perception of the EU as something distant from its citizens, the prioritisation of 
competitiveness considerations as opposed to those of cohesion and social justice, etc.  
ǲYou are pushing against the wind if you are trying to argue that Cohesion policy and Structural 
Funds are what the EU is about, when people's perception of the EU is not that. For them, the EU is 
about other things Ȃ support to big business, deregulating rather than properly regulating, 
ǥǳ 
ǯbroader issues than just marketing 
and communication techniques. Inability to raise this appreciation cannot be ascribed simply to 
the inefficiency of certain communication tools. Due recognition of the EU contribution and 
efficient communication measures are important but not sufficient to address a range of wider 
concerns and criticisms towards the policy as well as the EU in general. As suggested by the 
interviewees, the answer to this is not just to spend more efforts on communication. It is part of it, 
and the MA should take more seriously and proactively the communication aspects of the 
ǢǮǡǡ
ǯǤ 
 ?/ƚ ŝƐ Ă ĐŽŵŵŽŶ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂů ƚŚŝŶŬŝŶŐ  ? when something is not going well, blame the 
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?KƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĚŽŝƚ ?ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉĂƌƚŝĞƐĚŽŝƚ ? ?/ƚǁĂƐŶ ?ƚƉŽůŝĐǇƚŚĂƚǁĂƐǁƌŽŶŐ  ? it 
ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞĚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ?  ? that is a common and comforting way of thinking for people 
and organisations to take up, but it is not always the case. Sometimes you have to think if the 
policy is right, was it put across properly and effectively. Very often poor communication is a 
scapegoat ? ? 
Greater investment, including at the MA level, in the communication activity is seen important, but 
the major challenge for increasing appreciation is actually the need to improve the programme. 
 ǲ         Ǥ        ?
  ǯǤ    ǡ  Ǥ t improving communication itself 
won't bring better results, better visibility of the programmes, unless it is also accompanied by 
Ǥǳ 
Cohesion policy is seen by many interviewees as having limited appeal and being Ǯǯǡ
due to a range of factors, including: the inherent complexity of the language, architecture, rules and 
procedures; the high administrative burden associated with getting access to and delivering the 
funding; the relatively low impact on the national and regional economy, including due to the 
relatively low share of funding as opposed to domestic support; insufficient concentration due to 
the policy architecture (all-ȌǮ
ǯǤ 
ǲ          ǡ    Ǥ ȏ 
characterised by] vastly convoluted, arcane language, byzantine procedures Ȃ no wonder people 
Ǥǳ 
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Building in more flexibility in the policy itself, making it more flexible within the timescales of the 
programmes in order to enable it to adjust effectively to market conditions and changing 
circumstances has been noted as one of the ways to increase the efficiency and address the 
mismatch between the actual needs and the focus of funding. 
Nevertheless, it is recognised that communication has an important role to play. Delivering more 
good news stories on what the ESIF have ǡ    Ǯǯ f the 
Structural Funds by highlighting examples of good projects and their positive effects on the ground, 
overcoming the mentality where European funding is taken for granted, as well as seeking to 
dissociate the more negative narratives surrounding broader EU-related issues from the actual 
effects on Cohesion policy on the ground have been suggested as ways of  raising public 
appreciation of the policy.  
On the other hand, such dissociation might be difficult or impossible to achieve, as the appreciation 
of any EU-driven policy is closely related to the broader views and the value and role of the EU and 
its responsiveness to the actual needs and aspirations of European citizens Ȃ meaning that more 
fundamental changes, at a more global level, are needed in order to change the attitudes to a 
specific policy such as Cohesion policy. As noted by one of the interviewees: 
ǲǫ
that this has to go back to the EU level: the EU needs to ensure that what we aim to promote at 
member-state and regional level is something that resonates with the public and really means 
something to citizens and workers..Ǥǡ ǥ
challenges that the people and workers of Europe are facing ǥ and give more emphasis to that 
ǯǥ It goes back to the extent to which people feel that 
the political institutions of the EU are reflecting the concerns they have, the challenges they face in 
their workplaces and their communities... Unless there is a wider public appreciation of what the 
EU does in relation to things that impact people in their daily lives, all the things that promote the 
EU could be treated with a high degrǳǤ 
Mirroring the interview research responses, most stakeholder survey respondents see the effects 
ǯ 
(See Table 23). Thus, over 33 percent of respondents disagree that communication activities have 
    ǯ         
development, over 44 percent do not see their positive effect on ǯ ? ?
percent do not consider they have had a positive impact on their identification with the EU. This is 
     ǯ     
activities and messages, but may possibly relate to the broader contextual issues surrounding 
debates on the policy and European matters overall, as highlighted in the interviews. For instance, 
one of the respondents noted that:  
 
ǲǯ     here about projects funded by the EU, regionally and 
Ǥ    ǯ       
particular is another matter. The Commission is always going to be criticised for its 
Ǥǳ 
In referrǯ
EU Cohesion policy, one of respondents noted their general adequacy and potential effectiveness 
ǯawareness of the role of the policy and the European 
Union in general: 
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ǲ
ǤǤǤǤǤ          ǯ ǤǤǤ
knows.  Does anyone reǫǤǳ 
Several respondents highlighted the limited impact of Cohesion policy funding on anti-EU 
sentiments, as revealed among other things through the Brexit vote (where poor areas receiving 
significant EU funding had the largest vote leave shares in the UK), in an effort to demonstrate the 
ǯ
the EU.   
Overall, it should be noted that as with regards to many other Cohesion policy communication-
related issues, a large share of respondents neither agree nor disagree with the suggested 
statements, which might demonstrate either a limited and imperceptible effect of Cohesion policy 
  ǯ  to the EU in Scotland or a generally low level of interest, 
knowledge or relevance of the subject among stakeholders involved in Cohesion policy 
implementation in the region.  
Table 23: Stakeholder survey Q15. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
 Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
The communication activities have led to an increased 
awareness among citizens of the contribution of 
Cohesion policy to regional and local development 0.0% 22.2% 44.4% 27.8% 5.6% 
The communication activities of Cohesion policy funds 
increase the sense of belonging of citizens to the 
European Union  0.0% 22.2% 38.9% 27.8% 11.1% 
The communication activities of Cohesion policy funds 
contribute to increasing ǯ support for the 
European Union  0.0% 22.2% 33.3% 33.3% 11.1% 
Citizens mistrust Cohesion policy communication 
activities and messages or consider them to be 
propaganda 5.6% 22.2% 38.9% 22.2% 11.1% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
 
Views of stakeholder survey respondents on the contribution of Cohesion policy to EU attitudes by 
citizens are mixed. While 44 percent of respondents consider that Cohesion policy has made a 
   ǯ  towards the EU, 39 percent do not see any 
connection. That said, no respondents reported a negative impact of the po  ǯ
support (see Table 24). 
Table 24: Stakeholder survey Q4. In your opinion, has Cohesion policy during the last 10 years or so helped to 
make residents of your municipality/region support the European Union more? 
It has helped a 
lot 
It has rather helped It has had 
no impact 
It has had a rather 
negative impact 
It has had a very 
negative impact 
Don't know 
11.1% 33.3% 38.9% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% 
Source: COHESIFY Stakeholder Survey 2017, N=18 
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5. Citizens views of Cohesion policy and the EU  
 
5.1 Citizen survey results 
 
The COHESIFY Citizen Survey provides more direct and representative insight into ciǯ
awareness and appreciation of Cohesion policy funding in Scotland, as well as their attitudes to and 
identification with the EU. At least 500 citizens were survey by telephone in each of the 17 
COHESIFY case study regions: Scotland (UK); North-East England (UK); Lombardia (IT); 
Podkarpackie (PL); Pomorskie (PL); Cyprus (CY); Central Macedonia (EL); Nyugat Dunantual (HU); 
Zahodna (SI); West Romania (RO); the Province of Flevoland (NL); the Province of Limburg (NL); 
Baden-Württemberg (DE); Thüringen (DE); Andalucía (ES); Castilla y León (ES); and Southern and 
Eastern Ireland (IE).   
Awareness of EU funding 
Less than half (40.6 percent) of the surveyed citizens in Scotland have heard about EU funded 
projects in their region or city, which is below the average across the regions covered by the study 
(45.4 percent). Among those that have heard of EU projects, the main source of information is 
personal experience or knowledge of projects (53.2 percent), in line with stakeholder interview 
findings. The internet is the next most important source of knowledge (49.8 percent), followed by 
newspapers (45.8 percent for national and 46.3 percent for local or regional newspapers) and TV 
(44.8 percent for national, and 39.4 percent for local or regional TV). Billboards are a relatively 
important source of information (34 percent), and 37.4 percent of the surveyed population noticed 
public acknowledgement of EU funding in their region or town, e.g. in the form of banners or 
placards Ȃ which is however lower than the average (51.1 percent) across all analysed regions. 
Despite the recent trends in the use of communication tools, with an increased emphasis on social 
media, only a third (32.5 percent) of population gained their knowledge from this source. 
Table 25: Citizen survey: Sources of knowledge about EU funded projects  
Where did you hear about EU funding to regions and cities? 
Source Yes No  ǯ 
National newspapers 45.8% 53.2% 1.0% 
Local or regional newspapers 46.3% 53.2% 0.5% 
National TV 44.8% 55.2% 0.0% 
Local or regional TV 39.4% 59.6% 1.0% 
National radio 27.1% 72.4% 0.5% 
Local or regional radio 22.7% 76.4% 1.0% 
Internet 49.8% 49.3% 1.0% 
Social media 32.5% 66.5% 1.0% 
Billboard 34.0% 65.5% 0.5% 
Workplace 29.6% 69.0% 1.5% 
Personal experience or knowledge of projects 53.2% 45.3% 1.5% 
Other 25.6% 70.0% 2.5% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=203 
 
Levels of awareness of different ESI funds differ considerably, with the ERDF being the most 
recognisable fund (56.4 percent), while knowledge of ESF is just over 40 percent. This may be due to 
the more visible nature of ERDF support, notably in infrastructure. The level of awareness of both 
funds is lower in Scotland than the average levels across COHESIFY regions (60.8 percent for ERDF 
and 47.7 percent for ESF), potentially because of the lower funding allocations. Awareness of the 
Cohesion Fund is very low (10.8 percent), possibly because Scotland is not eligible for the Fund. 
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Overall, 17 percent reported having benefitted in their daily life from one of the funds, which is in 
line with the COHESIFY average of 17.5 percent. 
Table 26: Citizen survey: Level of awareness of individual ESI funds 
Have you heard about the following funds? 
Fund Yes No ǯ 
ERDF 56.4% 42.2% 1.4% 
ESF 41.0% 58.2% 0.8% 
Cohesion Fund   25.6% 70.0% 2.5% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=500 
 
Perceived impact of EU funding 
Scottish respondents have a positive perception the impact of EU funding on their region or city 
with  ? ?Ǥ ?Ǯǯȋ
 ? ?	ȌǤǮǯ
in Scotland (36.9 percent) is the third highest among the 17 COHESIFY regions. At the same time, 
    ȋ ?Ǥ ?        Ǯǯ  Ǯ
ǯȌ	 ?Ǥ ? ȌǤ 
Table 27: Citizen survey: Perceived impact of EU funding  
How positive or negative was the impact of the funding of the European Union on your region or city?  
Very 
positive 
Positive No 
impact 
Negative Very negative Not applicable for 
my region or city 
Refused ǯ
know 
36.9% 40.4% 7.4% 4.4% 3.0% 2.5% 0.0% 5.4% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=203     
For those that are critical of EU funding impacts, the main reasons are scarcity of funding (46.7 
percent) and allocation to the wrong projects as well as bad management (40 percent respectively). 
The latter two factors, however, appear to be relatively less significant when compared to 
COHESIFY average (61.8 and 69.8 percent respectively). Corruption, either among government 
officials awarding EU tenders (36.7 percent in Scotland compared to 61.5 percent for all COHESIFY 
regions) or among beneficiaries of EU funds (30 percent in Scotland compared to 59.2 percent for all 
COHESIFY regions), in relative terms, is not considered to be a major issue. 
Table 28: Citizen survey: Reasons for lack of positive impact of EU funding 
Why do you think there was no positive impact? 
Reason Yes No  Refused ǯ 
Not enough funding 46.7% 46.7% 0.0% 6.7% 
Allocation to the wrong projects 40.0% 46.7% 0.0% 13.3% 
Bad management 40.0% 50.0% 3.3% 6.7% 
Not executed on time 36.7% 53.3% 3.3% 6.7% 
Corruption among government officials awarding EU 
tenders 
36.7% 53.3% 3.3% 6.7% 
Corruptions among beneficiaries of EU funds 30.0% 43.3% 3.3% 23.3% 
Other reasons 53.6% 42.9% 3.6% 0.0% 
 Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=30 
 
Conversely, those who hold a positive view on the benefits of EU funding for regional and local 
development, see the extensive funding (80.9 percent) and allocation to the right projects (77.7 
percent) among main factors contributing to the positive impact. Good management (51.6 percent) 
and timely execution (55.4 percent) are also seen important, although a high proportion of 
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respondents (21.7 and 20.4 percent respectively) were not able to assess the importance of these 
two factors, which may relate to the lack of knowledge of the funds management procedures and 
processes. Lack of corruption was identified by nearly a third of respondents as a factor maximising 
the impact of EU funding (which is similar to the COHESIFY average), although the level of 
ignorance on this topic was relatively high (27.4 percent of the surveyed people were not able to 
answer). 
Table 29: Citizen survey: Reasons for the positive impact of EU funding 
Why do you think there was a positive impact? 
Reason Yes No Refused ǯ 
Extensive funding 80.9% 16.6% 0.0% 2.5% 
Allocation to the right projects 77.7% 12.7% 0.0% 9.6% 
Good management 51.6% 26.8% 0.0% 21.7% 
Executed on time 55.4% 23.6% 0.6% 20.4% 
No corruption among government officials awarding 
EU tenders 
31.2% 39.5% 1.9% 27.4% 
No corruptions among beneficiaries of EU funds 31.2% 39.5% 1.9% 27.4% 
Other reasons 41.3% 50.0% 1.4% 7.2% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=157 
 
Marginally more respondents do not believe that EU funding has had a positive impact on 
development. In total, 41.2 percent of the surveyed citizens believe that their region would have 
developed the same or even better without EU funding. On average, 37.8 percent of Scottish 
respondents think that their region or city would have developed worse (somewhat worse or a lot 
worse) without EU funding, while 19.4 percent consider it would have developed better (much 
better or somewhat better), which is a slightly less positive perception of EU funding when 
compared to COHESIFY average (45.5 and 17.7 percent respectively). Interestingly, the percentage 
of those who think the region would have developed much better without EU funding (9.2 percent) 
is in Scotland the highest among all COHESIFY regions (along with the Southern and Eastern region 
in Ireland). Furthermore, the share of those who think the question is not applicable for their region 
or city is the highest among all regions (11.2 percent), which might relate to the low level of 
awareness of EU funding and its impacts. 
Table 30: Citizen survey: Added value of EU funding 
How do you think your region or city would have developed without EU funding? 
Much 
better 
Somewhat 
better 
Same Somewhat 
worse 
A lot 
worse 
Not applicable for 
my region or city 
Refused ǯ
know 
9.2% 10.2% 21.8% 25.8% 12.0% 11.2% 0.2% 9.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=157 
 
EU attitudes  
Around two thirds of the surveyed population (65 percent) have a positive perception of the 
benefits of EU membership for their country, similar to the average across all COHESIFY regions 
ȋ ? ?Ǥ ? ȌǤ    ǡ      ȋ ? ? Ȍ Ǯ ǯ
with the idea that the UK has benefited from being a member of the EU (compared to the 
COHESIFY average of 25.9 percent). Nevertheless, negative perceptions Ȃ Ǯǯ
ǮǯȂ is also relatively higher 
in Scotland (20.2 percent) compared to COHESIFY average (17 percent). 
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Table 31: Citizen survey: Appreciation of EU membership  
To what extent do you agree with the following statement: "My country has benefited from being a member 
of the European Union"? 
Strongly 
agree 
Agree Neither agree 
nor disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
disagree 
Refused ǯ 
36.0% 29.0% 13.0% 12.2% 8.0% 0.4% 1.4% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=500 
  
Support for European integration is lower than perceived benefits from membership. More than 
ha   ȋ 崃?Ǥ ? Ȍ  Ǯ   ǯǡ Ǯ ǯ  Ǯ   
European integration, slightly lower than COHESIFY average (58.6 percent). At the same time, the 
Ǯǯ integration (28.8 percent) is the third 
highest among all COHESIFY regions (COHESIFY average being 19.5 percent). Yet, in terms of 
   ǡ      ȋ ? 崁? ? Ȍ  Ǯ
ǯǡ Ǯǯ  Ǯ ǯ Ȃ significantly above the COHESIFY average (16.4 
percent).  
Table 32: Citizen survey: Position on European integration 
How would you describe your general position on European integration?  
Strongly 
opposed 
Opposed Somewhat 
opposed 
Neutral Somewhat 
in favour 
In 
favour 
Strongly 
in favour 
Refused ǯ
know 
9.2% 8.8% 7.2% 16.6% 7.6% 19.4% 28.8% 0.6% 1.8% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=500 
 
European identity and attachment  
The citizen survey shows that a majority of citizens have a Europeanised identity, albeit less 
   	 Ǥ       Ǯ  ǯ
  ? ?Ǥ ?Ǥ  Ǯǯ
(3.6 per ?Ǥ ?	ȌǮ ǯȋ ?Ǥ ?
to 8.6 percent COHESIFY average) identity. This is in line with previous studies and surveys 
highlighting a relatively weaker European identity among Scottish people. By contrast, sole 
Ǯǯȋ-Scotland identification) 
among Scotland residents is significantly higher than the COHESIFY average at 44.8 percent 
compared to 32.2 percent.  
Table 33: Citizen survey: Self-identification 
ǥ 
Country only Country and European European European Refused ǯ 
44.8% 46.8% 3.6% 2.8% 0.8% 1.2% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=500 
  
At a more disaggregated level, when the country identity is disaggregated into British and Scottish 
ones, the results again show that most surveyed Scots hold a multiple Ȃ Ǯǡ
ǯȋ ? ?Ǥ ?ȌǮǯȋ ? ? Ǥ ?ȌǤ  ǮǯǮ
ǯ      ȋ ? ?   ? ?Ǥ ?  Ȍǡ    
Ǯǯȋ ? ?Ǥ ?ȌǤ  
Table 34: Citizen survey: Disaggregated self-identification 
ǥ 
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14.0% 13.6% 2.8% 17.2% 5.2% 13.2% 0.8% 2.8% 28.4% 0.8% 1.2% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=500 
 
In terms of the intensity of attachment to different places, Scottish residents have the strongest 
attachment to their region. Two third of reside ȋ ? ? Ȍ  Ǯ ǯǡ  
COHESIFY average of 51.9 percent and in line with the identified strong regional identity. By 
ǡȋ ? ?Ǥ ? ǮǯȌ
the COHESIFY average (64.5 percent). Over 14 percent of the surveyed population in Scotland do 
not feel any attachment to their country, in sharp contrast with the COHESIFY average of 3 percent. 
Local attachment (to city/town/village) also appears to be stronger than country attachment, and 
the relative share of people in Scotland reporting being very attached to their locality (53.2 percent) 
is largely in line with COHESIFY average (56.1 percent).  
Attachment to the EU or Europe is relatively weaker, with 26.4 percent  Ǯǯ   ? ?Ǥ ?
Ǯǯ     ȋ  ? ?Ǥ ?   ? ?Ǥ  ? 	 Ȍ   ? ?Ǥ ?   ? ?Ǥ ?
   Ǯǯ  Ǯǯ    ȋ   ? ?Ǥ ? 
42.1 percent for COHESIFY regions). The share of those feeling no attachment to the EU (26 
percent) and Europe (21.6 percent) in Scotland is also relatively higher than on average among the 
analysed regions (13.4 and 10.6 percent), showing the relative weakness of European attachment 
among the Scottish population. At the same time, both in Scotland and on average among 
COHESIFY regions, the degree of attachment to Europe is relatively higher than that to the EU.  
Table 35: Citizen survey: Territorial attachment  
People may feel different degrees of attachment to places. Please tell me how attached you feel to:  
 Very Somewhat A little Not at all 
Your city/town/village   53.2% 25.6% 12.6% 8.6% 
Your region Scotland 66.0% 21.4% 7.6% 4.2% 
Your country the United Kingdom 46.6% 25.4% 13.2% 14.2% 
European Union 26.4% 31.6% 15.6% 26.0% 
Europe 30.8% 30.6% 15.6% 21.6% 
Source: COHESIFY Citizen Survey 2017, N=500 
 
Overall, the citizen survey findings show that despite the lack of a high (although largely similar to 
other COHESIFY cases) level of awareness of EU funded projects, on average, Scottish respondents 
are generally predominantly appreciative of EU membership, EU integration and the benefits of EU 
funding for their region, although with slightly more negative perceptions on specific points in 
comparison with average COHESIFY perceptions.  
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5.2 Focus group results  
 
   ǯ         
identity in more depth, focus groups were carried out with 15 participants (7 female and 8 male) in 
three groups in the city of Glasgow. The groups included between 4-6 participants, and were 
homogenous per age cohort (19-41, 26-42, and 57-65 respectively). The first two groups had a 
relatively even gender balance. While the third group had a stronger male representation (4 males, 
1 female), this did not hinder the level of engagement by the female participant in the discussion. 
The majority of participants were residents in Glasgow and were British citizens. One Scottish 
participant was a resident from the Scottish city of Aberdeen, and two participants were from 
Sweden and Bulgaria although studying or working in Glasgow. 
Cohesion policy  
In the three focus groups carried out in Scotland, participants were generally not familiar with the 
ǮǯǤǡ
the EU provides funding for their region.        ǲǳǡ
ǲǳ  ǲ ǳ Ǥ   llowing description of the purpose of Cohesion 
policy was provided by one of the participants, emphasising the economic and social cohesion 
dimensions: 
UK 3, Participant 5ǣǲȏȐǤ
the various sectors and needs and finding a way to draw those together and 
benefitting economically and socially the EU rather than the individual 
Ǥǳ 
When probed about the individual funds, participants recognised the terms ERDF, ESF and 
Cohesion Fund. However, none of the participants could add any additional information. The 
majority were able to identify a project or area of investment they believed the EU was financing, 
particularly in the area of infrastructure (Table 36). Some of the participants identified projects 
implemented outside of their region or country in infrastructure and environmental protection.  
Table 36: Focus groups pǯ-financed by EU funds 
x Transport infrastructure:  
o Piers 
o Roads in the Highlands and Isle of Skye 
o Roads in Bulgaria, Spain and Portugal  
o Power station in the Highlands 
o Playground in Perth 
o Inverness airport  
o Waste water infrastructure 
o Ferries (connections to the islands) 
x Social infrastructure:  
o Community hubs 
x Business support 
x Research & Development: 
o Energy sector research 
x Education 
o education courses 
x Environmental protection: 
o beaches in Greece 
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Participants from Scotland expressed their appreciation of the impact of EU-funded projects, which 
is largely in line with the citizen survey findings. This was particular evident in one of the groups (UK 
1), where all the participants expressed a positive view. In the second group (UK 2), participants 
talked about the importance of EU funding for rural communities, where the impact was felt by 
citizens more intensely than in urban areas. One of the participants talked about the importance of 
EU funding, without which several projects would have not been implemented. Another participant 
mentioned the positive infrastructure impact in Glasgow. Appreciation of infrastructure impacts 
was mentioned also in the third group (UK 3), albeit linked to projects in Spain.  
When asked to evaluate the impact of Cohesion policy, most of the discussion focused on 
challengesǤ           ǯ
contribution to the development of Scotland. The lack of information was represented as highly 
  ǯ      two groups (UK 2 and UK 3). 
Mismanagement of projects was another challenge identified in two groups (UK 1 and UK 3). In one 
of the groups (UK 3), several participants felt that the basic needs of the community were not 
addressed. The same group also discussed the lack of attention to the problems of local 
communities. Other problems mentioned by individual participants included bureaucratic 
procedures, lack of accountability and fraud. Below some extracts are provided to highlight the way 
participants described the problems most often associated with Cohesion policy in Scotland. 
Project utility 
 
UK 3, Participant 5ǣ ǲ  ǡ      
   ǯ  ǡ     
hub and there was so much resentment because no one understand 
Ǥǳ 
Mismanagement UK 1, Participant  ?ǣǲ
huge chunk was used for admin and premises and suchlike. But in 
 ǡ  ǯ    Ǥ   etting used for 
Ǥǳ 
Communication UK 2, Participant 1ǣǲǡ
the European Parliament. We need a European representative to come 
      ǣ Ǯ    ǯ  Ǯ 
doing tǯǤǳ 
 
European identity 
Participants linked European identity to common values, such as peace, democratic institutions and 
culture, which enable closer relationships between countries of the EU. Participants said that 
Scotland shares social democratic political values with other European countries, which are less 
common in England. As a result, the Scottish are considered to be more European than the English 
(which finds confirmation in the literature). There was acknowledgement of dual Scottish and 
European identification rather than joint national/British and European identity.  
According to the participants, freedom of movement, trade and the euro are elements of European 
identity, while different languages reduce the sense of Europeanness. The latter clearly represents 
diversity as an obstacle for European identity, which is portrayed as based on common and shared 
Ǥ        ǲ  ǳ     
ǲǳǤǡbut not identify with it. 
European identity and Cohesion policy 
According to participants, the potential of Cohesion policy to contribute to European identity is 
constructed in functional terms since it depends on its benefits for citizens. This impact is however 
conditional on its visibility, since participants expressed doubts about whether Cohesion policy 
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outcomes are publicised enough to enable citizen awareness. However, when the discussion was 
centred on Scotland in particular, participants perceived EU funds to have had a positive impact on 
European identity by, for instance, helping to develop rural areas. Further, a greater sense of 
European identity could have been developed with more communication and EU physical 
representation in Scotland:  
UK 3, Participant 6ǣǲ
ǡǣǲǡǡǡ
ǳǤ ȏȐǡ
building and leave. I          Ǥ ȏǥȐ
Ǥǳ 
 
6. Conclusions  
 
This case study has investigated the implementation, performance and communication of EU 
Cohesion policy in Scot     ǯ    ǡ    
methods design drawing on desk research, stakeholder surveys and interviews, a large-scale survey 
of citizens and focus groups. This final section draws together the key conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
6.1 Key findings 
 
Despite the relatively low share of EU funding in domestic expenditure and therefore the natural 
limitations to exerting any transformational effects and a strong impact on the regional economy, 
the ESIF have proved to provide a valuable contribution to economic and social development in 
Scotland over years. Generally seen by the key stakeholders as well aligned with the local and 
regional development priorities, Structural Funds have played an important role in supporting 
reform and recovery in the Scottish economy over the 2007-13 funding period, contributed to 
increasing business competitiveness in the region, and are widely valued for having left a lasting 
   ǯ -to-day lives. The overall assessment of the value and 
effectiveness of Cohesion policy funds and their contribution to the development of the region is 
therefore largely positive, both by the key ESIF stakeholders and citizens.  
Despite the limited financial added-value capacity of Cohesion policy, Structural Funds are noted to 
provide significant added value in strategic, administrative and democratic terms. Apart from 
providing a more certain, stable, reliable and long-term framework for regional policy planning and 
delivery than many domestic programmes, Cohesion policy has been praised for stimulating 
partnership work and mainstreaming new and more efficient ways of working, mobilising relevant 
local and regional stakeholders.   
At the same time, the efficiency of ESIF delivery and performance have been affected by a number 
of challenges, related to policy architecture, Programme implementation arrangements or broader 
macro-economic conditions. The main reported policy implementation problems in the current 
period relate to excessive audit and control, as well as the complexity of EU rules and procedures 
determining access to ESIF funding, along with excessive reporting requirements. Furthermore, 
recent changes in management and implementation structures from the previous 2007-13 period 
are seen by a range of stakeholders as having had a detrimental effect on the effectiveness of 
programme delivery. The changing macro-economic conditions was one of the key challenges 
influencing programme performance in 2007-13, whereas the fallout from the recession and 
financial crisis continued to impact on delivery in 2014-20, requiring programme adaptation, 
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restricting the availability of local match funding and raising concerns about underspend and 
absorption. 
The predominantly positive perception of Cohesion policy funds and their impact among the 
surveyed population in Scotland is however combined with a generally low level of public profile, 
visibility and awareness of Structural Funds in the region. Despite the perceived considerable 
acǡǮǯ
projects among the general public appears to be below the average awareness levels across the 
ǡǯvalue of ESIF support for the local 
economies and communities is perceived by the key Programme stakeholders to be generally low. 
Furthermore, the predominantly positive views of Scottish respondents on EU membership, EU 
integration and the benefits of EU funding for their region do not appear to translate into a strong 
sense of European identity. Overall, Scots appear to share a rather strong nationalist (national or 
regional) sentiment, exhibiting relatively low levels (when compared to COHESIFY averages) of 
attachment to and identification with Europe and the EU. Nevertheless, European attachment and 
       Ǯǯ  -identifications of Scottish 
people, demonstrated by a high share of people holding multiple identities.      
Communication activities at programme and project level seek to address some of these issues, for 
instance by aiming to raise the awareness and understanding of the role of the EU and the 
contribution Structural Funds make to Scotland and publicise the activities and achievements of the 
ESIF programmes. Overall, there is continuity in the communication activities and measures for 
2014-20, although with some changes reflecting the new programme structure or relating to the 
new emphasis on social media and online activity. Despite the stated efforts to ensure a more 
proactive approach to publicising and promoting the Programmes in Scotland, a number of 
constraints may be limiting the effectiveness of communication measures. Some of the key findings 
regarding Cohesion policy communication in Scotland are listed below.  
x The approach to communication can be overall characterised as minimalist, although 
compliance with communication requirements is always ensured and there are specific 
efforts to pursue a more proactive approach to communication 
x Communication activity is overall given a relatively low priority in the chain of 
implementation priorities at programme and project level, with main focus being on 
compliance above other considerations such as performance or publicising achievements 
x There appears to be lack of real encouragement for ESIF delivery bodies to go beyond mere 
compliance with regulatory requirements on communication 
x Communication activity is often not evenly spread throughout the implementation cycle, 
becoming more of a priority only towards the end of the programming period 
x There appears to be a weak approach to indicators to measure progress and effectiveness 
of communication activity, at programme and, consequently, project level 
x Interest of the media in Cohesion policyȂrelated topics appears to be limited: the media is 
Ǯǯǡwith stories being rarely picked up 
x Regional and local media tend to present positive Cohesion policy-related news more often 
than national media, although the European perspective is lacking in all types of media 
x Close cooperation with local and regional media is important: Work with press officers and 
liaising with the local media is often viewed as an efficient way of ensuring communication 
on EU funded projects ǡǮǯ is 
often easier locally at project level 
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x Citizens and the media are interested predominantly in the results rather than funding 
sources: the media is largely indifferent to the source of support and, instead, interested in 
its effects (the outcomes and achievements of policy and human interest aspects) 
x There is a tendency to down-play European dimension and contribution in announcements 
and media stories: The EU dimension of support is often omitted or downplayed, while 
there is a tendency to highlight the actions, achievements and impact of domestic actors; 
Ǯǯasising the EU 
dimension, implying that national and local interests and priorities dominate the news 
stories of Cohesion policy 
x The changing nature of support (towards intangible investments) reduces visibility and 
presents a challenge in terms of ESIF communication. 
 
6.2 Policy implications and recommendations  
 
Based on the case study findings, a number of policy recommendations are formulated to increase 
citizen appreciation of EU Cohesion policy in Scotland, which could also be relevant to domestic 
regional policy in a post-Brexit scenario:  
x Pursue a more proactive approach to communicating the ESIF and their benefits by the MA 
and the European Commission, and more active encouragement to delivery bodies to go 
beyond mere compliance with regulatory requirements on communication 
x Ensure communication is not just about acknowledging European funding but showcasing 
and promoting its benefits and achievements 
x Ensure permanent and continuous communication activity over the whole programming 
period: Communicate during all period rather than concentrate all effort at the last stage, 
show what is happening on an on-going basis; even if no results are available as yet, 
communicate the expected results, announce new tranches of EU funding  
x Establish common output/result indicators with baselines to ensure strategic approach to 
communication 
x More proactive role of the European Commission in communication, including in providing 
examples of efficient and proactive communication measures Ȃ rather than leaving it to 
national governments 
x Ensure stronger EU/Commission presence in regions (to deliver the message to citizens and 
recipients) 
x Set common criteria for selecting good practices, as well as communicate and promote best 
practice examples 
x Set a clear budget for communication activity from the outset, ring-fence funding for 
dedicated and professional staff who can understand marketing tools better than general 
day-to-day programme managers, and overall strengthen budget allocations for 
communication 
x Ensure a coordinated approach to communication across all levels: Ensure effective 
cooperation of delivery bodies (the MA, lead partners) and beneficiaries to support clarity 
and consistency of messaging across communication channels, to maximise media 
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coverage about the awarding of funding, to strengthen partnership communications 
activity 
x Extend the scope and improve the quality of evaluations, and improve the uptake of their 
results: Conduct more, and more timely, quality evaluations of programmes and improve 
the uptake of their results, as well as use the case studies produced by evaluations for 
communication purposes 
x Highlight the European dimension of support, emphasise the EU added value and 
additionality of European funding in public announcements, press releases and through 
other means 
x Build and strengthen cooperation with the media, particularly through closer work with 
local press officers and liaison with the local media as an efficient way of ensuring 
communication on EU funded projects 
x Increase and improve use of social media, providing coverage to a wide audience, 
highlighting individual success stories, the human dimension and raising awareness of the 
EU in the lives of individuals 
x Focus    Ǯ ǯ Ȃ by highlighting small concrete success stories 
through case studies and personal accounts 
x Use simple and accessible language and deliver simple messages; focus on key, captivating 
      	        ǯ
imagination; create an attractive and strong story-line; collect together evidence from 
different cases and demonstrate the EU value in a comprehensive way; build a brand that is 
understandable and meaningful for people 
x Focus more on visual elements (e.g. infographics, maps): Promote a wider use of visuals 
such as infographics as an efficient and attractive communication tool 
x Involve high-       ǣ  Ǯǯǡ  
personalities, famous politicians to attend and make speeches at events promoting EU 
funds, e.g. launch events, launch of new big funding tranches etc. as an efficient way of 
raising interest and awareness among  stakeholders, the media and consequently 
(potentially) the wider public.   
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8. Annexes  
 
Annex 1: Research methods 
Table 37: ǯey  
Scotland 
 Number Rate 
Recipients 152  
Respondents 32 32/152 = 0.21 
Complete responses 18 18/152 = 0.12 
Incomplete responses 14 14/152 = 0.09 
Declined to participate  3 3/152 = 0.02 
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Table 38: Focus groups 
ID / file 
name Region Location  Date  Duration  
N of 
participants 
Female 
participants 
Age 
range 
Age range 
by year of 
birth 
UKSCOT1   Scotland Glasgow  6.12.17 66 mins 6 4 19-41 1976-1998 
UKSCOT2 Scotland Glasgow  6.12.17 67 mins 4 1 26-42 1952-1960 
UKSCOT3 Scotland Glasgow  14.12.17 60 mins 5 2 57-65 1975-1993 
 
Table 39: Focus groups participants 
ID / file 
name  Age Gender Name 
Recruitment 
method  Education level 
employment 
status 
UKSCOT1   32 Female P1 survey Post-secondary  unemployed 
UKSCOT1   41 Female P2 survey Tertiary education Ȃ advanced level  employed 
UKSCOT1   26 Male P3 snowball Tertiary education Ȃ advanced level  studying 
UKSCOT1   26 Female P4 snowball Tertiary education Ȃ advanced level  employed 
UKSCOT1   25 Female P5 snowball Tertiary education Ȃ advanced level  employed 
UKSCOT1   19 Male P6 survey Upper secondary  studying 
UKSCOT2   57 Male P1 survey Tertiary education Ȃ advanced level  retired 
UKSCOT2   65 Male P2 survey Post-secondary  retired 
UKSCOT2   62 Female P3 survey Upper secondary  retired 
UKSCOT2   65 Male P4 survey Tertiary education Ȃ advanced level  retired 
UKSCOT3   40 Male P1 survey Tertiary education Ȃ first level employed 
UKSCOT3   42 Male P2 survey Tertiary education Ȃ advanced level  employed 
UKSCOT3   24 Female P3 snowball Tertiary education Ȃ advanced level  employed 
UKSCOT3   38 Male P4 snowball college, university or other degree employed 
UKSCOT3   26 Female P5 snowball college, university or other degree employed 
 
Annex 2: List of interviewees 
 
Interview  Date Type of organisation Role 
1 22.06 Trade union General Secretary 
2 22.06 Local state institution Corporate Policy Manager 
3 23.06 Local state institution Team Manager European Policy and 
Programmes 
4 26.06 Local state institution Director of Development and 
Infrastructure 
5 29.06 Local state institution EU Liaison Officer, Development and 
Infrastructure 
6 05.07 Interest group, NGO, civil 
society organisation 
Director of public affairs 
7 07.07 Local state authority 
association or federation 
Economic development manager 
8 07.07 Local state institution Business Development Team Leader 
9 14.07 Local state institution Head of business support team 
10 14.07 Local state institution Manager in economic development 
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11 14.07 Local state institution Manager in economic development 
12 19.07 Local state authority 
association or federation 
Head of a local state authority association  
13 24.07 Regional state institution Head of Policy 
14 25.07 Local state institution Funding and Development Team Leader 
15 01.08 Local state institution Chief Executive 
16 04.08 Regional state institution Funding and Information Officer 
17 21.12 Regional state institution European Structural Funds & State Aid 
18 15.01.18 Regional state institution European Structural Funds & State Aid 
 
Annex 3: Operational Programmes for Scotland 2014 -2020   
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ERDF: 
Dimension 
of EU2020 
strategy 
Relevant TO  Key challenges  Key objectives ESIF response: IPs and Specific Objectives 
Smart 
growth 
TO 1: 
strengthening 
research, 
technological 
development and 
innovation 
- weak Business Expenditure on 
Research and Development 
(BERD)  
- Scotland as an innovation 
follower rather than innovation 
leader 
- low proportion of innovative 
firms  
- Costs of innovation as main 
barriers to undertaking 
innovative activity    
- encourage business-to-academia linkages, 
commercialisation of research produced by 
ǯ
encourage business investment in innovation 
- increase business demand for RTD&I support and 
investment, particularly in SMEs with growth 
potential and in key sectors 
IP: 
1b: Promoting business investment in R&I, developing links 
and synergies between enterprises, research and 
development centres ǡǥ 
Specific Objective: 
Increase business commercialisation and investment in 
RTDI, particularly in accordance with Smart Specialisation; 
close gap between BERD and HERD 
TO2: Enhancing 
access to and use 
and quality of 
ICT15 
- significant part without 
adequate broadband coverage 
and quality; poor fixed NGA 
infrastructure, particularly in 
rural and remote areas; a high 
  Ǯ ǯ  
digital coverage 
- limited exploitation of digital 
connectivity to realise economic 
potential. 
- enable individuals and businesses throughout 
Scotland to access digital services and business 
opportunities 
IP: 
2a: Extending broadband deployment and the roll-out of 
high-speed networks and supporting the adoption of 
emerging technologies and networks for the digital 
economy 
 
TO3: Enhancing 
the 
competitiveness 
of SMEs 
- Historically low business stock 
and business birth rate  
- Domination of micro and small 
businesses (SME make up 99% 
of business base) 
- Weak growth ambitions of 
SMEs 
- Lack of available business 
finance 
- small proportion of SMEs-
exporters 
 
- support SMEs to grow and create increasing 
employment  
- increase growth and export readiness and 
ambition of SMEs  
- support diversification of the economic base and 
employment growth in fragile areas. 
IP: 
3d: Supporting the capacity of SMEs to grow in regional, 
national and international markets, and to engage in 
innovation processes 
Specific Objective:  
Increase and support ambition of SMEs to grow and 
increase employment, particularly in accordance with Smart 
Specialisation sectors and regionally important sectors in 
fragile areas 
                                                                    
15 Broadband support eventually only available in the Highlands and Islands, and only where there is no other intervention. ERDF delivery of broadband depends on an area not being included in the scope of the 
domestic delivery contract. 
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Sustainable 
growth 
TO4: Supporting 
the shift towards 
a low-carbon 
economy in all 
sectors 
- wider environmental concerns 
related to climate change, 
resource depletion and 
environmental quality 
- transport as one of the main 
CO2 and particle emitters  
- challenge of reconciling 
environmental concerns and 
growth opportunities 
- challenge of capitalising on the 
low carbon economy as a strong 
potential area of growth and 
employment 
Achieve economic progress while reducing 
harmful carbon emissions: 
- lower the emissions and the carbon impact 
(outputs) of a range of activity, particularly taking 
advantage of the existing strengths in the energy 
sector (capitalising on the  growing renewables 
sector) 
- lower the level of resources (inputs) required to 
produce goods and services, and thus lowering the 
impact on the environment; reduce reliance on 
fossil fuels 
- explore the significant growth opportunities in 
offshore wind, wave and tidal technologies 
- address modal shift in transport usage 
IP: 
4e: Promoting low-carbon strategies for all types of 
territories, in particular for urban areas, including the 
promotion of sustainable multimodal urban mobility and 
mitigation-relevant adaptation measures 
Specific Objective:  
Remove (perceived) obstacles to short urban journeys being 
undertaken by public or active transport 
IP: 
4f: Promoting research and innovation in, and adoption of, 
low-carbon technologies 
Specific Objective:  
Scotland as a natural place to invest in low carbon sectors 
and supply chains, with well-developed project pipelines 
and investor support  
Develop low carbon communities to increase sustainability 
and reduce reliance of remote communities on fossil fuels 
TO6: Protecting 
the environment 
and promoting 
resource 
efficiency 
- relatively embryonic market for 
recycled materials  
- reluctance of SMEs to reduce 
their environmental impact 
- urban areas facing multiple 
social, economic and 
environmental challenges 
 
- build resource efficiency in all industrial and 
commercial sectors 
- unlock the social and economic potential of the 
urban environment through investment in green 
infrastructure and ensuring access to green spaces 
- helping SMEs become more resource efficient to 
lower their environmental impact, waste less 
resources and reduce the cost of production 
- exploit potential for growth in circular economies 
IP: 
- 6d: Protecting and restoring biodiversity and soil and 
promoting ecosystem services, including through Natura 
2000, and green infrastructure 
- 6g: Supporting industrial transition towards a resource-
efficient economy, promoting green growth, eco-innovation 
and environmental performance management in the public 
and private sectors 
Specific Objective:  
- Businesses and products which are designed to be 
environmentally friendly and resource efficient (particularly 
SMEs and SME clusters)  
- Growth in private-sector re-processing and 
remanufacturing industries through the reuse of waste 
products. 
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ESF: 
Dimensio
n of 
EU2020 
strategy 
Relevant TO and IPs Key challenges identified Key objectives Response: ESF  
Inclusive 
growth 
TO8: Promoting 
sustainable and 
quality employment 
and supporting 
labour mobility 
- unemployment and inactivity risen 
over the course of the economic crisis, 
particularly long-term unemployment 
- high levels of part-time employment, 
increasing numbers of underemployed  
- significant levels of youth 
unemployment 
 
- provide direct routes to sustainable 
employment for unemployed and inactive with 
multiple barriers 
- increase the skills and labour market 
opportunities of employed with multiple barriers 
- decrease the number of young unemployed 
people; reduce the number of young people not 
in employment, education or training 
IP: 
8i: Access to employment for job seekers and 
inactive people, including the long term unemployed 
and people far from the labour market, also through 
local employment initiatives and support for labour 
mobility 
8ii: Sustainable integration into the labour market of 
young people, in particular those not in 
ǡǥ 
TO9: Promoting 
social inclusion, 
combating poverty 
and any 
discrimination 
- presence of concentrated pockets of 
deprivation in both urban and rural 
settings 
- an increasing number of people at risk 
of poverty or social exclusion 
- increase the financial capacity of the most 
disadvantaged individuals and households 
- enable disadvantaged communities to develop 
long-term solutions to increase active inclusion 
and reduce poverty 
- increase the sustainability and capacity of the 
social economy to deliver support to the most 
disadvantaged areas / groups 
- support and encourage social innovation ideas 
and solutions 
IP: 
9i: Active inclusion, including with a view to 
promoting equal opportunities and active 
participation, and improving employability 
9v: Promoting social entrepreneurship and 
vocational integration in social enterprises and the 
social and solidarity economy in order to facilitate 
access to employment 
TO10: Investing in 
education, training 
and vocational 
training for skills and 
lifelong learning 
- Structural skills gap between high and 
low skills; lower skills and low 
achievement strongly correlated with 
lower pay, greater levels of deprivation 
- changing skills demands for future 
industries, particularly decreasing 
demand for low skills base 
- lack of vocational and technical 
learning options contributing both to 
early school leaver rates and skills 
shortages 
- 13% of the population leaving formal 
education with no qualifications 
- support key growth sectors by promoting 
relevant graduate-, post-graduate level and 
vocational skills  
- increase the number of employers who offer 
vocational placements and opportunities 
IP: 
10iv: Improving the labour market relevance of 
education and training systems, facilitating the 
transition from education to work, and 
strengthening vocational education and training 
systems and their quality, including through 
mechanisms for skills anticipation, adaptation of 
curricula and the establishment and development of 
work based learning systems, including dual learning 
systems and apprenticeship schemes 
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Annex 4: Operational Programmes for Scotland 2014 -20: targets and 
expected results  
 
Main Results Expected (PA): 
Thematic Objective  Main Results Expected (ERDF and ESF) 
(1) Strengthening research, 
technological development and 
innovation  
x Increase in the number of innovative enterprises as a % of all businesses 
in Scotland (ERDF)  
x Additional leverage BERD (Business Expenditure on Research & 
Development) (ERDF)   
(2) Enhancing access to, and use 
and quality of, ICT  
x Additional business and personal take up of high speed broadband of at 
least 30 mbps in previously low-speed or unserved areas (ERDF)  
x Improve business efficiency and competiveness though extending 
broadband access to at least 30mpbs (ERDF)  
(3) Enhancing the competitiveness 
of small and medium-sized 
enterprises 
x Increase in the number of SMEs exporting (ERDF)  
x Increase in turnover in Scottish SMEs (ERDF)  
x Increase employment opportunities in Scottish SMEs (ERDF)  
(4) Supporting the shift towards a 
low-carbon economy in all sectors  
x Reduction in average GHG emissions (ERDF)  
x Increase in the number of low carbon products, services and processes 
(ERDF)  
(6) Environment / resource 
efficiency  
x Increase in savings from resource efficiency measures in supported 
enterprises (ERDF)  
x Decrease in average GHG emissions (ERDF)  
(8) Promoting sustainable and 
quality employment and 
supporting labour mobility 
x Increased number in employment, education or training (ESF)  
x Increase in the level of skills attained for supported participants (ESF)  
x For YEI: Decrease in unemployment or inactivity especially amongst 16-
24 year olds (ESF, YEI)  
(9) Promoting social inclusion, 
combating poverty and any 
discrimination 
x Decrease in the number of people affected by poverty, social exclusion 
and disadvantage (ESF)  
x Increase in employment opportunities in community enterprises (ESF)  
(10) Investing in education, 
training and vocational training for 
skills and lifelong learning  
x Participants in employment, including self-employment, 6 months after 
leaving (ESF)  
x Participants with ISCED 3A and above skills attainment (ESF)  
x Number of employers in providing work-based vocational opportunities 
in key growth sectors (ESF)  
ESIF targets: 
Title Fund TO short Indicator   Target value  Measurement 
unit 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Research & 
Innovation 
Research, Innovation: Number of 
enterprises cooperating with research 
institutions  
                                   
1,200.0  
Enterprises 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Research & 
Innovation 
Research, Innovation: Number of 
enterprises supported to introduce new to 
the market products 
                                   
225.0  
Enterprises 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Research & 
Innovation 
Research, Innovation: Number of 
enterprises supported to introduce new to 
the firm products 
                                   
1,050.0  
Enterprises 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF ICT  ICT Infrastructure: Additional households 
with broadband access of at least 30 Mbps 
                                   
11,833.0  
Households 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Competitiveness 
of SMEs 
All firms receiving support                                    
11,600.0  
Enterprises 
ERDF ERDF Competitiveness Firms receiving grants                                     Enterprises 
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Scotland of SMEs 3,250.0  
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Competitiveness 
of SMEs 
Firms receiving financial instrument 
support (non-grants) 
                                   
515.0  
Enterprises 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Competitiveness 
of SMEs 
Firms receiving non-financial support 
(advice) 
                                   
11,350.0  
Enterprises 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Competitiveness 
of SMEs 
Start-ups supported                                    
950.0  
Enterprises 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Competitiveness 
of SMEs 
Private investment matching public support 
to enterprises (Financial Instruments) 
                            
123,600,000.0  
EUR 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Competitiveness 
of SMEs 
Direct employment increase in supported 
enterprises 
                                   
9,400.0  
Full time 
equivalents 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Low-Carbon 
Economy 
GHG reduction: Estimated annual decrease 
of greenhouse gas emissions 
                                   
224,001.0  
Tonnes of 
CO2eq 
ERDF 
Scotland 
ERDF Environment 
Protection & 
Resource 
Efficiency 
GHG reduction: Estimated annual decrease 
of greenhouse gas emissions 
                                   
22,718.0  
Tonnes of 
CO2eq 
ESF 
Scotland 
ESF Social Inclusion Supported micro/small/medium-sized 
enterprises including cooperatives, social 
economy (share of ESF finances - all TO - 
dedicated to this target:  5%) 
                                   
464.0  
Number 
  
Annex 5: Media framing of Cohesion policy in the UK 
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Source: Triga and Vadratsikas (2018) 
 
 
 
